VVHat is Truth, was an Enquiry many Ages since; and it being that which all Mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists; and so acquaint our selves with the Nature of it, as to observe how the Mind distinguishes it from Falshood.
Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signifie nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signified by them, do agree or disagree one with another; which way of joining or separating of Signs, we call Proposition. So that Truth properly belongs only to Propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. Mental and Verbal; as there are two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, viz. Ideas and Words.
To form a clear Notion of Truth, it is very necessary to consider Truth of Thought, and Truth of Words, distinctly one from another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is unavoidable, in treating of mental Propositions, to make use of Words; and then the instances given of Mental Propositions, cease immediately to be barely Mental, and become Verbal. For a mental Proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the Ideas, as they are in our Minds stripp'd of Names, they lose the Nature of purely mental Propositions, as soon as they are put into Words.
And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal Propositions separately, is, That most Men, if not all, in their Thinking and Reasonings within themselves, make use of Words instead of Ideas; at least when the subject of their Meditation contains in it complex Ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our Ideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark to shew us, what are those Things, we have clear and perfect established Ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our Mind takes in Thinking and Reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any Propositions within our own Thoughts, about White or Black, Sweet or Bitter, a Triangle or a Circle, we can, and often do frame in our Minds the Ideas themselves, without reflecting on the Names: But when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more complex Ideas, as of a Man, Vitriol, Fortitude, Glory, we usually put the Name for the Idea, because the Ideas these Names stand for, being for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the Names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier occurr to our Thoughts, than the pure Ideas, and so we make use of these Words instead of the Ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within our selves, and make tacit mental Propositions. In Substances, as has been already noted, this is occasioned by the imperfection of our Ideas, we making the Name stand for the real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all. In Modes, it is occasioned by the great number of simple Ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being very much compounded, the Name occurrs much easier, than the complex Idea it self, which requires time and attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the Mind, even in those Men, who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those, who though they have ready, in their Memory, the greatest part of the common Words of their Language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their Lives, to consider what precise Ideas the most of them stood for: Some confused or obscure Notions have served their turns; and many who talk very much of Religion and Conscience, of Church and Faith, of Power and Right, of Obstructions and Humours, Melancholy and Choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their Thoughts and Meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the Things themselves, and lay by those Words, with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.
But to return to the consideration of Truth. We must, I say, observe two sorts of Propositions, that we are capable of making. First, Mental, wherein the Ideas in our Understandings are without the use of Words put together, or separated by the Mind, perceiving, or judging of their Agreement, or Disagreement. Secondly, Verbal Propositions, which are Words the signs of our Ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative Sentences. By which way of affirming or denying, these Signs, made by Sounds, are as it were, put together or separated one from another. So that Proposition consists in joining, or separating Signs; and Truth consists in the putting together, or separating these Signs, according as the Things they stand for agree or disagree.
Every one's Experience will satisfie him, that the Mind, either by perceiving or supposing the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas, does tacitly within it self put them into a kind of Proposition affirmative or negative, which I have endeavoured to express by the terms Putting together and Separating. But this Action of the Mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning Man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us, when we reason, judge, or suppose, than to be explained by Words. When a Man has in his Mind the Idea of two Lines, viz. the Side and Diagonal of a Square, whereof the Diagonal is an Inch long, he may have the Idea also of the division of that Line, into a certain number of equal parts; v. g. into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a Thousand, or any other Number, and may have the Idea of that Inch-Line, being divisible or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of Divisibility to agree or disagree to his Idea of that Line, he, as it were, joins or separates those two Ideas, viz. the Idea of that Line, and the Idea of that kind of Divisibility, and so makes a mental Proposition, which is true or false, according as such a kind of Divisibility, a Divisibility into such aliquot parts, does really agree to that Line, or no: And when Ideas are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they or the Things they stand for do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental Truth. But Truth of Words is something more, and that is the affirming or denying of Words one of another, as the Ideas they stand for agree or disagree: And this again is is twofold, either purely Verbal, and trifling, which I shall speak of, Chap. 10. or Real and instructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledge, which we have spoken of already.
But here again will be apt to occurr the same doubt about Truth, that did about Knowledge: And it will be objected, That if Truth be nothing but the joining or separating of Words in Propositions, as the Ideas they stand for agree or disagree in Men's Mind, the Knowledge of Truth is not so valuable a Thing, as it is taken to be; nor worth the Pains and Time Men imploy in the search of it: since by this account, it amounts to no more than the conformity of Words, to the Chimaeras of Men's Brains. Who knows not what odd Notions many Men's Heads are fill'd with, and what strange Ideas all Men's Brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the visionary World in our own Imaginations; nor have other Truth, but what as much concerns Harpies and Centaurs, as Men and Horses. For those, and the like, may be Ideas in our Heads, and have their agreement and disagreement there, as well as the Ideas of real Beings, and so have as true Propositions made about them. And 'twill be altogether as true a Proposition, to say all Centaurs are Animals, as that all Men are Animals; and the certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Propositions, the Words are put together according to the agreement of the Ideas in our Minds: And the agreement of the Idea of Animal, with that of Centaur, is as clear and visible to the Mind, as the agreement of the Idea of Animal, with that of Man; and so these two Propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such Truth to us?
Though what has been said in the fore-going Chapter, to distinguish real from imaginary Knowledge, might suffice here, in answer to this Doubt, to distinguish real Truth from chimerical, or (if you please,) barely nominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that though our Words signifie nothing but our Ideas, yet being designed by them to signifie Things, the Truth they contain, when put into Propositions, will be only Verbal, when they stand for Ideas in the Mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of Things. And therefore Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come under the distinction of Verbal and Real; that being only verbal Truth wherein Terms are joined, according to the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our Ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having an Exstence in Nature. But then it is they contain real Truth, when these signs are joined as our Ideas agree, and when our Ideas are such, as we know are capable of having an Existence in Nature; which in Substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.
Truth is the marking down in Words, the agreement or disagreement of Ideas as it is. Falshood is the marking down in Words, the agreement or disagreement of Ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these Ideas, thus marked by Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, so far only is the Truth real. The knowledge of this Truth, consists in knowing what Ideas the Words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those Ideas, according as it is marked by these Words.
But because Words are looked on as the great Conduits of Truth and Knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of Truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use of Words and Propositions, I shall more at large enquire, wherein the certainty of real Truths, contained in Propositions, consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to shew in what sort of universal Propositions we are capable of being certain of their real Truth, or Falshood. I shall begin with general Propositions, as those which most employ our Thoughts, and exercise our Contemplation. General Truths are most looked after by the Mind, as those that most enlarge our Knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to Knowledge.
Besides Truth taken in the strict sense before-mentioned, there are other sorts of Truths; as, 1. Moral Truth, which is speaking Things according to the persuasion of our own Minds, though the Proposition we speak agree not to the reality of Things. 2. Metaphysical Truth, which is nothing but the real Existence of Things, conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names. This, though it seems to consist in the very Beings of Things, yet when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit Proposition, whereby the Mind joins that particular Thing, to the Idea it had before setled with a name to it. But these Considerations of Truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them.