THE Roman Satirist may be thought more than ordinarily satirical, when speaking of the Nobility and Court, he is so far from allowing them to be the Standard of Politeness and good Sense, that he makes 'em in a manner the Reverse.
[1]Rare is common sense in men of that rank.
Some of the[2] most ingenious Commentators, however, interpret this very differently from what is generally apprehended. They make this Common Sense of the Poet, by a Greek Derivation, to signify Sense of Publick Weal, and of the Common Interest; Love of the Community or Society, natural Affection, Humanity, Obligingness, or that sort of Civility which rises from a just Sense of the common Rights of Mankind, and the natural Equality there is among those of the same Species.
And indeed if we consider the thing nicely, it must seem somewhat hard in the Poet, to have deny'd Wit or Ability to a Court such as that of Rome, even under a Tiberius or a Nero. But for Humanity or Sense of Publick Good, and the common Interest of Mankind, 'twas no such deep Satir to question whether this was properly the Spirit of a Court. 'Twas difficult to apprehend what Community subsisted among Courtiers; or what Publick between an absolute Prince and his Slave-Subjects. And for real Society, there cou'd be none between such as had no other Sense than that of private Good.
Our Poet therefore seems not so immoderate in his Censure; if we consider it is the Heart, rather than the Head, he takes to task: when reflecting on a Court-Education, he thinks it unapt to raise any Affection towards a Country; and looks upon young Princes, and Lords, as the young Masters of the World; who being indulg'd in all their Passions, and train'd up in all manner of Licentiousness, have that thorow Contempt and Disregard of Mankind, which Mankind in a manner deserves, where Arbitrary Power is permitted, and a Tyranny ador'd.
[3] So much for the young man whom fame gives out as proud and puffed-up, and full of his relationship to Nero.
A publick Spirit can come only from a social Feeling or Sense of Partnership with human Kind. Now there are none so far from being Partners in this Sense, or Sharers in this common Affection, as they who scarcely know an Equal, nor consider themselves as subject to any Law of Fellowship or Community. And thus Morality and good Government go together. There is no real Love of Virtue, without the knowledg of Publick Good. And where absolute Power is, there is no Publick.
They who live under a Tyranny, and have learnt to admire its Power as Sacred and Divine, are debauch'd as much in their Religion, as in their Morals. Publick Good, according to their apprehension, is as little the Measure or Rule of Government in the Universe, as in the State. They have scarce a Notion of what is good or just, other than as mere Will and Power have determin'd. Omnipotence, they think, wou'd hardly be it-self, were it not at liberty to[4] dispense with the Laws of Equity, and change at pleasure the Standard of moral Rectitude.
But notwithstanding the Prejudices and Corruptions of this kind, 'tis plain there is something still of a publick Principle, even where it is most perverted and depress'd. The worst of Magistracys, the mere Despotick kind, can shew sufficient Instances of Zeal and Affection towards it. Where no other Government is known, it seldom fails of having that Allegiance and Duty paid it, which is owing to a better Form. The Eastern Countrys, and many barbarous Nations, have been and still are Examples of this kind. The personal Love they bear their Prince, however severe towards them, may shew, how natural an Affection there is towards Government and Order among Mankind. If Men have really no publick Parent, no Magistrate in common to cherish and protect 'em, they will still imagine they have such a one; and, like new-born Creatures who have never seen their Dam, will fansy one for themselves, and apply (as by Nature prompted) to some like Form, for Favour and Protection. In the room of a true Foster-Father, and Chief, they will take after a false one; and in the room of a legal Government and just Prince, obey even a Tyrant, and endure a whole Lineage and Succession of such.
As for us Britons, thank Heaven, we have a better Sense of Government deliver'd to us from our Ancestors. We have the Notion of a Publick, and a Constitution; how a Legislative, and how an Executive is model'd. We understand Weight and Measure in this kind, and can reason justly on the Balance of Power and Property. The Maxims we draw from hence, are as evident as those in Mathematicks. Our increasing Knowledg shews us every day, more and more, what CommonSense is in Politicks: And this must of necessity lead us to understand a like Sense in Morals; which is the Foundation.
'Tis ridiculous to say, there is any Obligation on Man to act sociably, or honestly, in a form'd Government; and not in that which is commonly call'd[5] the State of Nature. For, to speak in the fashionable Language of our modern Philosophy: Society being founded on a Compact; the Surrender made of every Man's private unlimited Right, into the hands of the Majority, or such as the Majority shou'd appoint, was of free Choice, and by a Promise.
Now the Promise it-self was made in the State of Nature: And that which cou'd make a Promise obligatory in the State of Nature, must make all other Acts of Humanity as much our real Duty, and natural Part. Thus Faith, Justice, Honesty, and Virtue, must have been as early as the State of Nature, or they cou'd never have been at all. The Civil Union, or Confederacy, cou'd never make Right or Wrong; if they subsisted not before. He who was free to any Villany before his Contract, will, and ought to make as free with his Contract, when he thinks fit. The Natural Knave has the same reason to be a Civil one; and may dispense with his politick Capacity as oft as he sees occasion: 'Tis only his Word stands in his way.—A Man is oblig'd to keep his Word. Why? Because he has given his Word to keep it.—Is not this a notable Account of the Original of moral Justice, and the Rise of Civil Government and Allegiance!
Rarus enim fermè Sensus communis in illâ
Fortunâ—
Juv. Sat. 8. v. 73.
Viz. The two Casaubons, Is. and Mer. Salmasius, and our English Gataker: See the first in Capitolinus, Vit. M. Ant. sub finem. The second in his Comment on M. Ant. lib. 1. sect. 13, & 16. Gataker on the same place; and Salmasius in the same Life of Capitolinus, at the end of his Annotations. The Greek word is Κοινονοημοσύνη, which Salmasius interprets, moderatam, usitatam & ordinariam hominis mentem quae in commune quodammodo consulit, nec omnia ad commodum suum refert, respectumque etiam habet eorum cum quibus versatur, modestè, modicéque de se sentiens. At contra inflati & superbi omnes se sibi tantùm suisque commodis natos arbitrantur, & prae se caeteros contemnunt & negligunt; & hi sunt qui Sensum Communem non habere rectè dici possunt. Nam ita Sensum Communem accipit Juvenalis, Sat. 8. Rarus enim fermè SENSUS COMMUNIS, &c. φιλανθρωπίαν & χρηστότητα Galenus vocat, quam Marcus de se loquens κοινονοημοσύνην; & alibi, ubi de eadem re loquitur, Μετριότητα καὶ Εὐγνωμοσύνην, qua gratiam illi fecerit Marcus simul eundi ad Germanicum Bellum ac sequendi se.
In the same manner Isaac Casaubon: Herodianus, says he, calls this the τὸ μέτριον καὶ ἰσόμετρον. Subjicit verò Antoninus quasi hanc vocem interpretans, καὶ τὸ ἐφει̑σθαι τοὶς φίλοις μήτε συνδειπνει̑ν αὐτῳ̑ πάντως, μήτε συναποδημει̑ν ἐπάναγκες.
This, I am persuaded, is the Sensus Communis of Horace, Sat. 3. lib. 1. which has been unobserv'd, as far as I can learn, by any of his Commentators: it being remarkable withal, that in this early Satir of Horace, before his latter days, and when his Philosophy as yet inclin'd to the less rigid Assertors of Virtue, he puts this Expression (as may be seen by the whole Satir taken together) into the Mouth of a Crispinus, or some ridiculous Mimick of that severe Philosophy, to which the Coinage of the word κοινονοημοσύνη properly belong'd. For so the Poet again (Sat. 4. v. 77.) uses the word SENSUS, speaking of those who without Sense of Manners, or common Society, without the least respect or deference to others, press rudely upon their Friends, and upon all Company in general, without regard to Time or Place, or any thing besides their selfish and brutish Humour:
—Haud illud quaerentes, num sine SENSU,
Tempore num faciant alieno.——ἀναισθητω̑ς,
as old Lambin interprets it, tho without any other Explanation; referring only to the Sensus Communis of Horace in that other Satir. Thus Seneca, Epist. 105. Odium autem ex offensa sic vitabis, neminem lacessendo gratuitò: à quo te SENSUS COMMUNIS tuebitur. And Cicero accordingly, Justitiae partes sunt, non violare homines: Verecundiae, non offendere. Lib. 1. de Off. It may be objected possibly by some, particularly vers'd in the Philosophy above-mention'd, that the κοίνος νοὺς, to which the Κοινονοημοσύνη seems to have relation, is of a different meaning. But they will consider withal how small the distinction was in that Philosophy, between the ὑπόληψις, and the vulgar αἴσθησις; how generally Passion was by those Philosophers brought under the Head of Opinion. And when they consider, besides this, the very Formation of the word Κοινονοημοσύνη upon the Model of the other femaliz'd Virtues, the Εὐγνωμοσύνη, Σωφροσύνη, Δικαιοσύνη, &c. they will no longer hesitate on this Interpretation.—The Reader may perhaps by this Note see better why the Latin Title of Sensus Communis has been given to this second Treatise. He may observe, withal, how the same Poet Juvenal uses the word Sensus, in Sat. 15. Haec nostri pars optima Sensûs.
Haec satis ad Juvenem, quem nobis fama superbum
Tradit, & inflatum, plenumque Nerone propinquo.
Juv. Sat. 8.
Inf. pag. 298.
VOL. II. p. 306, 310, &c.