ALTHO' the main practical Principles, which are inculcated in this Treatise, have this Prejudice in their Favour, that they have been taught and propagated by the best of Men in all Ages, yet there is reason to fear that renewed Treatises upon Subjects so often well managed, may be looked upon as superfluous; especially since little is offered upon them which has not often been well said before. But beside that general Consideration, that old Arguments may sometimes be set in such a Light by one, as will convince those who were not moved by them, even when better expressed by another; since, for every Class of Writers, there are Classes of Readers adapted, who cannot relish any thing higher: Besides this, I say, the very Novelty of a Book may procure a little Attention, from those who over-look the Writings which the World has long enjoyed. And if by Curiosity, or any other means, some few can be engaged to turn their Thoughts to these important Subjects, about which a little Reflection will discover the Truth, and a thorough Consideration of it may occasion a great Increase of real Happiness; no Person need be ashamed of his Labours as useless, which do such Service to any of his Fellow-Creatures.
If any should look upon some Things in this Inquiry into the Passions, as too subtile for common Apprehension, and consequently not necessary for the Instruction of Men in Morals, which are the common business of Mankind: Let them consider, that the Difficulty on these Subjects arises chiefly from some previous Notions, equally difficult at least, which have been already received, to the great Detriment of many a Natural Temper; since many have been discouraged from all Attempts of cultivating kind generous Affections in themselves, by a previous Notion that there are no such Affections in Nature, and that all Pretence to them was only Dissimulation, Affectation, or at best some unnatural Enthusiasm. And farther, that to discover Truth on these Subjects, nothing more is necessary than a little Attention to what passes in our own Hearts, and consequently every Man may come to Certainty in these Points, without much Art or Knowledge of other Matters.
Whatever Confusion the Schoolmen introduced into Philosophy, some of their keenest Adversaries seem to threaten it with a worse kind of Confusion, by attempting to take away some of the most immediate simple Perceptions, and to explain all Approbation, Condemnation, Pleasure and Pain, by some intricate Relations to the Perceptions of the External Senses. In like manner they have treated our Desires or Affections, making the most generous, kind and disinterested of them, to proceed from Self-Love, by some subtle Trains of Reasoning, to which honest Hearts are often wholly Strangers.
Let this also still be remembred, that the natural Dispositions of Mankind will operate regularly in those who never reflected upon them, nor formed just Notions about them. Many are really virtuous who cannot explain what Virtue is. Some act a most generous disinterested Part in Life, who have been taught to account for all their Actions by Self-Love, as their sole Spring. There have been very different and opposite Opinions in Opticks, contrary Accounts have been given of Hearing, voluntary Motion, Digestion, and other natural Actions. But the Powers themselves in reality perform their several Operations with sufficient Constancy and Uniformity, in Persons of good Health, whatever their Opinions be about them. In the same manner our moral Actions and Affections may be in good order, when our Opinions are quite wrong about them. True Opinions however, about both, may enable us to improve our natural Powers, and to rectify accidental Disorders incident unto them. And true Speculations on these Subjects must certainly be attended with as much Pleasure as any other Parts of Human Knowledge.
It may perhaps seem strange, that when in this Treatise Virtue is supposed disinterested; yet so much Pains is taken, by a Comparison of our several Pleasures, to prove the Pleasures of Virtue to be the greatest we are capable of, and that consequently it is our truest Interest to be virtuous. But let it be remembered here, that though there can be no Motives or Arguments suggested which can directly raise any ultimate Desire, such as that of our own Happiness, or publick Affections (as we attempt to prove in Treatise IV;) yet if both are natural Dispositions of our Minds, and nothing can stop the Operation of publick Affections but some selfish Interest, the only way to give publick Affections their full Force, and to make them prevalent in our Lives, must be to remove these Opinions of opposite Interests, and to shew a superior Interest on their side. If these Considerations be just and sufficiently attended to, a natural Disposition can scarce fail to exert itself to the full.
In this Essay on the Passions, the Proofs and Illustrations of this Point, that we have a moral Sense, and a Sense of Honour, by which we discern an immediate Good in Virtue and Honour, not referred to any further Enjoyment, are not much insisted on since they are already laid down in the Inquiry into Moral Good and Evil, in the first and fifth Sections. Would Men reflect upon what they feel in themselves, all Proofs in such Matters would be needless.
Some strange Love of Simplicity in the Structure of human Nature, or Attachment to some favourite Hypothesis, has engaged many Writers to pass over a great many Simple Perceptions, which we may find in ourselves. We have got the Number Five fixed for our external Senses, though a larger Number might as easily be defended. We have Multitudes of Perceptions which have no relation to any external Sensation; if by it we mean Perceptions immediately occasioned by Motions or Impressions made on our Bodies, such as the Ideas of Number, Duration, Proportion, Virtue, Vice, Pleasures of Honour, of Congratulation; the Pains of Remorse, Shame, Sympathy, and many others. It were to be wished, that those who are at such Pains to prove a beloved Maxim, that all Ideas arise from Sensation and Reflection,
had so explained themselves, that none should take their Meaning to be, that all our Ideas are either external Sensations, or reflex Acts upon external Sensations: Or if by Reflection they mean an inward Power of Perception, as Mr. Locke declares expressly, calling it internal Sensation, that they had as carefully examined into the several kinds of internal Perceptions, as they have done into the external Sensations: that we might have seen whether the former be not as natural and necessary and ultimate, without reference to any other, as the latter. Had they in like manner considered our Affections without a previous Notion, that they were all from Self-Love, they might have felt an ultimate Desire of the Happiness of others as easily conceivable, and as certainly implanted in the human Breast, though perhaps not so strong as Self-Love.
The Author hopes this imperfect Essay will be favourably received, till some Person of greater Abilities and Leisure apply himself to a more strict Philosophical Inquiry into the various natural Principles or natural Dispositions of Mankind; from which perhaps a more exact Theory of Morals may be formed, than any which has yet appeared: and hopes that this Attempt, to shew the fair side of the human Temper, may be of some little use towards this great End.
The Author takes nothing in bad part from any of his Adversaries, except that Outcry which one or two of them made against these Principles as opposite to Christianity, though it be so well known that they have been and are espoused by many of the most zealous Christians. There are Answers interspersed in the later Editions to these Objections, to avoid the disagreeable work of Replying or Remarking, in which one is not generally upon his Guard sufficiently to avoid Cavils and offensive Expressions.
The last Treatise had never seen the Light, had not some worthy Gentlemen mistaken some things about the moral Sense alledged to be in Mankind: Their Objections gave Opportunity of farther Inquiry into the several Schemes of accounting for our moral Ideas, which some apprehend to be wholly different from, and independent on, that Sense which the Author attempts to establish in Treat. IV. The following Papers attempt to shew, that all these Schemes must necessarily pre-suppose this moral Sense, and be resolved into it: Nor does the Author endeavour to over-turn them, or represent them as unnecessary Superstructures upon the Foundation of a moral Sense; though what he has suggested will probably shew a considerable Confusion in some of the Terms much used on these Subjects. One may easily see from the great variety of Terms, and diversity of Schemes invented, that all Men feel something in their own Hearts recommending Virtue, which yet it is difficult to explain. This Difficulty probably arises from our previous Notions of a small Number of Senses, so that we are unwilling to have recourse in our Theories to any more; and rather strain out some Explication of moral Ideas, with relation to some other natural Powers of Perception universally acknowledged. The like difficulty attends several other Perceptions, to the Reception of which Philosophers have not generally assigned their distinct Senses; such as natural Beauty, Harmony, the Perfection of Poetry, Architecture, Designing, and such like Affairs of Genius, Taste, or Fancy: The Explications or Theories on these Subjects are in like manner full of Confusion and Metaphor.
To define Virtue by agreeableness to this moral Sense, or describing it to be kind Affection, may appear perhaps too uncertain; considering that the Sense of particular Persons is often depraved by Custom, Habits, false Opinions, Company: and that some particular kind Passions toward some Persons are really pernicious, and attended with very unkind Affections toward others, or at least with a Neglect of their Interests. We must therefore only assert in general, that every one calls that Temper, or those Actions virtuous, which are approved by his own Sense;
and withal, that abstracting from particular Habits or Prejudices, that Temper which desires, and those Actions which are intended to procure the greatest Moment of Good toward the most extensive System to which our Power can reach, is approved as the highest Virtue; and that the universal calm Good-will or Benevolence, where it is the leading Affection of the Soul, so as to limit or restrain all other Affections, Appetites, or Passions, is the Temper which we esteem in the highest Degree, according to the natural Constitution of our Soul: And withal, that we in a lower Degree approve every particular kind Affection or Passion, which is not inconsistent with these higher and nobler Dispositions.
Our moral Sense shews this calm extensive Affection to be the highest Perfection of our Nature; what we may see to be the End or Design of such a Structure, and consequently what is required of us by the Author of our Nature: and therefore if any one like these Descriptions better, he may call Virtue, with many of the Antients, Vita secundum naturam;
or acting according to what we may see from the Constitution of our Nature, we were intended for by our Creator.
If this Moral Sense were once set in a convincing Light, those vain Shadows of Objections against a virtuous Life, in which some are wonderfully delighted, would soon vanish: alledging, that whatever we admire or honour in a moral Species, is the effect of Art, Education, Custom, Policy, or subtle Views of Interest; we should then acknowledge
Quid sumus, & quidnam victuri gignimur. —Pers.
It is true, a Power of Reasoning is natural to us; and we must own, that all Arts and Sciences which are well founded, and tend to direct our Actions, if not to be called Natural, yet are an Improvement upon our Nature: but if Virtue be looked upon as wholly Artificial, there are I know not what Suspicions against it; as if indeed it might tend to the greater Interest of large Bodies or Societies of Men, or to that of their Governors; while yet one may better find his private Interest, or enjoy greater Pleasures in the Practices counted vicious, especially if he has any Probability of Secrecy in them. These Suspicions must be entirely removed, if we have a moral Sense and publick Affections, whose Gratifications are constituted by Nature, our most intense and durable Pleasures.
Gentlemen, who have opposed some other Sentiments of the Author of the Inquiry, seem convinced of a moral Sense. Some of them have by a Mistake made a Compliment to the Author, which does not belong to him; as if the World were any way indebted to him for this Discovery. He has too often met with the Sensus Decori & Honesti, and with the φιλάνθρωπον και αγαθοειδες, to assume any such thing to himself.
Some Letters in the London Journals in 1728, subscribed Philaretus, gave the first Occasion to the Fourth Treatise; the Answers given to them in those weekly Papers bore too visible Marks of the Hurry in which they were wrote, and therefore the Author declined to continue the Debate that way; chusing to send a private Letter to Philaretus, to desire a more private Correspondence on the Subject of our Debate. He was soon after informed, that his Death disappointed the Author's great Expectations from so ingenious a Correspondent. The Objections proposed in the first Section of Treatise IV, are not always those of Philaretus, though the Author endeavoured to leave no Objections of his unanswered; but he also interspersed whatever Objections occurred in Conversation on these Subjects; and has not used any Expressions inconsistent with the high Regard he has for the Memory of so ingenious a Gentleman, and of such Distinction in the World.
In the References, at bottom of Pages, the Inquiry into Beauty is called Treatise I. That into the Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is Treatise II. The Essay on the Passions, Treatise III. And the Illustrations on the moral Sense, Treatise IV.