THE Differences of Actions from which some are constituted morally Good, and others morally Evil, have always been accounted a very important Subject of Inquiry: And therefore, every Attempt to free this Subject from the usual Causes of Error and Dispute, the Confusion of ambiguous Words, must be excusable.
Definitions. In the following Discourse, Happiness denotes pleasant Sensation of any kind, or a continued State of such Sensations; and Misery denotes the contrary Sensations.
Such Actions as tend to procure Happiness to the Agent, are called for shortness, privately useful: and such Actions as procure Misery to the Agent, privately hurtful.
Actions procuring Happiness to others may be called publickly useful, and the contrary Actions publickly hurtful. Some Actions may be both publickly and privately useful, and others both publickly and privately hurtful.
These different natural Tendencies of Actions are universally acknowledged; and in proportion to our Reflection upon human Affairs, we shall enlarge our Knowledge of these Differences.
Two Questions about Morality. When these natural Differences are known, it remains to be inquired into: 1st, What Quality in any Action determines our Election of it rather than the contrary?
Or, if the Mind determines itself, What Motives or Desires excite to an Action, rather than the contrary, or rather than to the Omission?
2dly, What Quality determines our Approbation of one Action, rather than of the contrary Action?
The Words Election and Approbation seem to denote simple Ideas known by Consciousness; which can only be explained by synonimous Words, or by concomitant or consequent Circumstances. Election is purposing to do an Action rather than its contrary, or than being inactive. Approbation of our own Action denotes, or is attended with, a Pleasure in the Contemplation of it, and in Reflection upon the Affections which inclined us to it. Approbation of the Action of another has some little Pleasure attending it in the Observer, and raises Love toward the Agent, in whom the Quality approved is deemed to reside, and not in the Observer, who has a Satisfaction in the Act of approving.[1]
The Qualities moving to Election, or exciting to Action, are different from those moving to Approbation: We often do Actions which we do not approve, and approve Actions which we omit: We often desire that an Agent had omitted an Action which we approve; and wish he would do an Action which we condemn. Approbation is employed about the Actions of others, where there is no room for our Election.
Now in our Search into the Qualities exciting either our Election or Approbation, let us consider the several Notions advanced of moral Good and Evil in both these Respects; and what Senses, Instincts, or Affections, must be necessarily supposed to account for our Approbation or Election.
The Epicurean Opinion. There are two Opinions on this Subject entirely opposite: The one that of the old Epicureans, as it is beautifully explained in the first Book of Cicero, De finibus; which is revived by Hobbes, Rochefocault, and others of the last Century, and followed by many better Writers: That all the Desires of the human Mind, nay of all thinking Natures, are reducible to Self-Love, or Desire of private Happiness: That from this Desire all Actions of any Agent do flow.
Our Christian Moralists of this Scheme introduce other sorts of Happiness to be desired, but still it is the Prospect of private Happiness, which, with some of them, is the sole Motive of Election. And that, in like manner, what determines any Agent to approve his own Action, is its Tendency to his private Happiness in the whole, tho' it may bring present Pain along with it: That the Approbation of the Action of another, is from an Opinion of its Tendency to the Happiness of the Approver, either immediately or more remotely: That each Agent may discover it to be the surest way to promote his private Happiness, to do publickly useful Actions, and to abstain from those which are publickly hurtful: That the neglecting to observe this, and doing publickly hurtful Actions, does mischief to the whole of Mankind, by hurting any one part; that every one has some little damage by this Action: Such an inadvertent Person might possibly be pernicious to any one, were he in his Neighbourhood; and the very Example of such Actions may extend over the whole World, and produce some pernicious Effects upon any Observer. That therefore every one may look upon such Actions as hurtful to himself, and in this view does disapprove them, and hates the Agent. In the like manner, a publickly useful Action may diffuse some small Advantage to every Observer, whence he may approve it, and love the Agent.
Does not answer the Appearances. This Scheme can never account for the principal Actions of human Life:[2] Such as the Offices of Friendship, Gratitude, natural Affection, Generosity, publick Spirit, Compassion. Men are conscious of no such Intentions or acute Reflections about these Actions. Ingenious speculative Men, in their straining to support an Hypothesis, may contrive a thousand subtle selfish Motives, which a kind generous Heart never dreamed of. In like manner, this Scheme can never account for the sudden Approbation, and violent Sense of something amiable in Actions done in distant Ages and Nations, while the Approver has perhaps never thought of these distant Tendencies to his Happiness. Nor will it better account for our want of Approbation toward publickly useful Actions done casually, or only with Intention of private Happiness to the Agent. And then, in these Actions reputed generous, if the Agent's Motive was only a view to his own Pleasure, how come we to approve them more than his enriching himself, or his gratifying his own Taste with good Food? The whole Species may receive a like Advantage from both, and the Observer an equal Share.
Were our Approbation of Actions done in distant Ages and Nations, occasioned by this Thought, that such an Action done toward ourselves would be useful to us, why do not we approve and love in like manner, any Man who finds a Treasure, or indulges himself in any exquisite Sensation, since these Advantages or Pleasures might have been conferred on ourselves; and tend more to our Happiness than any Actions in distant Ages?
The Sanctions of Laws may make any Agent chuse the Action required, under the Conception of useful to himself, and lead him into an Opinion of private Advantage in it, and of detriment in the contrary Actions; but what should determine any Person to approve the Actions of others, because of a Conformity to a Law, if Approbation in any Person were only an Opinion of private Advantage?
The opposite Opinion does plainly. The other Opinion is this, That we have not only Self-Love, but benevolent Affections also toward others, in various Degrees, making us desire their Happiness as an ultimate End, without any view to private Happiness: That we have a moral Sense or Determination of our Mind, to approve every kind Affection either in ourselves or others, and all publickly useful Actions which we imagine flow from such Affection, without our having a view to our private Happiness, in our Approbation of these Actions.
These two Opinions seem both intelligible, each consistent with itself. The former seems not to represent human Nature as it is; the other seems to do it.
Schemes seemingly different from both. There have been many ways of speaking introduced, which seem to signify something different from both the former Opinions. Such as these, that Morality of Actions consists in Conformity to Reason, or Difformity from it:
That Virtue is acting according to the absolute Fitness and Unfitness of Things, or agreeably to the Natures or Relations of Things,
and many others in different Authors. To examine these is the Design of the following Sections; and to explain more fully how the Moral Sense alledged to be in Mankind, must be presupposed even in these Schemes.
See Treat. II. Sect. 2. Parag. ult.
See Treat. III. Sect. 1.