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SECT. II.

Concerning the immediate Motive to virtuous Actions.

Nature. THE Motives of human Actions, or their immediate Causes, would be best understood after considering the Passions and Affections; but here we shall only consider the Springs of the Actions which we call virtuous, as far as it is necessary to settle the general Foundation of the Moral Sense.

Affections, the Motives to Actions. Every Action, which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always suppos'd to flow from some Affection toward sensitive Natures; and whatever we call Virtue or Vice, is either some such Affection, or some Action consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action, or Omission, appear vitious, if it argues the Want of such Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted morally good. All the Actions counted religious in any Country, are suppos'd, by those who count them so, to flow from some Affections toward the Deity; and whatever we call social Virtue, we still suppose to flow from Affections toward our Fellow-Creatures: for in this all seem to agree, That external Motions, when accompany'd with no Affections toward God or Man, or evidencing no Want of the expected Affections toward either, can have no moral Good or Evil in them.

Ask, for instance, the most abstemious Hermit, if Temperance of itself would be morally good, supposing it shew'd no Obedience toward the Deity, made us no fitter for Devotion, or the Service of Mankind, or the Search after Truth, than Luxury; and he will easily grant, that it would be no moral Good, tho' still it might be naturally good or advantageous to Health: And mere Courage, or Contempt of Danger, if we conceive it to have no regard to the Defence of the Innocent, or repairing of Wrongs or Self-Interest, wou'd only entitle its Possessor to Bedlam. When such sort of Courage is sometimes admir'd, it is upon some secret Apprehension of a good Intention in the Use of it, or as a natural Ability capable of an useful Application. Prudence, if it was only employ'd in promoting private Interest, is never imagin'd to be a Virtue: and Justice, or observing a strict Equality, if it has no regard to the Good of Mankind, the Preservation of Rights, and securing Peace, is a Quality properer for its ordinary Gestamen, a Beam and Scales, than for a rational Agent. So that these four Qualitys, commonly call'd Cardinal Virtues, obtain that Name, because they are Dispositions universally necessary to promote publick Good, and denote Affections toward rational Agents; otherwise there would appear no Virtue in them.

Affections, disinterested. Now, if it can be made appear, that none of these Affections which we approve as virtuous, are either Self-love, or Desire of private Interest; since all Virtue is either some such Affections, or Actions consequent upon them; it must necessarily follow, That Virtue springs from some other Affection than Self-love, or Desire of private Advantage. And where Self-Interest excites to the same Action, the Approbation is given only to the disinterested Principle.

Love of Complacence, and Hatred of Displicence. The Affections which are of most Importance in Morals, are commonly included under the Names of Love and Hatred. Now in discoursing of Love, we need not be caution'd not to include that Love between the Sexes, which, when no other Affections accompany it, is only Desire of Pleasure, and is never counted a Virtue. Love toward rational Agents, is subdivided into Love of Complacence or Esteem, and Love of Benevolence: And Hatred is subdivided into Hatred of Displicence or Contempt, and Hatred of Malice. Complacence denotes Approbation of any Person by our Moral Sense; and is rather a Perception than an Affection; tho' the Affection of Good-will is ordinarily subsequent to it. Benevolence is the Desire of the Happiness of another. Their Opposites are called Dislike and Malice. Concerning each of these separately we shall consider, Whether they can be influenc'd by Motives of Self-Interest.

Are entirely disinterested. COMPLACENCE, Esteem, or Good-liking, at first view appears to be disinterested, and so Displicence or Dislike; and are entirely excited by some moral Qualitys, Good or Evil, apprehended to be in the Objects; which Qualitys the very Frame of our Nature determines us to approve or disapprove, according to the moral Sense[1] above explain'd. Propose to a Man all the Rewards in the World, or threaten all the Punishments, to engage him to Esteem and Complacence toward a person intirely unknown, or if known, apprehended to be cruel, treacherous, ungrateful; you may procure external Obsequiousness, or good Offices, or Dissimulation; but real Esteem no Price can purchase. And the same is obvious as to Contempt, which no Motive of Advantage can prevent. On the contrary, represent a Character as generous, kind, faithful, humane, tho' in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid Esteem and Complacence. A Bribe may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of Advantage may excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us disapprove him, while we retain the same Opinion of his Temper and Intentions. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade ourselves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of Advantage; nor execute it without the strongest Reluctance and Remorse, until we have blinded ourselves into a false Opinion about his Temper.

Benevolence and Malice, disinterested. As to the Love of Benevolence, the very Name excludes Self-Interest. We never call that Man benevolent, who is in Fact useful to others, but at the same time only intends his own Interest, without any ultimate Desire of the Good of others. If there be any Benevolence at all, it must be disinterested; for the most useful Action imaginable loses all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-Love, or Interest. Thus, never were any human Actions more advantageous, than the Inventions of Fire, and Iron; but if these were casual, or if the Inventor only intended his own Interest in them, there is nothing which can be call'd benevolent in them. Where-ever then Benevolence is suppos'd, there it is imagin'd disinterested, and design'd for the Good of others. To raise Benevolence, no more is required than calmly to consider and sensitive Nature not pernicious to others. Gratitude arises from Benefits conferred from Good-will on ourselves, or those we love; Complacence is a Perception of the moral Sense. Gratitude includes some Complacence, and Complacence still raises a stronger Good-will than that we have toward indifferent Characters, where there is no Opposition of Interests.

Self-Love join'd with Benevolence. But it must be here observ'd, That as all Men have Self-Love, as well as Benevolence, these two Principles may jointly excite a Man to the same Action; and then they are to be consider'd as two Forces impelling the same Body to Motion; sometimes they conspire, sometimes are indifferent to each other, and sometimes are in some degree opposite. Thus, if a Man have such strong Benevolence, as would have produc'd an Action without any Views of Self-Interest; that such a Man has also in View private Advantage, along with publick Good, as the Effect of his Action, does no way diminish the Benevolence of the Action. When he would not have produc'd so much publick Good, had it not been for Prospect of Self-Interest, then the Effect of Self-Love is to be deducted, and his Benevolence is proportion'd to the Remainder of Good, which pure Benevolence would have produc'd. When a Man's Benevolence is hurtful to himself, then Self-Love is opposite to Benevolence, and the Benevolence is proportion'd to the Sum of the Good produc'd, added to the Resistance of Self-Love surmounted by it. In most Cases it is impossible for Men to know how far their Fellows are influenc'd by the one or other of these Principles; but yet the general Truth is sufficiently certain, That this is the way in which the Benevolence of Actions is to be computed.

Benevolence is disinterested. There are two ways in which some may deduce Benevolence from Self-Love, the one supposing that we voluntarily bring this Affection upon ourselves, whenever we have an Opinion that it will be for our Interest to have this Affection, either as it may be immediately pleasant, or may afford pleasant Reflection afterwards by our Moral Sense, or as it may tend to procure some external Reward from God or Man. The other Scheme alledges no such Power in us of raising Desire or Affection of any kind by our Choice or Volition; but supposes our Minds determined by the Frame of their Nature to desire whatever is apprehended as the Means of any private Happiness; and that the Observation of the Happiness of other Persons, in many Cases is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure to the Observer, as their Misery is the Occasion of his Uneasiness: and in Consequence of this Connexion, as soon as we have observed it, we begin to desire the Happiness of others as the Means of obtaining this Happiness to ourselves, which we expect from the Contemplation of others in a happy State. They alledge it to be impossible to desire either the Happiness of another, or any Event whatsoever, without conceiving it as the Means of some Happiness or Pleasure to ourselves; but own at the same time, that Desire is not raised in us directly by any Volition, but arises necessarily upon our apprehending any Object or Event to be conducive to our Happiness.

The first contrary Opinion confuted. That the former Scheme is not just, may appear from this general Consideration, that neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or Desire can be directly raised by Volition. If they could, then we could be bribed into any Affection whatsoever toward any Object, even the most improper: we might raise Jealousy, Fear, Anger, Love, toward any sort of Persons indifferently by an Hire, even as we engage Men to external Actions, or to the Dissimulation of Passions; but this every Person will by his own Reflection find to be impossible. The Prospect of any Advantage to arise to us from having any Affection, may indeed turn our Attention to those Qualitys in the Object, which are naturally constituted the necessary Causes or Occasions of the advantageous Affection; and if we find such Qualitys in the Object, the Affection will certainly arise. Thus indirectly the Prospect of Advantage may tend to raise any Affection; but if these Qualitys be not found or apprehended in the Object, no Volition of ours, nor Desire, will ever raise any Affection in us.

But more particularly, that Desire of the Good of others, which we approve as virtuous, cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from Prospect of any Pleasure accompanying the Affection itself: for 'tis plain that our Benevolence is not always accompanied with Pleasure; nay, 'tis often attended with Pain, when the Object is in Distress. Desire in general is rather uneasy than pleasant. 'Tis true, indeed, all the Passions and Affections justify themselves; while they continue, (as Malebranch expresses it) we generally approve our being thus affected on this Occasion, as an innocent Disposition, or a just one, and condemn a Person who would be otherwise affected on the like Occasion. So the Sorrowful, the Angry, the Jealous, the Compassionate, approve their several Passions on the apprehended Occasion; but we should not therefore conclude, that Sorrow, Anger, Jealousy or Pity are pleasant, or chosen for their concomitant Pleasure. The Case is plainly thus: The Frame of our Nature on the Occasions which move these Passions, determines us to be thus affected, and to approve our Affection at least as innocent. Uneasiness generally attends our Desires of any kind; and this Sensation tends to fix our Attention, and to continue the Desire. But the Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of the Pain accompanying the Desire, but upon some other Event: the concomitant Pain is what we seldom reflect upon, unless when it is very violent. Nor does any Desire or Affection terminate upon the Pleasure which may accompany the Affection; much less is it raised by an Act of our Will, with a View to obtain this Pleasure.

The same Reflection will shew, that we do not by an Act of our Will raise in ourselves that Benevolence which we approve as virtuous, with a View to obtain future Pleasures of Self-Approbation by our Moral Sense. Could we raise Affections in this manner, we should be engaged to any Affection by the Prospect of an Interest equivalent to this of Self-Approbation, such as Wealth or sensual Pleasure, which with many Tempers are more powerful; and yet we universally own, that that Disposition to do good Offices to others, which is raised by these Motives, is not virtuous: how can we then imagine, that the virtuous Benevolence is brought upon us by a Motive equally selfish?

But what will most effectually convince us of the Truth on this Point, is Reflection upon our own Hearts, whether we have not a Desire of the Good of others, generally without any Consideration or Intention of obtaining these pleasant Reflections on our own Virtue: nay, often this Desire is strongest where we least imagine Virtue, in natural Affection toward Offspring, and in Gratitude to a great Benefactor; the Absence of which is indeed the greatest Vice, but the Affections themselves are not esteemed in any considerable degree virtuous. The same Reflection will also convince us, that these Desires or Affections are not produced by Choice, with a View to obtain this private Good.

In like manner, if no Volition of ours can directly raise Affections from the former Prospects of Interest, no more can any Volition raise them from Prospects of eternal Rewards, or to avoid eternal Punishments. The former Motives differ from these only as smaller from greater, shorter from more durable. If Affections could be directly raised by Volition, the same Consideration would make us angry at the most innocent or virtuous Character, and jealous of the most faithful and affectionate, or sorrowful for the Prosperity of a Friend; which we all find to be impossible. The Prospect of a future State, may, no doubt, have a greater indirect Influence, by turning our Attention to the Qualitys in the Objects naturally apt to raise the required Affection, than any other Consideration[2].

'Tis indeed probably true in Fact, that those who are engaged by Prospect of future Rewards to do good Offices to Mankind, have generally the virtuous Benevolence jointly exciting them to Action; because, as it may appear hereafter, Benevolence is natural to Mankind, and still operates where there is no Opposition of apparent Interest, or where any contrary apparent Interest is overbalanced by a greater Interest. Men, conscious of this, do generally approve good Offices, to which Motives of a future State partly excited the Agent. But that the Approbation is founded upon the Apprehension of a disinterested Desire partly exciting the Agent, is plain from this, that not only Obedience to an evil Deity in doing Mischief, or even in performing trifling Ceremonies, only from Hope of Reward, or Prospect of avoiding Punishment, but even Obedience to a good Deity only from the same Motives, without any Love or Gratitude towards him, and with a perfect Indifference about the Happiness or Misery of Mankind, abstracting from this private Interest, would meet with no Approbation. We plainly see that a Change of external Circumstances of Interest under an evil Deity, without any Change in the Disposition of the Agent, would lead him into every Cruelty and Inhumanity.

Gratitude toward the Deity is indeed disinterested, as it will appear hereafter. This Affection therefore may obtain our Approbation, where it excites to Action, tho' there were no other Benevolence exciting the Agent. But this Case scarce occurs among Men. But where the Sanction of the Law is the only Motive of Action, we could expect no more Benevolence, nor no other Affection, than those in one forced by the Law to be Curator to a Person for whom he has not the least Regard. The Agent would so manage as to save himself harmless if he could, but would be under no Concern about the Success of his Attempts, or the Happiness of the Person whom he served, provided he performed the Task required by Law; nor would any Spectator approve this Conduct.

The second Opinion confuted. The other Scheme is more plausible: That Benevolence is not raised by any Volition upon Prospect of Advantage; but that we desire the Happiness of others, as conceiving it necessary to procure some pleasant Sensations which we expect to feel upon seeing others happy; and that for like Reason we have Aversion to their Misery. This Connection between the Happiness of others and our Pleasure, say they, is chiefly felt among Friends, Parents and Children, and eminently virtuous Characters. But this Benevolence flows as directly from Self-Love as any other Desire.

To shew that this Scheme is not true in Fact, let us consider, that if in our Benevolence we only desired the Happiness of others as the Means of this Pleasure to ourselves, whence is it that no Man approves the Desire of the Happiness of others as a means of procuring Wealth or sensual Pleasure to ourselves? If a Person had wagered concerning the future Happiness of a Man of such Veracity, that he would sincerely confess whether he were happy or not; would this Wagerer's Desire of the Happiness of another, in order to win the Wager, be approved as virtuous? If not, wherein does this Desire differ from the former? except that in one case there is one pleasant Sensation expected, and in the other case other Sensations: For by increasing or diminishing the Sum wagered, the Interest in this case may be made either greater or less than that in the other.

Reflecting on our own Minds again will best discover the Truth. Many have never thought upon this Connection: nor do we ordinarily intend the obtaining of any such Pleasure when we do generous Offices. We all often feel Delight upon seeing others happy, but during our Pursuit of their Happiness we have no Intention of obtaining this Delight. We often feel the Pain of Compassion; but were our sole ultimate Intention or Desire the freeing ourselves from this Pain, would the Deity offer to us either wholly to blot out all Memory of the Person in Distress, to take away this Connection, so that we should be easy during the Misery of our Friend on the one hand, or on the other would relieve him from his Misery, we should be as ready to choose the former way as the latter; since either of them would free us from our Pain, which upon this Scheme is the sole End proposed by the compassionate Person.—Don't we find in ourselves that our Desire does not terminate upon the Removal of our own Pain? Were this our sole Intention, we would run away, shut our Eyes, or divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, as the readiest way of removing our Pain: This we seldom do, nay, we croud about such Objects, and voluntarily expose ourselves to this Pain, unless calm Reflection upon our Inability to relieve the Miserable, countermand our Inclination, or some selfish Affection, as Fear of Danger, over-power it.

To make this yet clearer, suppose that the Deity should declare to a good Man that he should be suddenly annihilated, but at the Instant of his Exit it should be left to his Choice whether his Friend, his Children, or his Country should be made happy or miserable for the Future, when he himself could have no Sense of either Pleasure or Pain from their State. Pray would he be any more indifferent about their State now, that he neither hoped or feared any thing to himself from it, than he was in any prior Period of his Life? Nay, is it not a pretty common Opinion among us, that after our Decease we know nothing of what befalls those who survive us? How comes it then that we do not lose, at the Approach of Death, all Concern for our Families, Friends, or Country? Can there be any Instance given of our desiring any Thing only as the Means of private Good, as violently when we know that we shall not enjoy this Good many Minutes, as if we expected the Possession of this Good for many Years? Is this the way we compute the Value of Annuities?

How the disinterested Desire of the Good of others should seem inconceivable, 'tis hard to account: perhaps 'tis owing to the Attempts of some great Men to give Definitions of simple Ideas.—Desire, say they, is Uneasiness, or uneasy Sensation upon the Absence of any Good.—Whereas Desire is as distinct from Uneasiness, as Volition is from Sensation. Don't they themselves often speak of our desiring to remove Uneasiness? Desire then is different from Uneasiness, however a Sense of Uneasiness accompanies it, as Extension does the Idea of Colour, which yet is a very distinct Idea. Now wherein lies the Impossibility of desiring the Happiness of another without conceiving it as the Means of obtaining any thing farther, even as we desire our own Happiness without farther View? If any alledge, that we desire our own Happiness as the Means of removing the Uneasiness we feel in the Absence of Happiness, then at least the Desire of removing our own Uneasiness is an ultimate Desire: and why may we not have other ultimate Desires?

But can any Being be concerned about the Absence of an Event which gives it no Uneasiness? Perhaps superior Natures desire without uneasy Sensation. But what if we cannot? We may be uneasy while a desired Event is in Suspence, and yet not desire this Event only as the Means of removing this Uneasiness: Nay, if we did not desire the Event without View to this Uneasiness, we should never have brought the Uneasiness upon ourselves by desiring it. So likewise we may feel Delight upon the Existence of a desired Event, when yet we did not desire the Event only as the Means of obtaining this Delight; even as we often receive Delight from Events which we had an Aversion to.

If any one should ask, since none of these Motives of Self-Interest excite our Benevolence, but we are in virtuous Actions intending solely the Good of others, to what Purpose serves our moral Sense, our Sense of Pleasure from the Happiness of others? To what Purpose serves the wise Order of Nature, by which Virtue is even made generally advantageous in this Life? To what End are eternal Rewards appointed and revealed? The Answer to these Questions was given partly already: all these Motives may make us desire to have benevolent Affections, and consequently turn our Attention to those Qualities in Objects which excite them; they may overbalance all apparent contrary Motives, and all Temptations to Vice. But farther, I hope it will be still thought an End worthy of the Deity, to make the Virtuous happy, by a wise Constitution of Nature, whether the Virtuous were in every Action intending to obtain this Happiness or not. Beneficent Actions tend to the publick Good; it is therefore good and kind to give all possible additional Motives to them; and to excite Men, who have some weak Degrees of good Affection, to promote the publick Good more vigorously by Motives of Self-Interest; or even to excite those who have no Virtue at all to external Acts of Beneficence, and to restrain them from Vice[3].

From the Whole it may appear, that there is in human Nature a disinterested ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others; and that our Moral Sense determines us only to approve Actions as virtuous, which are apprehended to proceed partly at least from such Desire.

Human Nature incapable of sedate Malice. As to Malice, Human Nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested Hatred, or a sedate ultimate Desire of the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our Interest: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose those whose Interests are opposite to ours, it is only the Effect of Self-Love, and not of disinterested Malice. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as absolutely evil; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences of disinterested Malice: but as soon as we reflect upon human Nature, and form just Conceptions, this unnatural Passion is allay'd, and only Self-Love remains, which may make us, from Self-Interest, oppose our Adversarys.

Every one at present rejoices in the Destruction of our Pirates; and yet let us suppose a Band of such Villains cast in upon some desolate Island, and that we were assur'd some Fate would confine them there perpetually, so that they should disturb Mankind no more: Now let us calmly reflect, that these Persons are capable of Knowledge and Counsel, may be happy and joyful, or may be involv'd in Misery, Sorrow, and Pain; that they may return to a State of Love, Humanity, Kindness, and become Friends, Citizens, Husbands, Parents, with all the sweet Sentiments which accompany these Relations: then let us ask our selves, when Self-Love, or regard to the Safety of better Men, no longer makes us desire their Destruction, and when we cease to look upon them under the Ideas suggested by fresh Resentment of Injurys done to us or our Friends, as utterly incapable of any good moral Quality; whether we would wish them the Fate of Cadmus's Army, by plunging their Swords in each others Breast, or a worse Fate by the most exquisite Tortures; or rather, that they should recover the ordinary Affections of Men, become kind, compassionate, and friendly; contrive Laws, Constitutions, Governments, Propertys; and form an honest happy Society with Marriages, and

Relations dear, and all the Charities
Of Father, Son, and Brother ——[4]?

I fansy the latter would be the Wish of every Mortal, notwithstanding our present just Abhorrence of them from Self-Interest, or publick Love, and Desire of promoting the Interest of our Friends who are expos'd to their Fury. Now this plainly evidences, that we scarce ever have any sedate Malice against any Person, or ultimate Desire of his Misery. Our calm Ill-will is only from Opposition of Interest; or if we can entertain sedate Malice, it must be toward a Character apprehended necessarily and unalterably Evil in a moral Sense; such as a sudden Passion sometimes represents our Enemies to us: and perhaps no such Being occurs to us among the Works of a good Deity.

Other Affections disinterested. Having offer'd what may perhaps prove, That neither our Esteem or Benevolence is founded on Self-Love, or views of Interest; let us see if some other Affections, in which Virtue may be plac'd, do arise from Self-Love; such as Fear, or Reverence, arising from an Apprehension of Goodness, Power, and Justice. For no body apprehends any Virtue in base Dread and Servitude toward a powerful Evil Being: This is indeed the meanest Selfishness. Now the same Arguments which prove Esteem to be disinterested, will prove this honourable Reverence to be so too; for it plainly arises from an Apprehension of amiable Qualitys in the Person, and Love toward him, which raises an Abhorrence of offending him. Could we reverence a Being because it was our Interest to do so, a third Person might bribe us into Reverence toward a Being neither good, nor powerful, which every one sees to be a Jest. And this we might shew to be common to all other Passions, which have been reputed virtuous.

Objections. There is one Objection against disinterested Good-Will, which occurs from considering, That nothing so effectually excites our Love toward rational Agents, as their Beneficence, and especially toward ourselves; whence we are led to imagine, that our Love of Persons, as well as irrational Objects, flows intirely from Self-Interest. But let us here examine ourselves more narrowly. Do we only wish well to the Beneficent, because it is our Interest to do so? Or do we choose to love them, because our Love is the means of procuring their Bounty? If it be so, then we could indifferently love any Character, even to obtain the Bounty of a third Person; or we could be brib'd by a third Person to love the greatest Villain heartily, as we may be brib'd to external Offices: Now this is plainly impossible. Nay, farther, is not our Good-will the Consequent of Bounty, and not the Means of procuring it? External Shew, Obsequiousness, and Dissimulation may proceed an Opinion of Beneficence; but real Love always presupposes it, and will necessarily arise even when we expect no more, from Consideration of past Benefits.

Or can any one say he only loves the Beneficent, as he does a Field or Garden, because of its Advantage? His Love then must cease toward one who has ruin'd himself in kind Offices to him, when he can do him no more; as we cease to love an inanimate Object which ceases to be useful, unless a Poetical Prosopopoeia animate it, and raise an imaginary Gratitude, which is indeed pretty common. Beneficence then must increase our Good-will, as it raises Complacence, which is still attended with stronger Degrees of Benevolence: and hence we love even those who are beneficent to others.

In the Benefits which we receive ourselves, we are more fully sensible of their Value, and of the Circumstances of the Action, which are Evidences of a generous Temper in the Donor; and from the good Opinion we have of ourselves, we are apt to look upon the Kindness as better employ'd, than when it is bestow'd on others, of whom perhaps we have less favourable Sentiments. It is however sufficient to remove the Objection, that Bounty from a Donor apprehended as morally evil, or extorted by Force, or conferr'd with some View of Self-Interest, will not procure real Good-will; nay, it may raise Indignation, if we suspect Dissimulation of Love, or a Design to allure us into any thing dishonourable: whereas wisely employ'd Bounty is always approv'd, and gains Love to the Author from all who hear of it.

Virtue disinterested. If then no Good-will toward Persons arises from Self-Love, or Views of Interest, and all Virtue flows from Good-will, or some other Affection equally disinterested; it remains, That there must be some other Affection than Self-Love, or Interest, which excites us to the Actions we call Virtuous.

Had we no other ultimate Desire but that of private Advantage, we must imagine that every rational Being acts only for its own Advantage; and however we may call a beneficent Being a good Being, because it acts for our Advantage, yet upon this Scheme we should not be apt to think there is any beneficent Being in Nature, or a Being who acts for the Good of others. Particularly, If there is no Sense of Excellence in publick Love, and promoting the Happiness of others, whence should this Persuasion arise, That the Deity will make the Virtuous happy? Can we prove that it is for the Advantage of the Deity to do so? This I fancy will be look'd upon as very absurd, by many who yet expect Mercy and Beneficence in the Deity. And if there be such Dispositions in the Deity, where is the impossibility of some small degree of this publick Love in his Creatures? And why must they be suppos'd incapable of acting but from Self-Love?

In short, without acknowledging some other Principle of Action in rational Agents than Self-Love, I see no Foundation to expect Beneficence, or Rewards from God or Man, farther than it is the Interest of the Benefactor; and all Expectation of Benefits from a Being whose Interests are independent on us, must be perfectly ridiculous. What should engage the Deity to reward Virtue? Virtue is commonly suppos'd, upon this Scheme, to be only a consulting our own Happiness in the most artful way, consistently with the Good of the Whole; and in Vice the same thing is foolishly pursu'd, in a manner which will not so probably succeed, and which is contrary to the Good of the Whole. But how is the Deity concern'd in this Whole, if every Agent always acts from Self-Love? And what Ground have we, from the Idea of infinite Power and Art, to believe the Deity is good in the Christian Sense, that is, studious of the Good of his Creatures? Perhaps the Misery of his Creatures may give him as much Pleasure, as their Happiness: And who can find fault, or blame such a Being to study their Misery? for what else should we expect? A Manichean evil God, is a Notion which Men would as readily run into, as that of a good one, if there is no Excellence in disinterested Love, and no Being acts but for its own Advantage; unless we prov'd, that the Happiness of Creatures was advantageous to the Deity.

The true Spring of Virtue. Having remov'd these false Springs of virtuous Actions, let us next establish the true one, viz. some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others; or some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others; even as the moral Sense,[5] above explain'd, determines us to approve the Actions which flow from this Love in ourselves or others. This disinterested Affection, may appear strange to Men impress'd with Notions of Self-Love, as the sole Spring of Action, from the Pulpit, the Schools, the Systems, and Conversations regulated by them: but let us consider it in its strongest and simplest Kinds; and when we see the Possibility of it in these Instances, we may easily discover its universal Extent.

Natural Affection. An honest Farmer will tell you, that he studies the Preservation and Happiness of his Children, and loves them without any design of Good to himself. But say some of our Philosophers, The Happiness of their Children gives Parents Pleasure, and their Misery gives them Pain; and therefore to obtain the former, and avoid the latter, they study, from Self-Love, the Good of their Children. Suppose several Merchants join'd in Partnership of their whole Effects; one of them is employ'd abroad in managing the Stock of the Company; his Prosperity occasions Gain to all, and his Losses give them Pain from their Share in the Loss: Is this then the same Kind of Affection with that of Parents to their Children? Is there the same tender, personal Regard? I fancy no Parent will say so. In this Case of Merchants there is a plain Conjunction of Interest; but whence the Conjunction of Interest between the Parent and Child? Do the Child's Sensations give Pleasure or Pain to the Parent? Is the Parent hungry, thirsty, sick, when his Children are so? No, but his naturally implanted Desire of their Good, and Aversion to their Misery, makes him be affected with Joy or Sorrow from their Pleasures or Pains. This Desire then is antecedent to the Conjunction of Interest, and the Cause of it, not the Effect: it then must be disinterested. No, says another Sophist, Children are Parts of ourselves, and in loving them we but love ourselves in them. A very good Answer! Let us carry it as far as it will go. How are they Parts of ourselves? Not as a Leg or an Arm: We are not conscious of their Sensations. But their Bodys were form'd from Parts of ours. So is a Fly, or a Maggot, which may breed in any discharg'd Blood or Humour: Very dear Insects surely! There must be something else then which makes Children Parts of ourselves; and what is this but that Affection, which Nature determines us to have toward them? This Love makes them Parts of ourselves, and therefore does not flow from their being so before. This is indeed a good Metaphor; and where-ever we find a Determination among several rational Agents to mutual Love, let each Individual be look'd upon as a Part of a great Whole, or System, and concern himself in the publick Good of it.

But a later Author observes,[6] That natural Affection in Parents is weak, till the Children begin to give Evidences of Knowledge and Affections. Mothers say they feel it strong from the very first: and yet I could wish, for the Destruction of his Hypothesis, that what he alledges was true; as I fansy it is in some measure, tho' we may find in some Parents an Affection toward Idiots. The observing of Understanding and Affections in Children, which make them appear moral Agents, can increase Love toward them without prospect of Interest; for I hope, this Increase of Love is not from Prospect of Advantage from the Knowledge or Affections of Children, for whom Parents are still toiling, and never intend to be refunded their Expences, or recompens'd for their Labour, but in Cases of extreme Necessity. If then the observing a Moral Capacity can be the occasion of increasing Love without Self-Interest, even from the Frame of our Nature; pray, may not this be a Foundation of weaker degrees of Love, where there is no preceding Tie of Parentage, and extend it to all Mankind?

Publick Affections, natural. And that this is so in Fact, will appear by considering some more distant Attachments. If we observe any Neighbours, from whom perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into Friendships, Familys, Partnerships, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray ask any Mortal if he would not more desire their Prosperity, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than their Misery and Ruin? and you shall find a Bond of Benevolence farther extended than a Family and Children, altho' the Ties are not so strong. Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his native Country, and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he had receiv'd no Injurys from his Country: ask such a Man, would he not rather desire the Prosperity of his Country? Or could he, now that his Interests are separated from that of his Nation, as readily wish that it was laid waste by Tyranny, or a foreign Power? I fansy his Answer would shew us a Benevolence extended beyond Neighbourhoods or Acquaintances. Let a Man of a compos'd Temper, out of the hurry of his private Affairs, only read of the Constitution of a foreign Country, even in the most distant Parts of the Earth, and observe Art, Design, and a Study of publick Good in the Laws of this Association; and he shall find his Mind mov'd in their favour; he shall be contriving Rectifications and Amendments in their Constitution, and regret any unlucky Part of it which may be pernicious to their Interest; he shall bewail any Disaster which befalls them, and accompany all their Fortunes with the Affections of a Friend. Now this proves Benevolence to be in some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no interfering Interest, which from Self-Love may obstruct it. And had we any Notions of rational Agents, capable of moral Affections, in the most distant Planets, our good Wishes would still attend them, and we should desire their Happiness. And that all these Affections, whether more or less extensive, are properly disinterested, not even founded on any Desire of that Happiness we may expect in seeing their prosperous Condition; may appear from this, that they would continue even at the Instant of our Death, or intire Destruction, as was already observed, Art. IV. of this Section.

National Love. Here we may transiently remark the Foundation of what we call national Love, or Love of one's native Country. Whatever place we have liv'd in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the various Affections of human Nature; we have known many lovely Characters; we remember the Associations, Friendships, Familys, natural Affections, and other human Sentiments: our moral Sense determines us to approve these lovely Dispositions, where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our Benevolence concerns us in the Interests of the Persons possess'd of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in another Country, we begin to acquire a national Love toward it also; nor has our own Country any other preference in our Idea, unless it be by an Association of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the Buildings, Fields, and Woods where we receiv'd them. This may let us see how Tyranny, Faction, a Neglect of Justice, a Corruption of Manners, and any thing which occasions the Misery of the Subjects, destroys this national Love, and the dear Idea of a Country.

The Reason why natural Affections do not always appear. We ought here to observe, That the only Reason of that apparent Want of natural Affection, among collateral Relations, is, that these natural Inclinations, in many Cases, are overpower'd by Self-Love, where there happens any Opposition of Interests; but where this does not happen, we shall find all Mankind under its Influence, tho' with different Degrees of Strength, according to the nearer or more remote Relations they stand in to each other; and according as the natural Affection of Benevolence is join'd with and strengthen'd by Esteem, Gratitude, Compassion, or other kind Affections; or on the contrary, weaken'd by Displicence, Anger, or Envy.

THESE several Motives of Interest, which, some alledge, excite us to Benevolence, operate upon us in a very different Manner. Prospect of external Advantage of any kind in this Life from our Fellows, is only a Motive to the Volition of external Actions immediately, and not to raise Desire of the Happiness of others. Now being willing to do external Actions which we know do in Fact promote the Happiness of others, without any Desire of their Happiness, is not approved as virtuous: Otherwise it were Virtue to do a beneficent Action for a Bribe of Money. THE Prospect of Rewards from the Deity, of future Pleasure from the Self-Approbation of our Moral Sense, or of any Pleasure attending an Affection itself, are only Motives to us to desire or wish to have the Affection of Benevolence in our Hearts; and consequently, if our Volition could raise Affections in us, these Motives would make us will or choose to raise benevolent Affections: But these Prospects cannot be Motives to us from Self-Love, to desire the Happiness of others; for, from Self-Love we only desire what we apprehend to be the Means of private Good. Now the having those Affections is the Means of obtaining these private Goods, and not the actual Happiness of others; for the Pleasure of Self-Approbation, and Divine Rewards, are not obtained or lost according as others are happy or miserable, but according to the Goodness of our Affections. If therefore Affections are not directly raised by Volition or Choice, Prospects of future Rewards, or of Self-Approbation, cannot directly raise them.

LET it be also remembred, that every Consideration suggested in the Gospel, as an additional Motive to beneficent Actions, is not immediately to be looked upon as the proper Motive to Virtue, or what would engage our Approbation of Actions flowing from it alone. We have the Promises of this Life as well as of the next, and yet the former alone was never thought a virtuous Principle. Some Texts are also brought to confute this Scheme of disinterested Affections as the only truly virtuous Principle, such as 1 Corinth. Ch. XV. ver. 32 which imports no more than this, That if there were no Resurrection, and consequently Christ had not risen, and therefore his Religion only an Imposture, it had been the greatest Folly in the Apostle to have exposed himself to Persecution: Not that the Prospect of a future Reward was the only Motive to Virtue, or that the only Affection of Mind which made the Apostle bear Persecution, was Hope of Reward. ANOTHER Text insisted on is, Heb. XI. ver. 6. But this only means, either that no Man can perform religious Acts acceptably to God, who does not believe his Existence and Goodness, which is self-evident: Or it is to be understood of embracing the true Religion, and adhering to it under the most severe Persecutions, which we may allow no Man could do without Hopes of future Reward. Not this does not prove either that our sole, or our strongest Incitement to virtuous Actions is a Prospect of Interest, nor even that any Action is approved, because it springs from Hope of Reward. Heb. XII. ver. 2. is chiefly urged, but with least Ground: if we have it well translated, it only asserts, That the Hope of future Joy was one Incitement to our Saviour in enduring Sufferings, not that this was the principal Spring of his beneficient Actions, or that they were made amiable by arising from it. Nay, this Joy may be understood metonymically, for its Object, viz. the Salvation of Mankind. Not to mention another Translation long ago known to Criticks; some of whom insist that αντι is seldom used for the final Cause; but means instead of, in this Place, as well as in Texts debated with the Sucinians: And the this Verse may be thus translated; Who instead of that Joy which was ready at hand, or in his Power to have enjoyed, as he had from the Beggining, he submitted to the Cross. Nor is there any thing to confute this Translation; save that some Antithesis between our suffering from Faith in a Reward, and his suffering in like manner, is not kept up so well; as if it were a necessary Perfection in the Scriptures to abound in such Antitheses. For in this Translation there is good Reasoning, in shewing how our Saviour's Sufferings are enhanced by his exchanging a State of Joy for them, parallel to Philip. II. ver. 6, 7. WHOEVER would appeal to the general Strain of the Christian Exhortations, will find disinterested Love more inculcated, and Motives of Gratitude more frequently suggested, that any others.

Milt. Par. Lost, B. iv. v. 756.

See the Fable of the Bees, Pag. 68, 3d Ed.