THE Nature of human Actions cannot be sufficiently understood without considering the Affections and Passions; or those Modifications, or Actions of the Mind consequent upon the Apprehension of certain Objects or Events, in which the Mind generally conceives Good or Evil. In this Inquiry we need little Reasoning, or Argument, since Certainty is only attainable by distinct Attention to what we are conscious happens in our Minds.
Objects, Actions, or Events obtain the Name of Good, or Evil, according as they are the Causes, or Occasions, mediately, or immediately, of a grateful, or ungrateful Perception to some sensitive Nature.
To understand therefore the several Kinds of Good, or Evil, we must apprehend the several Powers of Perception or Senses natural to us.
It is by some Power of Perception, or Sense, that we first receive the Ideas of these Objects we are conversant with, or by some Reasoning upon these perceived Objects of Sense. By Sensation we not only receive the Image or Representation, but some Feelings of Pleasure or Pain; nay sometimes the sole Perception is that of Pleasure or Pain, as in Smells, and the Feelings of Hunger and Thirst. The Pleasures or Pains perceived, are sometimes simple, without any other previous Idea, or any Image, or other concomitant Ideas, save those of Duration or Time, which accompanies every Perception, whether of Sense, or inward Consciousness. Other Pleasures arise only upon some previous Idea, or Image, Assemblage, or Comparison of Ideas. These Pleasures presupposing previous Ideas, were called Perceptions of an internal Sense, in a former Treatise[1]. Thus Regularity and Uniformity in Figures, are no less grateful than Tastes, or Smells; the Harmony of Notes, is more grateful than simple Sounds[2]. In like manner, Affections, Tempers, Sentiments, or Actions, reflected upon in ourselves, or observed in others, are the constant Occasions of agreeable or disagreeable Perceptions, which we call Approbation, or Dislike. These Moral Perceptions arise in us as necessarily as any other Sensations; nor can we alter, or stop them, while our previous Opinion or Apprehension of the Affection, Temper, or Intention of the Agent continues the same; any more than we can make the Taste of Wormwood sweet, or that of Honey bitter.
If we may call every Determination of our Minds to receive Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and Pain, ^a Sense^
, we shall find many other Senses beside those commonly explained. Though it is not easy to assign accurate Divisions on such Subjects, yet we may reduce them to the following Classes, leaving it to others to arrange them as they think convenient. A little Reflection will shew that there are such Natural Powers in the human Mind, in whatever Order we place them. In the 1st Class are the External Senses, universally known. In the 2d, the Pleasant Perceptions arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also from Grandeur and Novelty. These we may call, after Mr. Addison, the Pleasures of the Imagination; or we may call the Power of receiving them, an Internal Sense. Whoever dislikes this Name may substitute another. 3. The next Class of Perceptions we may call a Publick Sense, viz. our Determination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their Misery.
This is found in some degree in all Men, and was sometimes called Ḱοινονοημοσύνη, or Sensus Communis by some of the Antients. This inward Pain of Compassion cannot be called a Sensation of Sight. It solely arises from an Opinion of Misery felt by another, and not immediately from a visible Form. The same Form presented to the Eye by the exactest Painting, or the Action of a Player, gives no Pain to those who remember that there is no Misery felt. When Men by Imagination conceive real Pain felt by an Actor, without recollecting that it is merely feigned, or when they think of the real Story represented, then, as there is a confused Opinion of real Misery, there is also Pain in Compassion. 4. The fourth Class we may call the Moral Sense, by which we perceive Virtue or Vice, in ourselves, or others.
This is plainly distinct from the former Class of Perceptions, since many are strongly affected with the Fortunes of others, who seldom reflect upon Virtue or Vice, in themselves, or others, as an Object: as we may find in Natural Affection, Compassion, Friendship, or even general Benevolence to Mankind, which connect our Happiness or Pleasure with that of others, even when we are not reflecting upon our own Temper, nor delighted with the Perception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth Class is a Sense of Honour, which makes the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have done, the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their Dislike, Condemnation, or Resentment of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy Sensation called Shame, even when we fear no further evil from them.
There are perhaps other Perceptions distinct from all these Classes, such as some Ideas of Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Nature in certain Actions and Circumstances; and of an Indecency, Meanness, and Unworthiness, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, even without any conception of Moral Good, or Evil.
Thus the Pleasures of Sight, and Hearing, are more esteemed than those of Taste or Touch: The Pursuits of the Pleasures of the Imagination, are more approved than those of simple external Sensations. Plato makes one of his Dialogists[3] account for this difference from a constant Opinion of Innocence in this sort of Pleasures, which would reduce this Perception to the Moral Sense. Others may imagine that the difference is not owing to any such Reflection upon their Innocence, but that there is a different sort of Perceptions in these cases, to be reckoned another Class of Sensations.
A like Division of our Desires. Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable Sensation, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the uneasy Sensation, when it is evil. Our original Desires and Aversions may therefore be divided into five Classes, answering to the Classes of our Senses. 1. The Desire of sensual Pleasure, (by which we mean that of the external Senses, of Taste and Touch chiefly); and Aversion to the opposite Pains. 2. The Desires of the Pleasures of Imagination or Internal Sense[4], and Aversion to what is disagreeable to it. 3. Desires of the Pleasures arising from Publick Happiness, and Aversion to the Pains arising from the Misery of others. 4. Desires of Virtue, and Aversion to Vice, according to the Notions we have of the Tendency of Actions to the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 5. Desires of Honour, and Aversion to Shame[5].
Secondary Desires of Wealth and Power. And since we are capable of Reflection, Memory, Observation, and Reasoning about the distant Tendencies of Objects and Actions, and not confined to things present, there must arise, in consequence of our original Desires, secondary Desires of every thing imagined useful to gratify any of the primary Desires, and that with strength proportioned to the several original Desires, and the imagined Usefulness, or Necessity, of the advantageous Object.
Thus as soon as we come to apprehend the Use of Wealth or Power to gratify any of our original Desires, we must also desire them. Hence arises the Universality of these Desires of Wealth and Power, since they are the Means of gratifying all other Desires. How foolish then is the Inference, some would make, from the universal Prevalence of these Desires, that human Nature is wholly selfish, or that each one is only studious of his own Advantage; since Wealth or Power are as naturally fit to gratify our Publick Desires, or to serve virtuous Purposes, as the selfish ones?
How weak also are the Reasonings of some recluse Moralists, who condemn in general all Pursuits of Wealth or Power, as below a perfectly virtuous Character:
since Wealth and Power are the most effectual Means, and the most powerful Instruments, even of the greatest Virtues, and most generous Actions? The Pursuit of them is laudable, when the Intention is virtuous; and the neglect of them, when honourable Opportunities offer, is really a Weakness. This justifies the Poet's Sentiments:
——— Hic onus horret,
Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpore majus:
Hic subit & perfert: aut virtus nomen inane est,
Aut Decus & Pretium recte petit experiens Vir.
Hor. Epist. 17.
Further, the Laws or Customs of a Country, the Humour of our Company may have made strange Associations of Ideas, so that some Objects, which of themselves are indifferent to any Sense, by reason of some additional grateful Idea, may become very desirable; or by like Addition of an ungrateful Idea may raise the strongest Aversion. Thus many a Trifle, when once it is made a Badge of Honour, an Evidence of some generous Disposition, a Monument of some great Action, may be impatiently pursued, from our Desire of Honour. When any Circumstance, Dress, State, Posture, is constituted as a Mark of Infamy, it may become in like manner the Object of Aversion, though in itself most inoffensive to our Senses. If a certain way of Living, of receiving Company, of shewing Courtesy, is once received among those who are honoured; they who cannot bear the Expence of all this, may be made uneasy at their Condition, though much freer from Trouble than that of higher Stations. Thus Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions are made Matters of considerable Importance by additional Ideas[6]. Nor is it in vain that the wisest and greatest Men regard these things; for however it may concern them to break such Associations in their own Minds, yet, since the bulk of Mankind will retain them, they must comply with their Sentiments and Humours in things innocent, as they expect the publick Esteem, which is generally necessary to enable Men to serve the Publick.
The Uses of these Associations. Should any one be surprized at this Disposition in our Nature to associate any Ideas together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly, considering what great Evils, and how much Corruption of Affections is owing to it, it may help to account for this Part of our Constitution, to consider that all our Language and much of our Memory depends upon it:
So that were there no such Associations made, we must lose the use of Words, and a great part of our Power of recollecting past Events; beside many other valuable Powers and Arts which depend upon them. Let it also be considered that it is much in our power by a vigorous Attention either to prevent these Associations, or by Abstraction to separate Ideas when it may be useful for us to do so.
Concerning our Pursuit of Honour, it is to be observed, that since our Minds are incapable of retaining a great Diversity of Objects, the Novelty, or Singularity of any Object is enough to raise a particular Attention to it among many of equal Merit:
And therefore were Virtue universal among Men, yet, it is probable, the Attention of Observers would be turned chiefly toward those who distinguished themselves by some singular Ability, or by some Circumstance, which, however trifling in its own Nature, yet had some honourable Ideas commonly joined to it, such as those of Magnificence, Generosity, or the like. We should perhaps, when we considered sedately the common Virtues of others, equally love and esteem them[7]: And yet probably our Attention would be generally fixed to those who thus were distinguished from the Multitude. Hence our natural Love of Honour, raises in us an Emulation or Desire of Eminence, either by higher Degrees of Virtue; or, if we cannot easily or probably obtain it this way, we attempt it in an easier manner, by any Circumstance, which, through a Confusion of Ideas, is reputed honourable.
This Desire of Distinction has great Influence on the Pleasures and Pains of Mankind, and makes them chuse things for their very Rarity, Difficulty, or Expence; by a confused Imagination that they evidence Generosity, Ability, or a finer Taste than ordinary; nay, often the merest Trifles are by these means ardently pursued. A Form of Dress, a foreign Dish, a Title, a Place, a Jewel; an useless Problem, a Criticism on an obsolete Word, the Origin of a Poetic Fable, the Situation of a razed Town, may employ many an Hour in tedious Labour:
Sic leve, sic parvum est, animum quod laudis avarum
Subruit aut reficit.—
Hor.
Desires, selfish and publick. There is another Division of our Desires taken from the Persons for whose Advantage we pursue or shun any Object. The Desires in which one intends or pursues what he apprehends advantageous to himself, we may call Selfish; and those in which we pursue what we apprehend advantageous to others, and do not apprehend advantageous to ourselves, or do not pursue with this view, we may call Publick or Benevolent Desires.
If there be a just Foundation for this Division, it is more extensive than the former Division, since each of the former Classes may come under either Member of this Division, according as we are desiring any of the five sorts of Pleasures for ourselves, or desiring them for others. The former Division may therefore be conceived as a Subdivision of the latter.
This Division has been disputed since Epicurus; who with his old Followers, and some of late, who detest other parts of his Scheme, maintain, that all our Desires are selfish: or, that what every one intends or designs ultimately, in each Action, is the obtaining Pleasure to himself, or the avoiding his own Private Pain.
[8]
It requires a good deal of Subtilty to defend this Scheme, so seemingly opposite to Natural Affection, Friendship, Love of a Country, or Community, which many find very strong in their Breasts. The Defences and Schemes commonly offered, can scarce free the Sustainers of this Cause from manifest Absurdity and Affectation. But some do[9] acknowledge a publick Sense in many Instances; especially in natural Affection, and Compassion; by which the Observation of the Happiness of others is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their Misery the Occasion of Pain to the Observer.
That this Sympathy with others is the Effect of the Constitution of our Nature, and not brought upon ourselves by any Choice, with view to any selfish Advantage, they must own: whatever Advantage there may be in Sympathy with the Fortunate, none can be alledged in Sympathy with the Distressed: And every one feels that this publick Sense will not leave his Heart, upon a change of the Fortunes of his Child or Friend; nor does it depend upon a Man's Choice, whether he will be affected with their Fortunes or not. But supposing this publick Sense, they insist, That by means of it there is a Conjunction of Interest: the Happiness of others becomes the Means of private Pleasure to the Observer; and for this Reason, or with a View to this private Pleasure, he desires the Happiness of another.
Others deduce our Desire of the Happiness of others from Self-love, in a less specious manner.
If a publick Sense be acknowledged in Men, by which the Happiness of one is made to depend upon that of others, independently of his Choice, this is indeed a strong Evidence of the Goodness of the Author of our Nature. But whether this Scheme does truly account for our Love of others, or for generous Offices, may be determined from the following Considerations; which being matters of internal Consciousness, every one can best satisfy himself by Attention, concerning their Truth and Certainty.
Let it be premised, that there is a certain Pain or Uneasiness accompanying our violent Desires. Though the Object pursued be Good, or the Means of Pleasure, yet the Desire of it generally is attended with an uneasy Sensation. When an Object or Event appears Evil, we desire to shun or prevent it. This Desire is also attended with an uneasy Sensation of Impatience: Now this Sensation immediately connected with the Desire, is a distinct Sensation from those which we dread, and endeavour to shun. It is plain then,
That no Desire of any Event is excited by any view of removing the uneasy Sensation attending this Desire itself.
Uneasy Sensations previously felt, will raise a Desire of whatever will remove them; and this Desire may have its concomitant Uneasiness. Pleasant Sensations expected from any Object may raise our Desire of it; this Desire too may have its concomitant uneasy Sensations: But the uneasy Sensation, accompanying and connected with the Desire itself, cannot be a Motive to that Desire which it presupposes. The Sensation accompanying Desire is generally uneasy, and consequently our Desire is never raised with a view to obtain or continue it; nor is the Desire raised with a view to remove this uneasy Sensation, for the Desire is raised previously to it. This holds concerning all Desire publick or private.
There is also a peculiar pleasant Sensation of Joy, attending the Gratification of any Desire, beside the Sensation received from the Object itself, which we directly intended. But Desire does never arise from a View of obtaining that Sensation of Joy, connected with the Success or Gratification of Desire; otherwise the strongest Desires might arise toward any Trifle, or an Event in all respects indifferent: Since, if Desire arose from this View, the stronger the Desire were, the higher would be the Pleasure of Gratification; and therefore we might desire the turning of a Straw as violently as we do Wealth or Power.
This Expectation of that Pleasure which merely arises from gratifying of Desire, would equally excite us to desire the Misery of others as their Happiness; since the Pleasure of Gratification might be obtained from both Events alike.
It is certain that that Desire of the Happiness of others which we account virtuous, is not directly excited by prospects of any secular Advantage, Wealth, Power, Pleasure of the external Senses, Reward from the Deity, or future Pleasures of Self-Approbation.
To prove this let us consider, That no Desire of any Event can arise immediately or directly from an Opinion in the Agent, that his having such a Desire will be the Means of private Good.
This Opinion would make us wish or desire to have that advantageous Desire or Affection; and would incline us to use any means in our power to raise that Affection: but no Affection or Desire is raised in us, directly by our volition or desiring it. That alone which raises in us from Self-Love the Desire of any Event, is an Opinion that that Event is the Means of private Good. As soon as we form this Opinion, a Desire of the Event immediately arises: But if having the Desire, or the mere Affection be imagined the Means of private Good, and not the Existence of the Event desired, then from Self-Love we should only desire or wish to have the Desire of that Event, and should not desire the Event itself, since the Event is not conceived as the Means of Good.
For instance, suppose God revealed to us that he would confer Happiness on us, if our Country were happy; then from Self-Love we should have immediately the subordinate Desire of our Country's Happiness, as the Means of our own. But were we assured that, whether our Country were happy or not, it should not affect our future Happiness; but that we should be rewarded, provided we desired the Happiness of our Country; our Self-Love could never make us now desire the Happiness of our Country, since it is not now conceived as the Means of our future Happiness, but is perfectly indifferent to it. The Means of our Happiness is the having a Desire of our Country's Happiness; we should therefore from Self-Love only wish to have this Desire.
It is true indeed in fact, that, because Benevolence is natural to us, a little Attention to other Natures will raise in us good-will towards them, whenever by any Opinions we are persuaded that there is no real Opposition of Interest. But had we no Affection distinct from Self-Love, nothing could raise our Desire of the Happiness of others, but conceiving their Happiness as the Means of ours. An Opinion that our having kind Affections would be the Means of our private Happiness, would only make us desire to have those Affections. Now that Affections do not arise upon our wishing to have them, or our volition of raising them; as conceiving the Affections themselves to be the Means of private Good; is plain from this, that if they did thus arise, then a Bribe might raise any Desire toward any Event, or any Affection toward the most improper Object. We might be hired to love or hate any sort of Persons, to be angry, jealous, or compassionate, as we can be engaged into external Actions; which we all see to be absurd. Now those who alledge, that our Benevolence may arise from prospect of secular Advantage, Honour, Self-Approbation, or future Rewards, must own, that the two former are Motives only to external Actions; and the other two only shew that having the Desire of the Happiness of others, would be the Means of private Good; while the Event desired, viz. the Happiness of others, is not supposed the Means of any private Good. But the best Defenders of this part of the Scheme of Epicurus, acknowledge that Desires are not raised by Volition.
This Distinction Defended. There are in Men Desires of the Happiness of others, when they do not conceive this Happiness as the Means of obtaining any sort of Happiness to themselves.
Self-Approbation, or Rewards from the Deity, might be the Ends, for obtaining which we might possibly desire or will from Self-Love, to raise in ourselves kind Affections; but we could not from Self-Love desire the Happiness of others, except we imagined their Happiness to be the Means of our own. Now it is certain that sometimes we may have this subordinate Desire of the Happiness of others, conceived as the Means of our own; as suppose one had laid a Wager upon the Happiness of a Person of such Veracity, that he would own sincerely whether he were happy or not; when Men are Partners in Stock, and share in Profit or Loss; when one hopes to succeed to, or some way to share in the Prosperity of another; or if the Deity had given such Threatnings, as they tell us Telamon gave his Sons when they went to War, that he would reward or punish one according as others were happy or miserable: In such cases one might have this subordinate Desire of another's Happiness from Self-Love. But as we are sure the Deity has not given such Comminations, so we often are conscious of the Desire of the Happiness of others, without any such Conception of it as the Means of our own; and are sensible that this subordinate Desire is not that virtuous Affection which we approve. The virtuous Benevolence must be an ultimate Desire, which would subsist without view to private Good. Such ultimate publick Desires we often feel, without any subordinate Desire of the same Event, as the Means of private Good. The subordinate may sometimes, nay often does concur with the ultimate; and then indeed the whole Moment of these conspiring Desires may be greater than that of either alone: But the subordinate alone is not that Affection which we approve as virtuous.
Benevolence is not the Desire of the Pleasures of the publick Sense. This will clear our way to answer the chief Difficulty: May not our Benevolence be at least a Desire of the Happiness of others, as the Means of obtaining the Pleasures of the publick Sense, from the Contemplation of their Happiness?
If it were so, it is very unaccountable that we should approve this subordinate Desire as virtuous, and yet not approve the like Desire upon a Wager, or other Considerations of Interest. Both Desires proceed from Self-Love in the same manner: In the latter case the Desires might be extended to multitudes, if any one would wager so capriciously; and, by increasing the Sum wagered, the Motive of Interest might, with many Tempers, be made stronger than that from the Pleasures of the publick Sense.
Do not we find that we often desire the Happiness of others without any such selfish Intention? How few have thought upon this part of our Constitution which we call a Publick Sense? Were it our only View, in Compassion to free ourselves from the Pain of the publick Sense; should the Deity propose it to our Choice, either to obliterate all Ideas of the Person in Distress, or to harden our Hearts against all feelings of Compassion, on the one hand, while yet the Object continued in Misery; or on the other hand to relieve him from it; should we not upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, and chuse the former as soon as the latter? Should the Deity assure us that we should be immediately annihilated, so that we should be incapable of either Pleasure or Pain, but that it should depend upon our Choice at our very Exit, whether our Children, our Friends, or our Country should be happy or miserable; should we not upon this Scheme be entirely indifferent? Or, if we should even desire the pleasant Thought of their Happiness, in our last Moment, would not this Desire be the faintest imaginable?
It is true, our Publick Sense might be as acute at our Exit as ever; as a Man's Taste of Meat or Drink and his Sensations of Hunger and Thirst might be as lively the instant before his Dissolution as in any part of his Life. But would any Man have as strong Desires of the Means of obtaining these Pleasures, only with a view to himself, when he was to perish the next Moment? Is it supposable that any Desire of the Means of private Pleasure can be as strong when we only expect to enjoy it a Minute, as when we expect the Continuance of it for many Years? And yet, it is certain, any good Man would as strongly desire at his Exit the Happiness of others, as in any part of his Life, which must be the Case with those who voluntarily hazard their Lives, or resolve on Death for their Country or Friends. We do not therefore desire it as the Means of private Pleasure.
Should any alledge, that this Desire of the Happiness of others, after our Exit, is from some confused Association of Ideas; as a Miser, who loves nobody, might desire an Increase of Wealth at his Death; or as any one may have an Aversion to have his Body dissected, or made a Prey to Dogs after Death: let any honest Heart try if the deepest Reflection will break this Association (if there be any) which is supposed to raise the Desire. The closest Reflection would be found rather to strengthen it. How would any Spectator like the Temper of one thus rendered indifferent to all others at his own Exit, so that he would not even open his Mouth to procure Happiness to Posterity? Would we esteem it refined Wisdom, or a Perfection of Mind, and not rather the vilest Perverseness? It is plain then we feel this ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others to be a most natural Instinct, which we also expect in others, and not the Effect of any confused Ideas.
The Occasion of the imagined Difficulty in conceiving distinterested Desires, has probably been attempting to define this simple Idea, Desire. It is called an uneasy Sensation in the absence of Good[10]. Whereas Desire is as distinct from any Sensation, as the Will is from the Understanding or Senses. This every one must acknowledge, who speaks of desiring to remove Uneasiness or Pain.
We may perhaps find, that our Desires are so far from tending always towards private Good, that they are oftner employed about the State of others. Nay further, we may have a Propensity toward an Event, which we neither apprehend as the Means of private Good, or publick. Thus an Epicurean who denies a future State; or, one to whom God revealed that he should be annihilated, might at his very Exit desire a future Fame, from which he expected no Pleasure to himself, nor intended any to others. Such Desires indeed no selfish Being, who had the modelling of his own Nature, would chuse to implant in itself. But since we have not this power, we must be content to be thus outwitted by nature into a publick Interest against our Will;
as an ingenious Author expresses it.
The Prospect of any Interest may be a Motive to us, to desire whatever we apprehend as the Means of obtaining it. Particularly, if Rewards of any kind are proposed to those who have virtuous Affections, this would raise in us the Desire of having these Affections, and would incline us to use all Means to raise them in ourselves; particularly to turn our Attention to all those Qualities in the Deity, or our Fellows, which are naturally apt to raise the virtuous Affections.
Thus it is, that Interest of any kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, and Rewards particularly may over-balance all Motives to Vice.
This may let us see, that the Sanctions of Rewards and Punishments, as proposed in the Gospel, are not rendered useless or unnecessary, by supposing the virtuous Affection to be disinterested;
since such Motives of Interest, proposed and attended to, must incline every Person to desire to have virtuous Affections, and to turn his Attention to every thing which is naturally apt to raise them; and must over-balance every other Motive of Interest, opposite to these Affections, which could incline Men to suppress or counteract them.
Inquiry into Beauty.
It is not easy to divide definitely our several Sensations into Classes. The Division of our External Senses into the five common Classes, seems very imperfect. Some Sensations, received without any previous Idea, can either be reduced to none of them, such as the Sensations of Hunger, Thirst, Weariness, Sickness; or if we reduce them to the Sense of Feeling, they are Perceptions as different from the other Ideas of Touch, such as Cold, Heat, Hardness, Softness, as the Ideas of Taste or Smell. Others have hinted at an External Sense different from all of these. The following general Account may possibly be useful. (1.) That certain Motions raised in our Bodies are by a general Law constituted the Occasion of Perceptions in the Mind. (2.) These Perceptions never come entirely alone, but have some other Perception joined with them. Thus every Sensation is accompanied with the Idea of Duration, and yet Duration is not a sensible Idea, since it also accompanies Ideas of Internal Consciousness or Reflection: So the Idea of Number may accompany any sensible Ideas, and yet may also accompany any other Ideas, as well as external Sensations. Brutes, when several Objects are before them, have probably all the proper Ideas of Sight which we have, without the Idea of Number. (3.) Some Ideas are found accompanying the most different Sensations, which yet are not to be perceived separately from some sensible Quality; such are Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, which accompany the Ideas of Sight, or Colours, and yet may be perceived without them, as in the Ideas of Touch, at least if we move our Organs along the Parts of the Body touched. Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest seem therefore to be more properly called Ideas accompanying the Sensations of Sight and Touch, than the Sensations of either of these Senses. The Perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper Sense, are Tastes, Smells, Colours, Sound, Cold, Heat, &c. The universal Concomitant Ideas which may attend any Idea whatsoever, are Duration, and Number. The Ideas which accompany the most different Sensations, are Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest. These all arise without any previous Ideas assembled, or compared: the Concomitant Ideas are reputed Images of something External. From all these we may justly distinguish those Pleasures perceived upon the previous Reception and Comparison of various sensible Perceptions, with their concomitant Ideas, or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Resemblance among them.
These are meant by the Perceptions of the internal Sense.
Hippias Major. See also Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 7.
See Treat. I.
See Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 3-8.
See Treat. I. Sect. 1. Art. 7. and Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 6.
See Treat. II. Sect. 3. last Parag.
See Cicero de finib. lib. 1.
See Mr. Clark of Hull, his Remarks on Treat. II. in his Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice.
See Mr. Lock's Essay on Human Understanding in the Chap. on the Passions.