Proper Affections are Desire and Aversion. AFTER the general account of Sensations, we may consider other Modifications of our Minds, consequent upon these Perceptions, whether grateful, or uneasy. The first which occur to any one are Desire of the grateful Perceptions, and Aversion to the uneasy, either for ourselves or others. If we would confine the word Affection to these two, which are entirely distinct from all Sensation, and directly incline the Mind to Action or Volition of Motion, we should have no Debate about the Number or Division of Affections. But since, by universal Custom, this Name is applied to other Modifications of the Mind, such as Joy, Sorrow, Despair, we may consider what universal Distinction can be assigned between these Modifications, and the several Sensations abovementioned; and we shall scarce find any other than this, that we call the direct immediate Perception of Pleasure or Pain from the present Object or Event, the Sensation:
Other Affections, wherein different from Sensation. But we denote by the Affection or Passion some other Perceptions of Pleasure or Pain, not directly raised by the Presence or Operation of the Event or Object, but by our Reflection upon, or Apprehension of their present or future Existence; so that we expect or judge that the Object or Event will raise the direct Sensations in us.
In beholding a regular Building we have the Sensation of Beauty; but upon our apprehending ourselves possessed of it, or that we can procure this pleasant Sensation when we please, we feel the Affection of Joy. When a Man has a Fit of the Gout, he has the painful Sensation; when he is not at present pained, yet apprehends a sudden return of it, he has the Affection of Sorrow, which might be called a Sort of Sensation: as the Physicians call many of our Passions internal Senses.
When the word Passion is imagined to denote any thing different from the Affections, it includes a strong Brutal Impulse of the Will, sometimes without any distinct notions of Good, publick or private, attended with a[1] confused Sensation either of Pleasure or Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions, which keeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all deliberate Reasoning about our Conduct.
General Desires, and particular Affections or Passions. We have little reason to imagine, that all other Agents have such confused Sensations accompanying their Desires as we often have. Let us abstract from them, and consider in what manner we should act upon the several Occasions which now excite our Passions, if we had none of these Sensations whence our Desires become passionate.
There is a Distinction to be observed on this Subject, between the calm Desire of Good, and Aversion to Evil, either selfish or publick, as it appears to our Reason or Reflection; and the particular Passions towards Objects immediately presented to some Sense.
Thus nothing can be more distinct than the general calm Desire of private Good of any kind, which alone would incline us to pursue whatever Objects were apprehended as the Means of Good, and the particular selfish Passions, such as Ambition, Covetousness, Hunger, Lust, Revenge, Anger, as they arise upon particular Occasions. In like manner our publick Desires may be distinguished into the general calm Desire of the Happiness of others, or Aversion to their Misery upon Reflection; and the particular Affections or Passions of Love, Congratulation, Compassion, natural Affection. These particular Affections are found in many Tempers, where, through want of Reflection, the general calm Desires are not found: Nay, the former may be opposite to the latter, where they are found in the same Temper. Sometimes the calm Motion of the Will conquers the Passions, and sometimes is conquered by it. Thus Lust or Revenge may conquer the calm Affection toward private Good, and sometimes are conquered by it. Compassion will prevent the necessary Correction of a Child, or the use of a severe Cure, while the calm parental Affection is exciting to it. Sometimes the latter prevails over the former. All this is beatifully represented in the 9th book of Plato's Republick. We obtain Command over the particular Passions, principally by strengthning the general Desires through frequent Reflection, and making them habitual, so as to obtain Strength superior to the particular Passions.[2]
Again, the calm publick Desires may be considered as they either regard the Good of particular Persons or Societies presented to our Senses; or that of some more abstracted or general Community, such as a Species or System.
This latter sort we may call universal calm Benevolence. Now it is plain, that not only particular kind Passions, but even calm particular Benevolence do not always arise from, or necessarily presuppose, the universal Benevolence; both the former may be found in Persons of little Reflection, where the latter is wanting: And the former two may be opposite to the other, where they meet together in one Temper. So the universal Benevolence might be where there was neither of the former; as in any superior Nature or Angel, who had no particular Intercourse with any part of Mankind.
Our moral Sense, though it approves all particular kind Affection or Passion, as well as calm particular Benevolence abstractedly considered; yet it also approves the Restraint or Limitation of all particular Affections or Passions, by the calm universal Benevolence. To make this Desire prevalent above all particular Affections, is the only sure way to obtain constant Self-Approbation.
The calm selfish Desires would determine any Agent to pursue every Object or Event, known either by Reason or prior Experience to be good to itself. We need not imagine any innate Idea of Good in general, of infinite Good, or of the greatest Aggregate: Much less need we suppose any actual Inclination toward any of these, as the Cause or Spring of all particular Desires. It is enough to allow, that we are capable by enlarging, or by Abstraction, of coming to these Ideas: That we must, by the Constitution of our Nature, desire any apprehended Good which occurs a-part from any Evil: That of two Objects inconsistent with each other, we shall desire that which seems to contain the greatest Moment of Good.
So that it cannot be pronounced concerning any finite Good, that it shall necessarily engage our Pursuit; since the Agent may possibly have the Idea of a Greater, or see this to be inconsistent with some more valuable Object, or that it may bring upon him some prepollent Evil. The certain Knowledge of any of these Things, or probable Presumption of them, may stop the Pursuit of any finite Good. If this be any sort of Liberty, it must be allowed to be in Men, even by those who maintain the Desire or Will to be necessarily determined by the prepollent Motive;
since this very Presumption may be a prepollent Motive, especially to those, who by frequent Attention make the Idea of the greatest Good always present to themselves on all important Occasions. The same my easly be applied to our Aversion to finite Evils.
There seems to be this Degree of Liberty even in the acts of the Understanding, or in Judging, that though the highest Certainty or Demonstration does necessarily engage our Assent, yet we can suspend any absolute Conclusion from probable Arguments, until we examine whether this apparent Probability be not opposite to Demonstration, or superior Probability on the other side.
This may let us see, that though it were acknowledged that Men are necessarily determined to pursue their own Happiness, and to be influenced by whatever Motive appears to be prepollent;
yet they might be proper Subjects of a Law; since the very Sanctions of the Law, if they attend to them, may suggest a Motive prepollent to all others. In like manner, Errors may be criminal,[3] where there are sufficient Data or Objective Evidence for the Truth;
since no Demonstration can lead to Error, and we can suspend our Assent to probable Arguments, till we have examined both Sides. Yet human Penalties concerning Opinions must be of little consequence, since no Penalty can supply the place of Argument, or Probability to engage our Assent, however they may as Motives determine our Election.
In the calm publick Desires, in like manner, where there are no opposite Desires, the greater Good of another is always preferred to the less: And in the calm universal Benevolence, the Choice is determined by the Importance or Moment of the Good, and the Number of those who shall enjoy it.
When the publick Desires are opposite to the private, or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is stronger or more intense.
Definitions. The following Definitions of certain Words used on this Subject, may shorten our Expressions; and the Maxims subjoined may shew the manner of acting from calm Desire, with Analogy to the Laws of Motion.
Natural Good is Pleasure: Natural Evil is Pain.
Natural good Objects are those which are apt either mediately or immediately to give Pleasure; the former are called Advantageous. Natural Evil Objects are such as, in like manner, give Pain.
Absolute Good is that which, considered with all its Concomitants and Consequences, contains more Good than what compensates all its Evils.
Absolute Evil, on the contrary, contains Evil which outweighs all its Good.
Relative Good or Evil, is any particular Good or Evil, which does not thus compensate its contrary Concomitants or Consequences. This Distinction would have been more exactly expressed by the Bonum simpliciter, and secundum quid of the Schoolmen.
Hence relative Good may be Absolute Evil; thus often sensual Pleasures are in the whole pernicious: And Absolute Good may be Relative Evil; thus an unpleasant Potion may recover Health.
Good and Evil, according to the Persons whom they affect, may be divided into Universal, Particular, and Private.
Universal. Universal Good is what tends to the Happiness of the whole System of sensitive Beings; and Universal Evil is the contrary.
Particular. Particular Good is what tends to the Happiness of a Part of this System; Particular Evil is the contrary.
Private. Private Good or Evil is that of the Person acting. Each of these three Members may be either Absolute or Relative.
Hence. 1. Particular or private Good may possibly be universal Evil: And universal Good may be particular or private Evil. The Punishment of a Criminal is an Instance of the latter. Of the former, perhaps, there are no real Instances in the whole Administration of Nature: but there are some apparent Instances; such as the Success of an unjust War; or the Escape of an unrelenting Criminal.
2. When particular or private Goods are entirely innocent toward others, they are universal Good.
Compound. Compound good Objects or Events, are such as contain Goods of several sorts at once. Thus, Meat may be both pleasant and healthful; an Action may give its Author at once the Pleasures of the Moral Sense and of Honour. The same is easily applicable to compound Evil.
Mixed. A mixed Object is what contains at once Good and Evil: Thus a virtuous Action may give the Agent the Pleasures of the Moral Sense, and Pains of the external Senses. Execution of Justice may give the Pleasures of the publick Sense, and the Pains of Compassion toward the Sufferer.
Greatest Good. The greatest or most perfect Good is that whole Series, or Scheme of Events, which contains a greater Aggregate of Happiness in the whole, or more absolute universal Good, than any other possible Scheme, after subtracting all the Evils connected with each of them.
Moral Good. An Action is morally good, when it flows from benevolent Affection, or Intention of absolute Good to others. Men of much Reflection may actually intend universal absolute Good; but with the common rate of Men their Virtue consists in intending and pursuing particular absolute Good, not inconsistent with universal Good.
Moral Evil. An Action is morally evil, either from Intention of absolute Evil, universal, or particular, ([4]universal Evil is scarce ever intended, and particular Evil only in violent Passions) or from pursuit of private or particular relative Good, which they might have known did tend to universal absolute Evil. For even the want of a[5] just Degree of Benevolence renders an Action evil.
Compound. Compound moral Goodness is that to which different moral Species concur: Thus the same Action may evidence Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to God. We may in like manner understand compound moral Evil. We cannot suppose mixed moral Actions.[6]
Agents are denominated morally good or evil, from their Affections and Actions, or Attempts of Action.
Axioms, or general Laws. Maxims, or natural Laws of calm Desire.
Selfish Desires pursue ultimately only the private Good of the Agent.
Benevolent or publick Desires pursue the Good of others, according to the several Systems to which we extend our Attention, but with different Degrees of Strength.
The Strength either of the private or publick Desire of any Event, is proportioned to the imagined Quantity of Good, which will arise from it to the Agent, or the Person for whose sake it is desired.
Mixed Objects are pursued or shunned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the apprehended Excess of Good or Evil.
Equal Mixtures of Good and Evil stop all Desire or Aversion.
A compound good or evil Object, is prosecuted or shunned with a Degree of Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the Sum of Good, or of Evil.
In computing the Quantities of Good or Evil, which we pursue or shun, either for ourselves or others, when the Durations are equal, the Moment is as the Intenseness, or Dignity of the Enjoyment: and when the Intenseness of Pleasure is the same, or equal, the Moment is as the Duration.
Hence the Moment of Good in any Object, is in a compound Proportion of the Duration and Intenseness.
The Trouble, Pain, or Danger, incurred by the Agent, in acquiring or retaining any Good, is to be subtracted from the Sum of the Good. So the Pleasures which attend or flow from the means of prepollent Evil, are to be subtracted, to find the absolute Quantity.
The Ratio of the Hazard of acquiring or retaining any Good must be multiplied into the Moment of the Good; so also the Hazard of avoiding any Evil is to be multiplied into the Moment of it, to find its comparative value.
Hence it is, that the smallest certain Good may raise stronger Desire than the greatest Good, if the Uncertainty of the latter surpass that of the former, in a greater Proportion than that of the greater to the less. Thus Men content themselves in all Affairs with smaller, but more probably successful Pursuits, quitting those of greater Moment but less Probability.
To an immortal Nature it is indifferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys a Good limited in Duration, if its Sense be equally acute in all parts of its Existence; and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes not the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one time more than another. The same may be applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited in Duration.
But if the Duration of the Good be infinite, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment, as finite added to infinite, surpasses infinite alone.
To Beings of limited certain Duration, Axiom 12. may be applied, when the Duration of the Good would not surpass the Existence of the Possessor, after the Time of its Commencement.
To Beings of limited uncertain Duration, the Earliness of Commencement increases the Moment of any Good, according to the Hazard of the Possessor's Duration. This may, perhaps, account for what some alledge to be a natural Disposition of our Minds, even previous to any Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, viz. that we are so constituted, as to desire more ardently the nearer Enjoyments than the more distant, tho' of equal Moment in themselves, and as certainly to be obtained by us.
The Removal of Pain has always the Notion of Good, and sollicits us more importunately: Its Moment is the same way computed by Intenseness and Duration, and affected by the Hazard and by the Uncertainty of our Existence.
These are the general Ways of computing the Quantities of Good in any Object or Event, whether we are pursuing our own private Good from selfish Desires, or the Good of others from publick Affections. Concerning these latter we may observe,
That our Desires toward publick Good are, when other Circumstances are equal, proportioned to the Moment of the Goods themselves.
Our publick Desires of any Events, are proportioned to the Number of Persons to whom the good Event shall extend, when the Moments and other Circumstances are equal.
When the Moments themselves, and Numbers of Enjoyers are equal, our Desire is proportioned to the Strength or Nearness of the Ties or Attachments to the Persons.
When all other Circumstances are equal, our Desires are proportional to the apprehended Moral Excellence of the Persons.
In general, the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the Quantity of the Good itself, and the Number, Attachment, and Dignity of the Persons.
These seem to be the general Laws, according to which our Desires arise. Our Senses constitute Objects, Events or Actions good; and we have Power to reason, reflect and compare the several Goods, and to find out the proper and effectual Means of obtaining the greatest for ourselves or others, so as not to be led aside by every Appearance of relative or particular Good.
Action from pure Desire or Affection. If it be granted, that we have implanted in our Nature the several Desires above-mentioned, let us next inquire into what State we would incline to bring ourselves, upon the several Accidents which now raise our Passions; supposing that we had the Choice of our own State entirely, and were not, by the Frame of our Nature, subjected to certain Sensations, independently of our Volition.
If it seems too rash to assert a Distinction between Affections and Passions, or that Desire may subsist without any uneasiness, since perhaps we are never conscious of any Desire absolutely free from all uneasiness; let it be considered, that the simple Idea of Desire is different from that of Pain of any kind, or from any Sensation whatsoever: Nor is there any other Argument for their Identity than this, that they occur to us at once: But this Argument is inconclusive, otherwise it would prove Colour and Figure to be the same, or Incision and Pain.
There is a middle State of our Minds, when we are not in the pursuit of any important Good, nor know of any great Indigence of those we love. In this State, when any smaller positive Good to ourselves or our Friend is apprehended to be in our power, we may resolutely desire and pursue it, without any considerable Sensation of Pain or Uneasiness. Some Tempers seem to have as strong Desires as any, by the Constancy and Vigor of their Pursuits, either of publick or private Good; and yet give small Evidence of any uneasy Sensation. This is observable in some sedate Men, who seem no way inferior in Strength of Desire to others: Nay, if we consult our Hearts, we shall perhaps find, that the noblest Desire in our Nature, that of universal Happiness, is generally calm, and wholly free from any confused uneasy Sensation:
except in some warm Tempers, who, by a lively Imagination, and frequent Attention to general Ideas, raise something of Passion even toward universal Nature.[7] Yea, further, Desire may be as strong as possible toward a certainly future Event, the fixed Time of its Existence being also known, and yet we are not conscious of any Pain attending such Desires. But tho' this should not be granted to be Fact with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas of Desire and Pain, may give sufficient ground for abstracting them; and for our making the Supposition of their being separated.
Upon this Supposition then, when any Object was desired, if we found it difficult or uncertain to be obtained, but worthy of all the Labour it would cost; we would set about it with Diligence, but would never chuse to bring upon ourselves any painful Sensation accompanying our Desire, nor to increase our Toil by Anxiety. Whatever Satisfaction we had in our State before the Prospect of this additional Good, we should continue to enjoy it while this Good was in suspense; and if we found it unattainable, we should be just as we were before: And we should never chuse to bring upon ourselves those Frettings which now commonly arise from Disappointments. Upon Opinion of any impending Evil, we should desire and use all means to prevent it, but should never voluntarily bring upon ourselves the uneasy Sensation of Fear, which now naturally anticipates our Misery, and gives us a Foretaste of it, more ungrateful sometimes than the Suffering itself. If the Evil did befal us, we should never chuse to increase it, by the Sensations of Sorrow or Despair; we should consider what was the Sum of Good remaining in our State, after subtracting this Evil; and should enjoy ourselves as well as a Being, who had never known greater Good, nor enjoyed greater Pleasure, than the absolute Good yet remaining with us; or perhaps we should pursue some other attainable Good. In the like manner, did our State and the Modifications of our Mind depend upon our Choice, should we be affected upon the apprehended Approach of Good or Evil, to those whom we love; we should have desires of obtaining the one for them, and of defending them from the other, accompanied with no uneasy Sensations. We indeed find in fact, that our stronger Desires, whether private or publick, are accompanied with uneasy Sensations; but these Sensations seem not the necessary Result of the Desire itself: They depend upon the present Constitution of our Nature, which might possibly have been otherwise ordered. And in fact we find a considerable Diversity of Tempers in this matter; some sedate Tempers equally desiring either publick or private Good with the more passionate Tempers; but without that Degree of Ferment, Confusion, and Pain, which attend the same Desires in the Passionate.
According to the present Constitution of our Nature, we find that the Modifications or Passions of our Mind, are very different from those which we would chuse to bring upon ourselves, upon their several Occasions. The Prospect of any considerable Good for ourselves, or those we love, raises Desire; and this Desire is accompanied with uneasy confused Sensations, which often occasion Fretfulness, Anxiety, and Impatience. We find violent Motions in our Bodies; and are often made unfit for serious Deliberation about the Means of obtaining the Good desired. When it is first obtained, we find violent confused Sensations of Joy, beyond the Proportion of the Good itself, or its Moment to our Happiness. If we are disappointed, we feel a Sensation of Sorrow and Dejection, which is often entirely useless to our present State. Foreseen Evils are antedated by painful Sensations of Fear; and Reflection, attended with Sensations of Sorrow, gives a tedious Existence to transitory Misfortunes. Our publick Desires are in the same manner accompanied with painful Sensations. The Presence or Suspence of Good or Evil to others, is made the Occasion of the like confused Sensations. A little Reflection will shew, that none of these Sensations depend upon our Choice, but arise from the very Frame of our Nature, however we may regulate or moderate them.
The Necessity for these Sensations. Let us then examine for what Purpose our Nature was so constituted, that Sensations do thus necessarily arise in us.
Would not those first sorts of Sensations, by which we apprehend Good and Evil in the Objects themselves, have been sufficient, along with our Reason and pure Desires, without those Sensations attending the very Desires themselves, for which they are called Passions, or those Sensations which attend our Reflection upon the Presence, Absence, or Approach of Good or Evil?
The common Answer, that they are given to us as useful Incitements or Spurs to Action, by which we are roused more effectually to promote our private Good, or that of the Publick,
is too general and undetermined. What need is there for rousing us to Action, more than a calm pure Desire of Good, and Aversion to Evil would do, without these confused Sensations? Say they, we are averse to Labour; we are apt to be hurried away by Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth; we are often so indolent and averse to the vigorous Use of our Powers, that we should neglect our true Interest without these solliciting Sensations.
But may it not be answered, that if Labour and vigorous Use of our Powers be attended with Uneasiness or Pain, why should not this be brought into the Account? The Pursuit of a small Good by great Toil is really foolish; violent Labour may be as pernicious as any thing else: Why should we be excited to any uneasy Labour, except for prepollent Good? And, when the Good is prepollent, what need of any further Incitement than the calm Desire of it? The same may be said of the Avocations of Curiosity or Mirth; if their absolute Pleasures be greater than that of the good from which they divert us, why should we not be diverted from it? If not, then the real Moment of the Good proposed is sufficient to engage our Pursuit of it, in Opposition to our Curiosity or Mirth.
If indeed our Aversion to Labour, or our Propensity to Mirth be accompanied with these Sensations, then it was necessary that other Desires should be attended with like Sensations, that so a Ballance might be preserved. So if we have confused Sensation strengthning and fixing our private Desires, the like Sensation joined to publick Affections is necessary, lest the former Desires should wholly engross our Minds: If weight be cast into one Scale, as much must be put into the other to preserve an Equilibrium. But the first Question is, whence arose the Necessity of such additional Incitements on either side?
It must be very difficult for Beings of such imperfect Knowledge as we are, to answer such Questions: we know very little of the Constitution of Nature, or what may be necessary for the Perfection of the whole. The Author of Nature has probably formed many active Beings, whose Desires are not attended with confused Sensations, raising them into Passions like to ours. There are perhaps Orders of rational Beings also without these particular limited Attachments, to which our Natures are subjected; who may perhaps have no Parental Affection, Friendships, or Love to a Country, or to any special smaller Systems; but have Universal Good-will to all, and this solely proportioned to the moral Excellencies of the several Objects, without any other Bonds of Affection. There is probably an infinite Variety of Beings, of all possible Degrees, in which the Sum of Happiness exceeds that of Misery. We know that our State is absolutely Good, notwithstanding a considerable Mixture of Evil. The Goodness of the great Author of Nature appears even in producing the inferior Natures, provided their State in the whole be absolutely Good: Since we may probably conclude,[8] that there are in the Universe as many Species of superior Natures, as was consistent with the most perfect State of the whole. This is the Thought so much insisted upon by Simplicius, that the universal Cause must produce τα μέσα, ασ ωελλ ασ τα πρω̑τα, και τα ἔσχατα. We know not if this Globe be a fit Place for the Habitation of Natures superior to ours: If not, it must certainly be in the whole better that it should have its imperfect Inhabitants, whose State is absolutely Good, than that it should be desolate.
All then which we can expect to do in this Matter, is only to shew, that these confused Sensations are necessary to such Natures as we are in other respects: Particularly that Beings of such Degrees of Understanding, and such Avenues to Knowledge as we have, must need these additional Forces, which we call Passions, beside the first Sensations by which Objects are constituted Good or Evil, and the pure Desire or Aversion arising from Opinion or Apprehension of Good or Evil.
From the Imperfection of our Understanding, which required Sensations of Appetite. Now our Reason, or Knowledge of the Relations of external Things to our Bodies, is so inconsiderable, that it is generally some pleasant Sensation which teaches us what tends to their Preservation; and some painful Sensation which shews what is pernicious. Nor is this Instruction sufficient; we need also to be directed when our Bodies want supplies of Nourishment; to this our Reason could not extend: Here then appears the first Necessity of uneasy Sensation, preceding Desire, and continuing to accompany it when it is raised.
Again, our Bodies could not be preserved without a Sense of Pain, connected with Incisions, Bruises, or violent Labour, or whatever else tends to destroy any part of their Mechanism; since our Knowledge does not extend so far, as to judge in time what would be pernicious to it: And yet, without a great deal of human Labour, and many Dangers, this Earth could not support the tenth Part of its Inhabitants. Our Nature therefore required a Sensation, accompanying its Desires of the Means of Preservation, capable to surmount the Uneasiness of Labour: this we have in the Pains or Uneasiness accompanying the Desires of Food.
In like manner, the Propagation of Animals is a Mystery to their Reason, but easy to their Instinct. An Offspring of such Creatures as Men are, could not be preserved without perpetual Labour and Care; which we find could not be expected from the more general Ties of Benevolence. Here then again appears the Necessity of strengthning the Στοργὴ, or natural Affection, with strong Sensations, or Pains of Desire, sufficient to counter-ballance the Pains of Labour, and the Sensations of the selfish Appetites; since Parents must often check and disappoint their own Appetites, to gratify those of their Children.
When a Necessity of joining strong Sensations to one Class of Desires appears, there must appear a like Necessity of strengthning the rest by like Sensations, to keep a just Ballance.
We know, for instance, that the Pleasures of the Imagination tend much to the Happiness of Mankind: the Desires of them therefore must have the like Sensations assisting them, to prevent our indulging a nasty solitary Luxury. The Happiness of human Life cannot be promoted without Society and mutual Aid, even beyond a Family; our publick Affections must therefore be strengthned as well as the private, to keep a Ballance; so must also our Desires of Virtue and Honour. Anger, which some have thought an useless Passion, is really as necessary as the rest; since Men's Interests often seem to interfere with each other; and they are thereby led from Self-Love to do the worst Injuries to their Fellows. There could not therefore be a wiser Contrivance to restrain Injuries, than to make every mortal some way formidable to an unjust Invader, by such a violent Passion. We need not have recourse to a Prometheus in this matter, with the old Poets: they might have ascribed it to their Optimus Maximus.
—Insani Leonis,
Vim Stomacho apposuisse nostro.
A Ballance may be still preserved. With this Ballance of publick Passions against the private, with our Passions toward Honour and Virtue, we find that human Nature may be as really amiable in its low Sphere, as superior Natures endowed with higher Reason, and influenced only by pure Desires; provided we vigorously exercise the Powers we have in keeping this Ballance of Affections, and checking any Passion which grows so violent, as to be inconsistent with the publick Good. If we have selfish Passions for our own Preservation, we have also publick Passions, which may engage us into vigorous and laborious Services to Offspring, Friends, Communities, Countries. Compassion will engage us to succour the distressed, even with our private Loss or Danger. An Abhorrence of the injurious, and Love toward the injured, with a Sense of Virtue, and Honour, can make us despise Labour, Expence, Wounds and Death.
The Sensations of Joy or Sorrow, upon the Success or Disappointment of any Pursuit, either publick or private, have directly the Effect of Rewards or Punishments, to excite us to act with the utmost Vigor, either for our own Advantage, or that of others, for the future, and to punish past Negligence. The Moment of every Event is thereby increased: as much as the Sensations of Sorrow add to our Misery, so much those of Joy add to our Happiness. Nay, since we have some considerable Power over our Desires, as shall be explained hereafter, we may probably, by good Conduct, obtain more frequent Pleasures of Joy upon our Success, than Pains of Sorrow upon Disappointment.
A just Balance very rare. 'Tis true indeed, that there are few Tempers to be found, wherein these Sensations of the several Passions are in such a Ballance, as in all cases to leave the Mind in a proper State, for considering the Importance of every Action or Event. The Sensations of Anger in some Tempers are violent above their proportion; those of Ambition, Avarice, desire of sensual Pleasure, and even of natural Affection, in several Dispositions, possess the Mind too much, and make it incapable of attending to any thing else. Scarce any one Temper is always constant and uniform in its Passions. The best State of human Nature possible, might require a Diversity of Passions and Inclinations, for the different Occupations necessary for the whole: But the Disorder seems to be much greater than is requisite for this End. Custom, Education, Habits, and Company, may often contribute much to this Disorder, however its Original may be ascribed to some more universal Cause. But it is not so great, but that human Life is still a desireable State, having a superiority of Goodness and Happiness. Nor, if we apply ourselves to it, does it hinder us from discerning that just Ballance and Oeconomy, which would constitute the most happy State of each Person, and promote the greatest Good in the whole.
Dispositions to some particular Passions. Let Physicians or Anatomists explain the several Motions in the Fluids or Solids of the Body, which accompany any Passion; or the Temperaments of Body which either make Men prone to any Passion, or are brought upon us by the long Continuance, or frequent Returns of it. It is only to our Purpose in general to observe, that probably certain Motions in the Body do accompany every Passion by a fixed Law of Nature; and alternately, that Temperament which is apt to receive or prolong these Motions in the Body, does influence our Passions to heighten or prolong them.
Thus a certain Temperament may be brought upon the Body, by its being frequently put into Motion by the Passions of Anger, Joy, Love, or Sorrow; and the Continuance of this Temperament shall make Men prone to the several Passions for the future. We find ourselves after a long Fit of Anger or Sorrow, in an uneasy State, even when we are not reflecting on the particular Occasion of our Passion. During this State, every trifle shall be apt to provoke or deject us. On the contrary, after good Success, after strong friendly Passions, or a State of Mirth, some considerable Injuries or Losses, which at other times would have affected us very much, shall be overlooked, or meekly received, or at most but slightly resented; perhaps because our Bodies are not fit easily to receive these Motions which are constituted the Occasion of the uneasy Sensations of Anger. This Diversity of Temper every one has felt, who reflects on himself at different Times. In some Tempers it will appear like Madness. Whether the only Seat of these Habits, or the Occasion rather of these Dispositions, be in the Body; or whether the Soul itself does not, by frequent Returns of any Passion acquire some greater Disposition to receive and retain it again, let those determine, who sufficiently understand the Nature of either the one or the other.
Whoever would see subtile Divisions of those Sensations, let him read Malebranche's Recherche de la Verite, B. v. c. 3. Together with these Sensations there are also some strong Propensities distinct from any rational Desire: About which see Sect. 3. Art. 2. of this Treatise.
The Schoolmen express this Distinction by the Appetitus rationalis and the Appetitus Sensitivus. All Animals have in common the External Senses suggesting notions of things as pleasant or painful; and have also the Appetitus Sensitivus, or some instinctive Desires and Aversions. Rational Agents have, superadded to these, two higher analogous Powers; viz. the Understanding, or Reason, presenting farther notions, and attended with an higher sort of Sensations; and the Appetitus rationalis. This latter is a constant natural Disposition of Soul to desire what the Understanding, or these sublimer Sensations, represent as Good, and to shun what they represent as Evil, and this either when it respects ourselves or others.
This many call the Will as distinct from the Passions. Some later Writers seem to have forgot it, by ascribing to the Understanding not only Ideas, Notions, Knowledge; but Action, Inclinations, Desires, Prosecution, and their Contraries.
See Treat. IV. Sect. 6. Art. 6, last Paragraph.
See Treatise II. Sect. 2. Art. 4. p. 143.
Treatise IV. Sect. 6. Art. 4.
See Treatise II. Sect. 7. Art. 9. last Parag.
See Marcus Aurelius, in many places.
See Simplicius on Epictetus, Cap. 34. And the Archbishop of Dublin, De Origine Mali, above all others on this subject.