All Virtue Benevolent. IF we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable any-where, and inquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv'd, we shall find that in the Opinion of the Person who approves them, they always appear as Benevolent, or flowing from Good-will to others, and a Study of their Happiness, whether the Approver be one of the Persons belov'd, or profited, or not; so that all those kind Affections which incline us to make others happy, and all Actions suppos'd to flow from such Affections, appear morally good, if, while they are benevolent toward some Persons, they be not pernicious to others. Nor shall we find any thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no Benevolence imagin'd; nor in any Disposition, or Capacity, which is not suppos'd applicable to, and design'd for, benevolent Purposes. Nay, as was before observ'd[1], the Actions which in Fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of moral Beauty, if we know they proceeded from no kind Intentions towards others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of promoting publick Good, shall appear as amiable as the most successful, if it flow'd from as strong Benevolence.
Religion. Hence those Affections which would lead us to do Good to our Benefactor, shall appear amiable, and the contrary Affections odious, even when our Actions cannot possibly be of any Advantage or Hurt to him. Thus a sincere Love and Gratitude toward our Benefactor, a chearful Readiness to do whatever he shall require, how burdensom soever, a hearty Inclination to comply with his Intentions, and Contentment with the State he has plac'd us in, are the strongest Evidences of Benevolence we can shew to such a Person; and therefore they must appear exceedingly amiable. And under these is included all the rational Devotion, or Religion toward a Deity apprehended as good, which we can possibly perform.
Gratitude. We may here transiently observe one Circumstance in the Frame of our Nature, which is wonderfully adapted to promote Benevolence, viz. that as a Benefit conferr'd necessarily raises Gratitude in the Person who receives it, so the Expressions of this Gratitude, even from the meanest of Mankind, are wonderfully delightful to the Benefactor. Never were there any Mortals so poor, so inconsiderable, whose grateful Praise would not be some way delightful; and by whom we would not rather chuse to be belov'd than hated, if their Love no way evidenc'd us to be Partners in their Vices, or concern'd in their Meanness. And thus the most abject Person oblig'd is capable, and inclin'd to make no small Addition to our Happiness by his Love and Gratitude, when he is utterly incapable of any other Return, and when we expect none from him: Thus,
——— A grateful Mind
By owing owes not, and still pays, at once
Indebted and discharg'd ——[2]
As to external Performances of Religion, they are no doubt very various in different Nations and Ages; and Education may give Men Opinions, that certain Actions are pleasing, and others displeasing to the Deity: but then where-ever any external Rite of Worship is approv'd, there also it is look'd upon to proceed from Love toward the Deity, or some other Affection necessarily join'd with Love, as Reverence, Repentance, or Sorrow to have offended. So that the general Principle of Love is the Foundation of all the apparent moral Excellence, even in the most fantastick Rites of Worship which were ever approv'd. For as to Rites design'd only to appease a furious Being, no Mortal, I fansy, apprehends there is any Virtue, or Excellence in them; but that they are chosen only as the dishonourable Means of avoiding a greater Evil. Now as there are various speculative Opinions about what is acceptable to the Deity, it necessarily follows, That, accordingly, Practices, and Approbation, must be various; tho' all the moral Goodness of Actions is still presum'd to flow from Love.
Social Virtues. Again, that we may see how Benevolence is the Foundation of all apprehended Excellence in social Virtues, let us only observe, That amidst the Diversity of Sentiments on this Head among various Sects, this is still allow'd to be the way of deciding the Controversy about any disputed Practice, viz. to inquire whether this Conduct, or the contrary, will most effectually promote the publick Good. The Morality is immediately adjusted, when the natural Tendency, or Influence of the Action upon the universal natural Good of Mankind, is agreed upon. That which produces more Good than Evil in the Whole, is acknowledg'd good; and what does not, is counted evil. In this Case, we no other way regard the good of the Actor, or that of those who are thus inquiring, than as they make a Part of the great System.
In our late Debates about Passive Obedience, and the Right of Resistance in Defence of Privileges, the Point disputed among Men of Sense was, Whether universal Submission would probably be attended with greater natural Evils, than temporary Insurrections, when Privileges are invaded? and not, Whether what tended in the Whole to the publick natural Good, was also morally good?
And if a divine Command was alledg'd in favour of the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, this would, no doubt, by its eternal Sanctions cast the ballance of natural Good to its own side, and determine our Election from Interest; and yet our Sense of the moral Good in Passive Obedience, would still be founded upon some Species of Benevolence, such as Gratitude toward the Deity, and Submission to his Will to whom we are so much oblig'd. But I fansy those, who believe the Deity to be good, would not rashly alledge such a Command, unless they also asserted, that the thing commanded did tend more to the universal Good, than the contrary, either by preventing the external Evils of Civil War, or by enuring Men to Patience, or some other Quality which they apprehended necessary to their everlasting Happiness. And were it not so, Passive Obedience might be recommended as an inglorious Method of escaping a greater Mischief, but could never have any thing morally amiable in it.
But let us quit the Disputes of the Learned, on whom, it may be alledg'd, Custom and Education have a powerful Influence; and consider upon what Grounds, in common Life, Actions are approv'd or condemn'd, vindicated or excus'd. We are universally asham'd to say an Action is just, because it tends to my Advantage, or to the Advantage of the Actor: And we as seldom condemn a beneficent kind Action, because it is not advantageous to us, or to the Actor. Blame and Censure are founded on a Tendency to publick Evil, or a Principle of private Malice in the Agent, or Neglect at least of the Good of others; on Inhumanity of Temper, or at least such strong Selfishness as makes the Agent careless of the Sufferings of others: and thus we blame and censure when the Action no way affects ourselves. All the moving and persuasive Vindications of Actions, which may, from some partial evil Tendency, appear evil, are taken from this, that they were necessary to some greater Good, which counterbalanc'd the Evil: Severity toward a few, is Compassion toward multitudes.—Transitory Punishments are necessary for avoiding more durable Evils.—Did not some suffer on such Occasions, there would be no living for honest Men
,—and such like. And even when an Action cannot be intirely justify'd, yet how greatly is the Guilt extenuated, if we can alledge; That it was only the Effect of Inadvertence without Malice, or of partial good Nature, Friendship, Compassion, natural Affection, or Love of a Party?
All these Considerations shew, what is the universal Foundation of our Sense of moral Good, or Evil, viz. Benevolence toward others on one hand, and Malice, or even Indolence, and Unconcernedness about the apparent publick Evil on the other. And let it be here observ'd, that we are so far from imagining all Men to act only from Self-Love, that we universally expect in others a Regard for the Publick; and do not look upon the Want of this, as barely the Absence of moral Good, or Virtue, but even as positively evil and hateful.
Moral Evil not always Malice. Contrarys may illustrate each other; let us therefore observe the general Foundation of our Sense of moral Evil more particularly. Disinterested Malice, or ultimate Desire of the Misery of others, is the highest pitch of what we count vitious; and every Action appears evil, which is imagin'd to flow from any degree of this Affection. Perhaps a violent Passion may hurry Men into it for a few Moments, and our rash angry Sentiments of our Enemys, may represent them as having such odious Dispositions; but it is very probable, from the Reasons offer'd above[3], that there is no such degree of Wickedness in human Nature, as in cold blood, to desire the Misery of others, when it is conceiv'd no way useful to our Interests.
The frequent, and seemingly unprovoked Cruelties of the Nero's and Domitian's, are often alledged in Opposition to all this; but perhaps unjustly. Such Tyrants are conscious that they are hated by all those whom the World repute virtuous, and they apprehend Danger from them: A Tyrant looks upon such Men as designing, artful, or ambitious, under a false Shew of Virtue. He imagines the surest Means of his own Safety is to appear terrible, and to deprive his Enemys of all Hopes of escaping by his Compassion. The Fame of Virtue in eminent Subjects is matter of Envy, and is a Reproach upon the Tyrant: It weakens his Power, and makes them dangerous to him. Power becomes the Object of Delight to the Tyrant; and in Ostentation of it, he may break through all Regards to Justice and Humanity. Habits of Cruelty can be acquired in such a Course. Any of these apparent Interests seem better to account for the Crueltys of Tyrants, than the supposing in them a Principle of calm Malice without Interest, of which the rest of Mankind seem intirely incapable.
Temper of a Tyrant. The Temper of a Tyrant seems a continu'd state of Anger, Hatred, and Fear. To form our Judgment then of his Motives of Action, and those of Men of like Tempers in lower Stations, let us reflect upon the Apprehensions we form of Mankind, when we are under any of those Passions which to the Tyrant are habitual. When we are under the fresh Impressions of an Injury, we find, that our Minds are wholly fill'd with Apprehensions of the Person who injur'd us, as if he were absolutely evil, and delighted in doing Mischief: We overlook the Virtues, which, when calm, we could have observ'd in him: we forget that perhaps he acted from Self-Love, and not Malice, or, it may be, some generous or kind Intention toward others. These, probably, are the Opinions which a Tyrant constantly forms concerning Mankind; and having very much weaken'd all kind Affections in himself, however he may pretend to them, he judges of the Tempers of others by his own. And were Men really such as he apprehends them, his Treatment of them would not be very unreasonable. We shall generally find our Passions arising suitably to the Apprehensions we form of others: if they are rashly form'd upon some sudden slight Views, it is no wonder if we find Dispositions following upon them, very little suited to the real State of human Nature.
Ordinary Springs of Vice. The ordinary Springs of Vice then among Men, must be a mistaken Self-Love, made so violent, as to overcome Benevolence; or such strong Appetites, or Passions either selfish, or toward some narrow Systems, as overcome our Regard to Publick Good; or Affections arising from false, and rashly form'd Opinions of Mankind; which we run into thro' the weakness of our Benevolence. When Men, who had good Opinions of each other, happen to have contrary Interests, they are apt to have their good Opinions of each other abated, by imagining a design'd Opposition from Malice; without this, they can scarcely hate one another. Thus two Candidates for the same Office wish each other dead, because that is an ordinary way by which Men make room for each other; but if there remains any Reflection on each other's Virtue, as there sometimes may in benevolent Tempers, then their Opposition may be without Hatred; and if another better Post, where there is no Competition, were bestow'd on one of them, the other shall rejoice at it.
Self-Love indifferent. Actions which flow solely from Self-Love, and yet evidence no Want of Benevolence, having no hurtful Effects upon others, seem of a middle Nature, neither virtuous nor vitious, and neither raise the Love or Hatred of the Observer. Our Reason can indeed discover certain Bounds, within which we may not only act from Self-Love, consistently with the Good of the Whole, but every Mortal's acting thus within these Bounds for his own Good, is absolutely necessary for the Good of the Whole; and the Want of such Self-Love would be universally pernicious. Hence, he who pursues his own private Good, with an Intention also to concur with that Constitution which tends to the Good of the Whole; and much more he who promotes his own Good, with a direct View of making himself more capable of serving God, or doing good to Mankind; acts not only innocently, but also honourably, and virtuously: for in both these Cases, Benevolence concurs with Self-Love to excite him to the Action. And thus a Neglect of our own Good may be morally evil, and argue a Want of Benevolence toward the Whole. But when Self-Love breaks over the Bounds above-mention'd, and leads us into Actions detrimental to others, and to the Whole; or makes us insensible of the generous kind Affections; then it appears vitious, and is disapprov'd. So also, when upon any small Injurys, or sudden Resentment, or any weak superstitious Suggestions, our Benevolence becomes so faint, as to let us entertain odious Conceptions of Men, or any Part of them, without just Ground, as if they were wholly evil, or malicious, or as if they were a worse Sort of Beings than they really are; these Conceptions must lead us into malevolent Affections, or at least weaken our good ones, and make us really vitious.
Benevolence of different Kinds. Benevolence is a Word fit enough in general, to denote the internal Spring of Virtue, as Bishop Cumberland always uses it. But to understand this more distinctly, 'tis highly necessary to observe, that under this Name are included very different Dispositions of the Soul. Sometimes it denotes a calm, extensive Affection, or Good-will toward all Beings capable of Happiness or Misery: Sometimes, 2. A calm deliberate Affection of the Soul toward the Happiness of certain smaller Systems or Individuals; such as Patriotism, or Love of a Country, Friendship, Parental Affection, as it is in Persons of Wisdom and Self-Government: Or, 3. The several kind particular Passions of Love, Pity, Sympathy, Congratulation. This Distinction between the calm Motions of the Will, Affections, Dispositions, or Instincts of the Soul, and the several turbulent Passions, is elsewhere more fully considered[4].
Now tho' all these different Dispositions come under the general Character of Benevolent, yet as they are in Nature different, so they have very different Degrees of Moral Beauty. The first Sort is above all amiable and excellent: 'Tis perhaps the sole Moral Perfection of some superior Natures; and the more this prevails and rules in any human Mind, the more amiable the Person appears, even when it not only checks and limits our lower Appetites, but when it controuls our kind particular Passions, or counteracts them. The second Sort of Benevolence is more amiable than the third, when it is sufficiently strong to influence our Conduct: And the third Sort, tho' of a lesser Moral Dignity, is also beautiful, when it is no way opposite to these more noble Principles. And when it is opposite, tho' it does not justify such Actions as are really detrimental to greater Systems, yet it is a strong extenuating Circumstance, and much alleviates the Moral Deformity. We are all sensible of this, when any Person from Friendship, Parental-Affection, or Pity, has done something hurtful to larger Societies.
Self-Love not excluded by Benevolence. Here we must also observe, that every moral Agent justly considers himself as a Part of this rational System, which may be useful to the Whole; so that he may be, in part, an Object of his own universal Benevolence. Nay further, as was hinted above, he may see, that the Preservation of the System requires every one to be innocently sollicitous about himself. Hence he may conclude, that an Action which brings greater Evil to the Agent, than Good to others, however it may evidence the Strength of some particular kind Attachment, or of a virtuous Disposition in the Agent, yet it must be founded upon a mistaken Opinion of its Tendency to publick Good: so that a Man who reason'd justly, and consider'd the whole, would not be led into it, by the calm extensive Benevolence, how strong soever it were; nor would he recommend it to the Practice of others; however he might acknowledge, that the Detriment arising to the Agent from a kind Action, did evidence a strong virtuous Disposition. Nay farther, if any Good was propos'd to the Pursuit of an Agent, and he had a Competitor in every respect only equal to himself; the highest universal Benevolence possible would not lead a wise Man to prefer another to himself, were there no Ties of Gratitude, or some other external Circumstance to move him to yield to his Competitor. A Man surely of the strongest Benevolence, may just treat himself as he would do a third Person, who was a Competitor of equal Merit with the other; and as his preferring one to another, in such a Case, would argue no Weakness of Benevolence; so no more would he evidence it by preferring himself to a Man of only equal Abilitys.
Where-ever a Regard to myself tends as much to the good of the Whole, as Regard to another; or where the Evil to myself, is equal to the Good obtain'd for another; tho' by acting, in such Cases, for the Good of another, I really shew a very amiable Disposition; yet by acting in the contrary manner, from Regard to myself, I evidence no evil Disposition, nor any want of the most extensive Benevolence; since the Moment of Good to the Whole is, in both Cases, exactly equal. And let it be here observ'd, that this does not supersede the Necessity of Liberality, or gratuitous Gifts, altho' in such Actions the Giver loses what the other receives; since the Moment of Good to any Person, in any given Case, is in a compound Proportion of the Quantity of the Good it self, and the Indigence of the Person. Hence it appears, that a Gift may make a much greater Addition to the Happiness of the Receiver, than the Diminution it occasions in the Happiness of the Giver: And that the most useful and important Gifts are those from the Wealthy to the Indigent. Yet Gifts from Equals are not useless, since they often increase the Happiness of both, as they are strong Evidences of mutual Love: but Gifts from the Poor to the Wealthy are really foolish, unless they be only little Expressions of Gratitude, which are also fruitful of Joy on both Sides: for these Expressions of Gratitude are really delightful and acceptable to the Wealthy, if they have any Humanity; and their Acceptance of them is matter of Joy to the poor Giver.
In like manner, when an Action does more Harm to the Agent, than Good to the Publick; the doing it evidences an amiable and truly virtuous Disposition in the Agent, tho 'tis plain he acts upon a mistaken View of his Duty. But if the private Evil to the Agent be so great, as to make him incapable, at another time, of promoting a publick Good of greater moment than what is attain'd by this Action; the Action may really be evil, so far as it evidences a prior Neglect of a greater attainable publick Good for a smaller one; tho' at present this Action also flows from a virtuous Disposition.
Benevolence, how affected by the Qualitys of its Object. The moral Beauty, or Deformity of Actions, is not alter'd by the moral Qualitys of the Objects any farther than the Qualitys of the Objects increase or diminish the Benevolence of the Action, or the publick Good intended by it. Thus Benevolence toward the worst Characters, or the Study of their Good, may be as amiable as any whatsoever; yea, often more so than that toward the Good, since it argues such a strong Degree of Benevolence as can surmount the greatest Obstacle, the moral Evil in the Object. Hence the Love of unjust Enemys, is counted among the highest Virtues. Yet, when our Benevolence to the Evil encourages them in their bad Intentions, or makes them more capable of Mischief; this diminishes or destroys the Beauty of the Action, or even makes it evil, as it betrays a Neglect of the Good of others more valuable; Beneficence toward whom, would have tended more to the publick Good, than that toward our Favourites: But Benevolence toward evil Characters, which neither encourages nor enables them to do Mischief, nor diverts our Benevolence from Persons more useful, has as much moral Beauty as any whatsoever.
Qualitys determining our Election. In comparing the moral Qualitys of Actions, in order to regulate our Election among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Virtue to judge thus; that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the Dignity or moral Importance of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio of the Quantity of Good, and Number of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the moral Evil, or Vice, is as the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; so that That Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.
Consequences, how they affect the Morality of Actions. Again, when the Consequences of Actions are of a mix'd Nature, partly advantageous, and partly pernicious; that Action is good, whose good Effects preponderate the evil by being useful to many, and pernicious to few; and that evil, which is otherwise. Here also the moral Importance of Characters, or Dignity of Persons may compensate Numbers; as may also the Degrees of Happiness or Misery: for to procure an inconsiderable Good to many, but an immense Evil to few, may be evil; and an immense Good to few, may preponderate a small Evil to many.
But the Consequences which affect the Morality of Actions, are not only the direct and natural Effects of the Actions themselves; but also all those Events which otherwise would not have happen'd. For many Actions which have no immediate or natural evil Effects, nay, which actually produce good Effects, may be evil; if a man foresees, that the evil Consequences, which will probably flow from the Folly of others, upon his doing of such Actions, are so great as to overbalance all the Good produc'd by those Actions, or all the Evils which would flow from the Omission of them: And in such Cases the Probability is to be computed on both sides. Thus if an Action of mine will probably, thro' the Mistakes or Corruption of others, be made a Precedent in unlike Cases, to very evil Actions; or when my Action, tho' good in itself, will probably provoke Men to very evil Actions, upon some mistaken Notion of their Right; any of these Considerations foreseen by me, may make such an Action of mine evil, whenever the Evils which will probably be occasion'd by the Action, are greater than the Evils occasion'd by the Omission.
And this is the Reason, that many Laws prohibit Actions in general, even when some particular Instances of those Actions would be very useful; because an universal Allowance of them, considering the Mistakes Men would probably fall into, would be more pernicious than an universal Prohibition; nor could there be any more special Boundarys fix'd between the right and wrong Cases. In such Cases, it is the Duty of Persons to comply with the generally useful Constitution; or if in some very important Instances, the Violation of the Law would be of less evil Consequence, than Obedience to it, they must patiently resolve to undergo those Penalties, which the State has, for valuable Ends to the Whole, appointed: and this Disobedience will have nothing criminal in it.
'Tis here to be observed, that tho' every kind Affection abstractly considered, is approved by our moral Sense, yet all sorts of Affections or Passions which pursue the Good of others are not equally approved, or do not seem in the same degree virtuous. Our calm Affections, either private or publick, are plainly distinct from our particular Passions; calm Self-Love quite distinct from Hunger, Thirst, Ambition, Lust, or Anger; so calm Good-will toward others is different from Pity, passionate Love, the Parental Affection, or the Passion of particular Friends. Now every kind Passion, which is not pernicious to othres, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: And yet a calm Good-will toward the same Persons appears more lovely. So calm Good-will toward a small System is lovely and preferable to more passionate Attachments; and yet a more extensive calm Benevolence is still more beautiful and virtuous; and the highest Perfection of Virtue is an universal calm Good-will toward all sensitive Natures. Hence it is, that we condemn particular Attachments, when inconsistent with the Interest of great Societies, because they argue some Defect in that more noble Principle, which is the Perfection of Virtue[5].
Partial Benevolence, how virtuous. From these Observations, we may see what Actions our moral Sense would most recommend to our Election, as the most perfectly Virtuous: viz. such as appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the greatest and most extensive Happiness of all the rational Agents, to whom our Influence can reach. All Beneficence, even toward a Part, is amiable, when not inconsistent with the Good of the Whole: But this is a smaller Degree of Virtue, unless our Beneficence be restrain'd by want of Power, and not want of Love to the Whole. All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of Beauty, even when the Good of the Whole requires a stricter Attachment to a Part, as in natural Affection, or virtuous Friendships; except when some Parts are so eminently useful to the Whole, that even universal Benevolence does determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. Thus universal Benevolence would incline us to a more strong Concern for the Interests of great and generous Characters in a high Station, or make us more earnestly study the Interests of any generous Society, whose whole Constitution was contriv'd to promote universal Good. Thus a good Fancy in Architecture would lead a Man, who was not able to bear the Expence of a completely regular Building, to chuse such a Degree of Ornament as he could keep uniformly thro' the Whole, and not move him to make a vain unfinish'd Attempt in one Part, of what he foresaw he could not succeed in as to the Whole. And he wouldcondemn a great Profusion of Ornament on one Part, above the Proportion of the Whole, unless that Part be some eminent Place of the Edifice, such as the chief Front, or publick Entrance; the adorning of which would beautify the Whole more than an equal Expence of Ornament on any other Part.
This Constitution of our Sense, whereby the moral Beauty of Actions, or Dispositions, increases according to the Number of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend; whence also Actions which flow from the nearer Attachments of Nature, such as that between the Sexes, and the Love of our Offspring, do not appear so virtuous as Actions of equal Moment of Good towards Persons less attach'd to us; has been chosen by the Author of Nature for this good Reason, That the more limited Instincts tend to produce a smaller Moment of Good, because confined to small Numbers. Whereas the more extensive calm Instinct of Good-will, attended with Power, would have no Bounds in its good Effects, and would never lead into any Evil, as the particular Passions may: and hence it is made more lovely to our Sense, that we might be induced to cultivate and strengthen it; and make it check even kind Passions, when they are opposite to the greater Good.
Moral Dispositions and Abilitys. From this primary Idea of moral Good in Actions, may arise a notion of moral Good in those Dispositions, whether natural or acquir'd, which enable us to do good to others; or which are presum'd to be design'd, and acquir'd or cultivated for that purpose; or are natural Indications of a good Temper, and usually accompany it. And hence those Abilitys, while nothing appears contrary to our Presumption, may increase our Approbation of the Possessor of them; but when they are imagin'd to be intended for publick Mischief, they make us hate him the more: Such are a penetrating Judgment, a tenacious Memory, a quick Invention; Patience of Labour, Pain, Hunger, Watching; a Contempt of Wealth, Rumour, Death. These may be rather call'd natural Abilitys, than moral Qualitys: And we seem to have a natural Relish for them distinct from moral Approbation. But if we plainly see them maliciously employ'd, they make the Agent more detestable.
How we compute the Morality of Actions in our Sense of them. To find a universal Rule to compute the Morality of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we judge of the Actions done by ourselves, or by others, we must observe the following Propositions or Axioms.
The moral Importance of any Agent, or the Quantity of publick Good he produces, is in a compound Proportion of his Benevolence and Abilitys. For 'tis plain that his good Offices depend upon these two jointly. In like manner, the Quantity of private Good which any Agent obtains for himself, is in a like compound Proportion of his selfish Principles, and his Abilitys. We speak here only of the external Goods of this World, which one pursues from some selfish Principles. For as to internal Goods of the Mind, these are most effectually obtain'd by the Exercise of other Affections than those called Selfish, even those which carry the Agent beyond himself toward the Good of others.
In comparing the Virtues of different Agents, when the Abilitys are equal, the Moments of publick Good are proportioned to the Goodness of the Temper, or the Benevolence; and when the Tempers are equal, the Quantitys of Good are as the Abilitys.
The Virtue then or Goodness of Temper is directly as the Moment of Good, when other Circumstances are equal, and inversly as the Abilitys. That is to say, where the Abilitys are greatest, there is less Virtue evidenced in any given Moment of Good produced.
But as the natural Consequences of our Actions are various, some good to ourselves, and evil to the Publick; and others evil to ourselves, and good to the Publick; or either useful both to ourselves and others, or pernicious to both; the intire Spring of good Actions is not always Benevolence alone; or of Evil, Malice alone (nay, sedate Malice is rarely found); but in most Actions we must look upon Self-Love as another Force, sometimes conspiring with Benevolence, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of private Interest, as well as publick Good; and sometimes opposing Benevolence, when the good Action is any way difficult or painful in the Performance, or detrimental in its Consequences to the Agent.
These selfish Motives shall be[6] hereafter more fully explain'd; here we may in general denote them by the Word Interest: which when it concurs with Benevolence, in any Action capable of Increase or Diminution, must produce a greater Quantity of Good, than Benevolence alone in the same Abilitys; and therefore when the Moment or Good, in an Action partly intended for the Good of the Agent, is but equal to the Moment of Good in the Action of another Agent, influenc'd only by Benevolence, the former is less virtuous; and in this Case the Interest must be deducted to find the true Effect of the Benevolence or Virtue. In the same manner, when Interest must be deducted to find the true Effect of the Benevolence, and yet is surmounted by it; this Interest must be added to the Moment, to increase the Virtue of the Action, or the Strength of the Benevolence. By Interest, in this last Case, is understood all the Advantage which the Agent might have obtain'd by omitting the Action, which is a negative Motive to it; and this, when subtracted, becomes positive.
Intention, and Foresight, affect Actions. But here we must observe, that no Advantage, not intended, altho' casually, or naturally, redounding to us from the Action, does at all affect its Morality to make it less amiable: nor does any Difficulty or Evil unforeseen, or not resolved upon, make a kind Action more virtuous; since in such Cases Self-Love neither assists nor opposes Benevolence. Nay, Self-Interest then only diminishes the Benevolence, when without this View of Interest the Action would not have been undertaken, or so much Good would not have been produc'd by the Agent; and it extenuates the Vice of an evil Action, only when without this Interest the Action would not have been done by the Agent, or so much Evil have been produc'd by him.
The fourth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each other's Hearts; for it may really happen in many Cases, that Men may have Benevolence sufficient to surmount any Difficulty, and yet they may meet with none at all: And in that Case, it is certain there is as much Virtue in the Agent, tho' he does not give such Proof of it to his Fellow-Creatures, as if he had surmounted Difficultys in his kind Actions. And this too must be the Case with the Deity, to whom nothing is difficult.
Perfect Virtue. Since then, in judging of the Goodness of Temper in any Agent, the Abilitys must come into Computation, as is above-mentioned, and none can act beyond their natural Abilitys; that must be the Perfection of Virtue, where the Moment of Good produced equals the Ability, or when the Being acts to the utmost of his Power for the publick Good; and hence the Perfection of Virtue, in this Case, is as Unity. And this may shew us the only Foundation for the boasting of the Stoicks, That a Creature suppos'd Innocent, by pursuing Virtue with his utmost Power, may in Virtue equal the Gods.
For in their Case, if the Ability be infinite, unlessthe Good to be produc'd in the whole, be so too, the Virtue is not absolutely perfect; and the Quotient can never surmount Unity.
Moral Evil, how computed. In the same Manner we may compute the Degree of Depravity of any Temper, directly as the Moment of Evil effected, and inversly as the Abilitys. The Springs of vicious Actions however are seldom any real ultimate Intention of Mischeif, and never ultimate deliberate Malice; but only sudden Anger, Self-Love, some selfish Passion or Appetite, some kind Attachment to Parties, or particular kind Passions.
The Motives of Interest may sometimes strongly cooperate with a depraved Temper, or may oppose it, in the same Manner that they cooperate with or oppose a good Temper. When they cooperate, they diminish the Moral Evil; when they oppose, they may argue the Depravity of Temper to be greater, which is able to surmount such Motives of Interest.
Intention, Foresight. But we must observe, that not only Innocence is expected from all Mortals, but they are presum'd, from their Nature, in some measure inclin'd to publick Good[7]; so that a bare Absence of this Desire is enough to make an Agent be reputed evil: Nor is a direct Intention of publick Evil necessary to make an Action evil; it is enough that it flows from Self-Love, with a plain Neglect of the Good of others, or an Insensibility of their Misery, which we either actually foresee, or have a probable Presumption of.
It is true indeed, that that publick Evil which I neither certainly foresee, nor have actual Presumptions of, as the Consequence of my Action, does not make my present Action criminal or odious; even altho' I might have foreseen this Evil by a serious Examination of my own Actions; because such Actions do not, at present, evidence either Malice, or want of Benevolence. But then it is also certain, that my prior Negligence, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the want of that Degree of good Affections which is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the Guilt properly lies in this Neglect, rather than in an Action which really flows from a good Intention. Human Laws however, which cannot examine the Intentions, or secret Knowledge of the Agent, must judge in gross of the Action itself; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain'd, which we are oblig'd to attain.
In like manner, no good Effect, which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action morally Good; however Human Laws or Governors, who cannot search into Mens Intentions, or know their secret Designs, justly reward Actions which tend to the publick Good, altho' the Agent was engag'd to those Actions only by selfish Views; and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him to them.
The Difference in Degree of Guilt between Crimes of Ignorance, when the Ignorance is vincible, and faulty, as to the natural Tendency of the Action; and Crimes of Malice, or direct evil Intention; consists in this, that the former, by a prior Neglect, argues a want of the due Degree of Benevolence, or right Affection; the latter evidences direct evil Affections, which are vastly more odious.
Morality distinct from Interest. From the former Reasonings we may form almost a demonstrative Conclusion, That we have a Sense of Goodness and moral Beauty in Actions, distinct from Advantage;
for had we no other Foundation of Approbation of Actions, but the Advantage which might arise to us from them, if they were done toward ourselves, we should make no Account of the Abilitys of the Agent, but would barely esteem them according to their Moment. The Abilitys come in only to shew the Degree of Benevolence, which supposes Benevolence necessarily amiable. Who was ever the better pleas'd with a barren rocky Farm, or an inconvenient House, by being told that the poor Farm gave as great Increase as it could; or that the House accommodated its Possessor as well as it could? And yet in our Sentiments of Actions, whose Moment is very inconsiderable, it shall wonderfully increase the Beauty to alledge, That it was all the poor Agent could do for the Publick, or his Friend.
Morality of Characters. The moral Beauty of Characters arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the publick Good, according to their Power. We form our Judgment of them according to what appears to be their fix'd Disposition, and not according to any particular Sallys of unkind Passions; altho' these abate the Beauty of good Characters, as the Motions of the kind Affections diminish the Deformity of the bad ones. What then properly constitutes a virtuous Character, is not some few accidental Motions of Compassion, natural Affection, or Gratitude; but such a fix'd Humanity, or Desire of the publick Good of all, to whom our Influence can extend, as uniformly excites us to all Acts of Beneficence, and makes us careful of informing ourselves right, concerning the truest Methods of serving their Interests. Every Motion indeed of the kind Affections appears in some degree amiable; but we denominate the Character from the prevailing Principle.
Instinct may be the spring of Virtue. Some will not allow that Virtue can spring from Passions, Instincts, or Affections of any Kind. 'Tis true, kind particular Passions are but a lower kind of Goodness, even when they are not opposite to the general Good. Those calmer Determinations of the Will, whether of greater of less Extent, or sedate strong Affections, or Desires of the Good of others, are more amiable. These may be as much rooted in the Frame of the Soul, or there may be as natural a Disposition to them as to particular Passions. They tell us, That Virtue should wholly spring from Reason;
as if Reason or Knowledge of any true Proposition could ever move to action where there is no End proposed, and no Affection or Desire toward that End[8]. For this see Treatise IV. Sect. i. and ii.
The ultimate End, according to many of our Moralists, is to each one his own Happiness; and yet this he seeks by Instinct. Now may not another Instinct toward the Publick, or the Good of others, be as proper a Principle of Virtue, as the Instinct toward private Happiness? This is certain, that whereas we behold the selfish Actions of others, with Indifference at best, we see something amiable in every Action which flows from kind Affections or Passions toward others; if they be conducted by Prudence, so as any way to attain their End, consistently with the general Good. If it be said, That Actions from Instinct are not the Effect of Prudence and Choice;
this Objection holds full as strongly against the Actions which flow from Self-Love; since the Use of our Reason is as requisite to find the proper Means of promoting publick Good, as private Good. And as it must be an Instinct, or a Determination previous to Reason, which makes us pursue private Good, as well as publick Good as our End; there is the same occasion for Prudence and Choice, in the Election of proper Means for promoting of either. I see no harm in supposing, That Men are naturally dispos'd to Virtue, and not left merely indifferent, until some Prospect of Interest allures them to it.
Surely, the Supposition of a benevolent universal Instinct, would recommend human Nature, and its Author, more to the Love of a good Man, and leave Room enough for the Exercise of our Reason, in contriving and settling Rights, Laws, Constitutions; in inventing Arts, and practising them so as to gratify, in the most effectual manner, that generous Inclination. And if we must bring in Self-Love to make Virtue rational, a little Reflection will discover, as shall appear hereafter, that this Benevolence is our greatest Happiness; and thence we may resolve to cultivate, as much as possible, this sweet Disposition, and to despise every opposite Interest. Not that we can be truly Virtuous, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which arises from Beneficence, without the Love of others: Nay, this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of disinterested Love to others, as the Spring of our Actions. But Self-Interest may be our Motive in studying to raise these kind Affections, and to continue in this agreeable State; tho' it cannot be the sole or principal Motive of any Action, which to our moral Sense appears virtuous[9].
Heroism in all stations. From the preceding Reasonings we shall only draw this one Inference, which seems the most joyful imaginable, even to the lowest Rank of Mankind, viz. That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the most heroick Virtue.
For how small soever the Moment of publick Good be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his Abilitys are proportionably small, the Virtue may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the Prince, the Statesman, the General, are capable of true Heroism, tho' these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus'd thro' various Nations and Ages: but when we find in an honest Trader, the kind Friend, the faithful prudent Adviser, the charitable and hospitable Neighbour, the tender Husband, and affectionate Parent, the sedate yet chearful Companion, the generous Assistant of Merit, the cautious Allayer of Contention and Debate, the Promoter of Love and good Understanding among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were all the good Offices which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge this Character really as amiable, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, That they are the only Heroes in Virtue.
See Sect. ii. Art. 3. Par. 1. Art. 9. Par. 2.
Par. Lost, B. iv. l. 55.
See Sect. ii. Art. 4.
See Treatise III. Sect. ii. Art. 3. and Treatise IV. Sect. vi. Art. 4.
See Essay on Passions, Sect. 2 Art. 3. And Illustrations, Sect. 6. Art. 4.
Vide Sect. v.
See Treatise IV. § 6.
These Gentlemen should either remember the common Doctrine of the Schools, or else confute it better; that the προαίρεσις which is necessary in virtuous Actions is όρεξις βουλευζιχη: And that Virtue needs not only the λογον αληθη, but the ορεξιν ορθήν. These many Authors who deny any Affections of Motions of the Will to be the proper Springs of sublime Virtue, yet, inconsistently with themselves, must allow in Men of sublime Virtue, and even in the Deity too, a settled Disposition of Will, or a constant Determination, or Desire to act in Conformity to Reason, or a fixed Affection toward a certain Manner of Conduct. Now an ill-natur'd Adversary would call this an Instinct, and Essential or Natural Disposition of Will, an Affectionate Determination toward a very sublime Object presented by the Understanding. See Aristotle's Magn. Moral. Lib. i. c. 18, 35. and Lib. ii. c. 7 & 8. and in many other Places.
'Tis thus we must understand many places of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others of the Antients, when they speak of a natural Instinct or Disposition in each Being, toward his own Preservation and highest Perfection, as the Spring of Virtue.
'Tis acknowledged by all, that we have such an Instinct, which must operate very indistinctly at first, till we come to consider our Constitution, and our several Powers. When we do so, we find, according to them, the natural Principles of Virtue, or the ϕυσικαὶ ἀϱεταὶ, implanted in us: They appear to us the noblest Parts of our Nature; such are our Desires of Knowledge, our Relish for Beauty, especially of the Moral Kind, our Sociable Affections. These upon Reflection we find to be natural Parts of our Constitution, and we desire to bring them to Perfection from the first-mentioned general Instinct. We must not thence conclude, that all our Affections spring from Self-Love, or are ultimately pursuing private Good. Disinterested Affections are presupposed as natural Parts of our Constitution, and found in it upon Reflection, not raised by an Act of Choice for some private Good, nor ultimately pursuing it. (See Cicer. De Finib. Lib. iii. & Lib. v.) This would be manifestly contrary to the most express Words of these great Men on Friendship, Patriotism, and other Subjects. See Aristotle in the Magn. Moral. & Nicom. on Friendship; and Cicero de Finib. Lib. ii. & Lib. v.