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THUS have we endeavour'd to prove what was propos'd in the beginning. And since in the common and known Sense of Vice and Illness, no-one can be vitious or ill, except either,

It must follow, that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the Creature, insomuch that his compleatest State of Misery is made from hence; ^To be wicked or vitious, is to be miserable and unhappy^.

And since every vitious Action must in proportion, more or less, help towards this Mischief, and Self-ill; it must follow, Conclusion. That ^every vitious action must be self-injurious and ill^.

On the other side; the Happiness and Good of Virtue has been prov'd from the contrary Effect of other Affections, such as are according to Nature, and the OEconomy of the Species or Kind. We have cast up all those Particulars, from whence (as by way of Addition and Subtraction) the main Sum or general Account of Happiness, is either augmented or diminish'd. And if there be no Article exceptionable in this Scheme of Moral Arithmetick; the Subject treated may be said to have an Evidence as great as that which is found in Numbers, or Mathematicks. For let us carry Scepticism ever so far, let us doubt, if we can, of every thing about us; we cannot doubt of what passes within our-selves. Our Passions and Affections are known to us. They are certain, whatever the Objects may be, on which they are employ'd. Nor is it of any concern to our Argument, how these exterior Objects stand; whether they are Realitys, or mere Illusions; whether we wake or dream. For ill Dreams will be equally disturbing. And a good Dream, if Life be nothing else, will be easily and happily pass'd. In this Dream of Life, therefore, our Demonstrations have the same force; our Balance and OEconomy hold good, and our Obligation to Virtue is in every respect the same.

Upon the whole: There is not, I presume, the least degree of Certainty wanting in what has been said concerning the Preferableness of the mental Pleasures to the sensual; and even of the sensual, accompany'd with good Affection, and under a temperate and right use, to those which are no ways restrain'd, nor supported by any thing social or affectionate.

Nor is there less Evidence in what has been said, of the united Structure and Fabrick of the Mind, and of those Passions which constitute the Temper, or Soul; and on which its Happiness or Misery so immediately depend. It has been shewn, That in this Constitution, the impairing of any one Part must instantly tend to the disorder and ruin of other Parts, and of the Whole it-self; thro' the necessary Connexion and Balance of the Affections: That those very Passions thro' which Men are vitious, are of themselves a Torment and Disease; and that whatsoever is done which is knowingly ill, must be of ill Consciousness; and in proportion, as the Act is ill, must impair and corrupt social Enjoyment, and destroy both the Capacity of kind Affection, and the Consciousness of meriting any such. So that neither can we participate thus in Joy or Happiness with others, or receive Satisfaction from the mutual Kindness or imagin'd Love of others: on which, however, the greatest of all our Pleasures are founded.

If this be the Case of moral Delinquency; and if the State which is consequent to this Defection from Nature, be of all other the most horrid, oppressive, and miserable; 'twill appear, That to yield or consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a Breach of Interest, and leads to the greatest Ills: and, That on the other side, Every thing which is an Improvement of Virtue, or an Establishment of right Affection and Integrity, is an Advancement of Interest, and leads to the greatest and most solid Happiness and Enjoyment.

Thus the Wisdom of what rules, and is first and chief in Nature, has made it to be according to the private Interest and Good of every-one, to work towards the general Good; which if a Creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own Happiness and Welfare. He is, on this account, directly his own Enemy: Nor can he any otherwise be good or useful to himself, than as he continues good to Society, and to that Whole of which he is himself a Part. So that Virtue, which of all Excellencys and Beautys is the chief, and most amiable; that which is the Prop and Ornament of human Affairs; which upholds Communitys, maintains Union, Friendship, and Correspondence amongst Men; that by which Countrys, as well as private Familys, flourish and are happy; and for want of which, every-thing comely, conspicuous, great and worthy, must perish, and go to ruin; that single Quality, thus beneficial to all Society, and to Mankind in general, is found equally a Happiness and Good to each Creature in particular; and is that by which alone Man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable.

And, thus, Virtue is the Good, and Vice the Ill of every-one.