Some do imagine, that to make an Action virtuous, it is necessary that the Agent should have previously known his Action to be acceptable to the Deity, and have undertaken it chiefly with design to please or obey him. We have not, say they, reason to imagine a malicious Intention in many of the worst Actions: the very want of good Affections in their just Degree, must constitute moral Evil. If so, then the moral Evil in the want of Love or Gratitude, must increase in proportion to the Causes of Love or Gratitude in the Object: by the Causes of Love, they mean those Qualities in the Object upon Observation of which Love or Gratitude do arise in every good Temper. Now the Causes of Love toward the Deity are infinite; therefore the want of the highest possible Degree of Love to him, must be infinitely evil.—To be excited more by smaller Motives or Causes than by greater; to love those who are less lovely, while we neglect him in whom are infinite Causes of Love, must argue great Perverseness of Affections. But the Causes of Love in the Deity, his infinite Goodness toward all, and even toward our selves, from whence springs all the Happiness of our Lives, are infinitely above any Causes of Love to be found in Creatures: Therefore to act from Love to them without Intention to please God, must be infinitely evil.
If this Reasoning be just, the best of Men are infinitely evil. The Distinction between habitual and actual Intention will not remove the Difficulty, since these Arguments require actual Intention. An habitual Intention is not a present act of Love to the Deity, influencing our Actions more than actual Love to Creatures, which this Argument requires; but a prior general Resolution not at present repeated.
To find what is just on this Subject, we may premise some Propositions of which Men must convince themselves by Reflection.
How we compute the Goodness of Temper. There is in Mankind such a Disposition naturally, that they desire the Happiness of any known Sensitive Nature, when it is not inconsistent with something more strongly desired; so that were there no Oppositions of Interest either private or publick, and sufficient Power, we would confer upon every Being the highest Happiness which it could receive.
But our Understanding and Power are limited, so that we cannot know many other Natures, nor is our utmost Power capable of promoting the Happiness of many: our Actions are therefore influenced by some stronger Affections than this general Benevolence. There are certain Qualities found in some Beings more than in others, which excite stronger Degrees of Good-will, and determine our Attention to their Interests, while that of others is neglected. The Ties of Blood, Benefits conferredupon us, and the Observation of Virtue in others, raise much more vigorus Affections, than that general Benevolence which we may have toward all. These Qualities or Relations we may call the Causes of Love.
However these Affections are very different from the general Benevolence toward all, yet it is very probable, that there is a Regularity or Proportion observed in the Constitution of our Nature; so that, abstracting from some acquired Habits, or Associations of Ideas, and from the more sudden Emotions of some particular Passions, that Temper which has the most lively Gratitude, or is the most susceptive of Friendship with virtuous Characters, would also have the strongest general Benevolence toward indifferent Persons: And on the contrary, where there is the weakest general Benevolence, there we could expect the least Gratitude, and the least Friendship, or Love toward the Virtuous. If this Proportion be observed, then, if we express all these Desires of the good of others by the Name of Benevolence, we may denote the several Degrees in which Men possess these several kind Dispositions by the Goodness of the Temper: And the Degrees of Desire toward the Happiness of any Person, we may call the Quantity of Love toward him. Then,
The Quantity of Love toward any Person is in a compound Proportion of the apprehended Causes of Love in him, and of the Goodness of Temper in the Observer. Or L = C × G.
When the Causes of Love in two Objects are apprehended equal, the Love toward either in different Persons is as the Goodness of Temper; or L = G × I.
When the Goodness of Temper is the same or equal, the Love toward any Objects will be as the Causes; or L = C × I.
The Goodness of any Temper is therefore as the Quantity of Love, divided by the apprehended Causes, or G = L/C. And since we cannot apprehend any Goodness in having the Degree of Love above the Proportion of its Causes, the most virtuous Temper is that in which the Love equals its Causes, which may therefore be expressed by Unity.[1]
Hence it follows, that if there were any Nature incomparably more excellent than any of our Fellow-Creatures, from whom also we our selves, and all others had received the greatest Benefits; there would be less Virtue in any small Degree of Desire of his Happiness, than in a like Degree of Love toward our Fellow-Creatures. But not loving such a Being, or having a smaller Degree of Love, must evidence a much greater Defect in Virtue, than a like want of Love toward our Fellow-Creature. For the Causes of Love being very great, unless the Love be also very great, the Quotient which expresses the Goodness of Temper will be very much below Unity.
The general Rules applied to the Love of God. To apply this to theDeity is very obvious. Our Affections toward him arise in the same manner as toward our Fellows, in proportion to our Attention to the Causes of Love in him, and the Goodness of our Temper. The Reflection on his Goodness raises Approbation and Complacence, his Benefits raise Gratitude, and both occasion Good-will or Benevolence. Some imagine, that his Happiness is wholly detached from all Events in this World, absolute, and unvaried in himself.
And yet the same Inclination of Mind might remain in us, tho we had this Opinion. When the Happiness of a Friendis in Suspense, we desire it; when he has obtained all that which we desired, the same Inclination of Mindseems to remain toward him, only without that Uneasiness accompanying Desire of an uncertain Object: Thus Gravity may be said to be the same when a Body is resting on a fixed Base, as when it caused descent.
Upon this Scheme of the divine Happiness, it is not easy to account how our Love to him could excite us to promote the Happiness of our Fellows. Our frequent Contemplation of such an amiable excellent Nature, might indeed tend to reform or improve our Temper.
If we imagine that the Deity has such Perceptions of Approbation or Dislike toward Actions as we have our selves, then indeed our Love to him would directly excite us to do whatever he approves, and shun what he condemns. We can scarce avoid imagining, that the frequent recurring of Events disapproved, must be uneasy to any Nature, and that the observing approved Actions must be delightful.
If we imagine that the divine Happiness, or any part of it is connected with the Happiness of his Creatures, so that their Happiness is constituted the Occasion of his; then indeed our Love to the Deity will directly excite us to all manner of beneficent Actions. 'Tis true, many good Men deny these two last Opinions, yet it is probable, when their Minds are diverted from Speculations, by Opportunities of Action, there recurs some Imagination of Offence, Uneasiness, and Resentment in the Deity, upon observing evil Actions; of Delight and Joy in beholding good Actions; of Sorrow upon observing the Misery of his Creatures, and Joy upon seeing them happy: So that by their Love to the Deity they are influenced to beneficent Actions, notwithstanding their speculative Opinions. In our Conceptions of the Deity, we are continually led to imagine a Resemblance to what we feel in our selves.
Whoever maintains these Opinions of the Deity to be true, must also suppose a particular Determination of all Events in the Universe;
otherwise this part of the divine Happiness is made precarious and uncertain, depending upon the undetermined Will of Creatures.
The Diversity of Opinions concerning the divine Happiness, may lead Men into different ways of accounting for the Influence which the Love of God may have upon our Actions toward our Fellows: But the Affections toward the Deity would be much the same upon both Schemes. Where there were the same just Apprehensions of the divine Goodness in two Persons, the Love to the Deity in both would be proportioned to the Goodness of Temper. Tho the highest possible Degree of Love to a perfectly good Deity, would evidence no more Virtue of Temper, than a proportioned Love to Creatures; yet the having only smaller Degrees of Love to the Deity, would evidence a greater Defect of Goodness in the Temper, than any want of Affection toward Creatures.
Here it must be remembred, that in arguing concerning the Goodness of Temper from the Degree of Love directly, and the Causes of Love inversly, actual Attention to the Causes of Love is supposed in the Person. For 'tis plain, that in the best Temper no one Affection or Idea can always continue present, and there can be no Affection present to the Mind, toward any Object, while the Idea of it is not present. The bare Absence therefore of Affection, while the Mind is employed upon a different Object, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther than want of Attention may argue want of Affection. In like manner, in the best Temper, there can be no Love toward an Object unknown: The want therefore of Love to an Object unknown, can argue no evil in the Temper, farther than Ignorance may argue want of Affection. It is certain indeed, that he who knows that there is a good Deity, and actually thinks of him, and of all his Benefits, yet has not the strongest Love and Gratitude toward him, must have a Temper void of all Goodness; but it will not follow, that that Mind is void of Goodness which is not always thinking of the Deity, or actually loving him, or even does not know him. How far the want of Attention to the Deity, and Ignorance of him, may argue an evil Temper, must be shown from different Topicks, to be considered hereafter.
What Degrees of Affection necessary to Innocence. But previously to these Inquiries we must consider what Degrees or Kinds of Affection are necessary to obtain the simple Approbation of Innocence.
'Tis plain, the bare Absence of all Malice is not enough. We may have the general Benevolence toward a mere sensitive Nature, which had no other desire but Self-Love; but we can apprehend no moral Goodness in such a Being: Nay, 'tis not every small Degree of kind Affections which we approve. There must be some proportion of kind Affections to the other Faculties in any Nature, particularly to its Understanding and active Powers to obtain Approbation. Some Brutes evidence small Degrees of Good-will, which make them be approvedin their Kind; but the same Degrees would not be approved in a Man. There is an higher Degree expected in Mankind, to which, if they do not come up, we do not account them innocent. It is not easy to fix precisely that Degree which we approve as innocent by our moral Sense. Every kind Affection, if it be considered only with relation to its own Object, is indeed approved; such as natural Affection, Gratitude, Pity, Friendship: And yet when we take a more extensive View of the Tendency of some Actions proceeding even from these Affections, we may often condemn these Actions when they are apprehended as pernicious to larger Systems of Mankind. In the same manner we often condemn Actions done from Love to a particular Country, when they appear to be pernicious to Mankindin general. In like manner, SelfPreservation and pursuing private Advantage abstractly considered, is innocent: But when it is apprehended as very pernicious in any case to the Safety of others, it is condemned.
Mankind are capable of large extensive Ideas of great Societies. And it is expected of them, that their general Benevolence should continually direct and limit, not only their selfish Affections, but even their nearer Attachments to others: that their Desire of publick Good, and Aversion to publick Misery, should overcome at least their Desire of positive private Advantages, either to themselves or their particular Favourites; so as to make them abstain from any Action which would be positively pernicious or hurtful to Mankind, however beneficial it might be to themselves, or their Favourites. To undergo positive Evil for the sake of positive Goodto others, seems some degree of Virtue above Innocence, which we do not universally expect: But to reject positive attainable 312/318 good, either for our selves or our particular Favourites, rather than occasion any considerable Misery to others, is requisite to obtain the Approbation of Innocence. The want of this Degree we positively condemn as evil; and an Agent must rise above it by positive Services to Mankind, with some Trouble and Expence to himself, before we approve him as virtuous. We seem indeed universally to expect from all Men those good Offices which give the Agent no trouble or expence: Whoever refuses them is below Innocence. But we do not positively condemn those as evil, who will not sacrifice their private Interest to the Advancement of the positive Goodof others, unless the private Interest be very small, and the publick Good very great.
But as the Desire of positive private Goodis weaker than Aversion to private Evil, or Pain; so our Desire of the positive Good of others, is weaker than our Aversion to their Misery: It seems at least requisite to Innocence, that the stronger publick Affection, viz. our Aversion to the Misery of others, should surmount the weaker private Affection, the Desire of positive private Good; so that no prospect of Good to our selves, should engage us to that which would occasion Misery to others. It is in like manner requisite to Innocence, that our Aversion to the Misery of greater or equal Systems, should surmount our Desire of the positive Goodof these to which we are more particularly attached.
How far it may be necessary to Innocence to submit to smaller private Pains to prevent the greater Sufferings of others, or to promote some great positive Advantages; or how far the Happiness of private Systems should be neglected for the Happiness of the greater, in order to obtain the Approbation of Innocence, it is perhaps impossible precisely to determine, or to fix any general Rules; nor indeed is it necessary. Our business is not to find out at how cheap a Rate we can purchase Innocence, but to know what is most noble, generous and virtuous in Life.
This we know consists in sacrificing all positive Interests, and bearing all private Evils for the publick Good: And in submitting also the Interests of all smaller Systems to the Interests of the whole: Without any other Exception or Reserve than this, that every Man may look upon himself as a Part of this System, and consequently not sacrifice an important private Interest to a less important Interest of others. We may find the same sort of Difficulty about all our other Senses, in determining precisely what Objects are indifferent, or where Pleasure ends, and Disgust begins, tho the positive Degrees of the grateful and ungrateful are easily distinguished.
It is also very difficult to fix any precise Degree of Affection toward the Deity, which should be barely requisite to Innocence. Only in general we must disapprove that Temper, which, upon Apprehension of the perfect Goodness of the Deity, and of his innumerable Benefits to Mankind, has not stronger Affections of Love and Gratitude toward him, than those toward any other Being. Such Affections would necessarily raise frequent Attention and Consideration of our Actions; and would engage us, if we apprehended any of them to be offensive to him, or contrary to that Scheme of Events in which we apprehended the Deity to delight, to avoid them with a more firm Resolution than what we had in any other Affairs. Positive Virtue toward the Deity must go farther than a resolute abstaining from Offence, by engaging us with the greatest Vigor, to do whatever we apprehend as positively pleasing, or conducive to those Ends in which we apprehend the Deity delights. It is scarce conceivable that any good Temper can want such Affections toward the Deity, when once he is known, as were above supposed necessary to Innocence. Nor can we imagine positive Degrees of Goodness of Temper above Innocence, where Affections toward the Deity do not arise proportionably.
What is here said relates only to the Apprehensions of our moral Sense, and not to those Degrees of Virtue which the Deity may require by Revelation: And every one's Heart may inform him, whether or no he does not approve, at least as innocent, those who omit many good Offices which they might possibly have done, provided they do a great deal of good; those who carefully abstain from every apprehended Offence toward the Deity, tho they might possibly be more frequent in Acts of Devotion. 'Tis true indeed, the Omission of what we know to be required is positively evil: so that by a Revelation we may be obliged to farther Services than were requisite previously to it, which we could not innocently omit, after this Revelation is known: But we are here only considering our moral Sense.
How far Ignorance of Deity is Evil. Now let us inquire how far simple Ignorance of a Deity, or unaffected Atheism does evidence an evil Disposition, or Defect of good Affections below Innocence.
Affections arising upon apparent Causes, or present Opinions, tho false, if they be such as would arise in the best Temper, were these Opinions true, cannot argue any present want of Goodness in any Temper, of themselves: the Opinions indeed may often argue a want of Goodness at the time they were formed: But to a benevolent Temper there is no Cause of Malice, or Desire of the Misery or Non-existence of any Being for itself. There may be Causes of Dislike, and Desire of Misery or Non-existence, as the Means of greater Good, or of lessening Evil.
No Object which is entirely unknown, or of which we have no Idea, can raise Affection in the best Temper; consequently want of Affection to an unknown Object evidences no evil. This would be the Case of those who never heard even the Report of a Deity, if ever there were any such: Or who never heard of any Fellow-Creatures, if one may make a Supposition like to that made by Cicero.[2] And this is perhaps the Case, as to the Deity, of any unfortunate Children, who may have some little Use of Reason, before they are instructed in any Religion.
If there really were an Innate Idea of a Deity so imprinted, that no Person could be without it; or if we are so disposed, as necessarily to receive this Idea, as soon as we can be called moral Agents: then no Ignorance of a Deity can be innocent; all Atheism must be affected, or an Opinion formed, either thro' evil Affection, or want of good Affection below Innocence. But if the Idea of a Deity be neither imprinted, nor offer itself even previously to any Reflection, nor be universally excited by Tradition, the bare Want of it, where there has been no Tradition or Reflection, cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. Those who make Virtue and Vice relative to a Law, may say, Men are required to reflect, and thence to know a Deity.
But they must allow Promulgation necessary, before Disobedience to a Law can be criminal. Now previously to Reflection it is supposed impossible for the Agent to know the Legislator, or to know the Law requiring him to reflect, therefore this Law requiring him to reflect, was not antecedently to his Reflection published to him.
The Case of human Laws, the Ignorance of which does not excuse, is not parallel to this. No Person under any Civil Government can be supposed ignorant that there are Laws made for the whole State. But in the present Supposition, Men antecedently to Reflection may be ignorant of the Deity, or that there are Laws of Nature. If any Subject could thus be unapprized, that he lived under Civil Government, he should not be accounted Compos Mentis. The Supposition indeed in both Cases is perhaps wholly imaginary; at least as to Persons above Childhood. One can scarce imagine that ever any Person was wholly unapprized of a governing Mind, and of a Right and Wrong in Morals. Whether this is to be ascribed to innate Ideas, to universal Tradition, or to some necessary Determination in our Nature, to imagine a designing Cause of the beautiful Objects which occur to us, with a moral Sense, let the curious inquire.
Suppose an Idea formed in a benevolent Mind, of other sensitive Natures, Desire of their Existence and Happiness would arise.
A good Temper would incline any one to wish, that other Natures were benevolent, or morally Good, since this is the chief Happiness.
A good Temper would desire that the Administration of Nature were by a benevolent or good Mind.
All Desire of any Event or Circumstance inclines any Mind to search into the Truth of that Event or Circumstance, by all the Evidence within its power to obtain.
Where there is such Desire, and sufficiently obvious Evidence given in proportion to the Sagacity of the desiring Mind, it will come to the Knowledge of the Truth, if its Desire be strong.
Now from these Propositions we may deduce the following Corollaries.
Supposing the Idea of a good Deity once apprehended, or excited either by Report, or the slightest Reflection; if there be objective Evidence in Nature proportioned to the Capacity of the Inquirer, for the Existence of a good Deity, Atheism directly argues want of good Affection below Innocence.
If there be only the simple Tradition or Presumption of a governing Mind once raised; and if there be Evidence as before for his Goodness, to conclude the Deity evil or malicious, must argue want of good Affection as before.
Suppose the Idea of an evil Deity once excited, and some Presumptions for his Malice from Tradition, or slight Reflection upon particular Evils in Nature; to rest in this Opinion without Inquiry, would argue want of good Affection; to desire to reject this Opinion, or confute it by contrary Evidence, would argue good Affection: Suppose such contrary Evidences obvious enough in Nature to one who inquired as diligently about it as about his own Interest; to continue in the false Opinion cannot be innocent.
How Ignorance in human Affairs evidences a bad Temper. In like manner concerning our Fellow-Creatures, who are actually known to us.
To imagine Fellow-Creatures morally Good, either according to Evidence upon Inquiry, or even by a rash Opinion, evidences good Affection.
Imagining them Evil contrary to obvious Evidence, argues want of good Affection below Innocence.
Retaining and inculcating an Opinion either of the Causes of Love in others, or of the Causes of Aversion, induces an Habit; and makes the Temper prone to the Affection often raised. Opinion of Goodness in the Deity and our Fellows, increases good Affection, and improves the Temper: Contrary Opinion of either, by raising frequent Aversions, weakens good Affection, and impairs the Temper.
This may shew how cautious Men ought to be in passing Sentence upon the Impiety of their Fellows, or representing them as wicked and profane, or hateful to the Deity, and justly given over to eternal Misery: We may see also what a wise Mark it is to know the true Church by, that it pronounces Damnation on all others.
Which is one of the Characters of the Romish Church, by which it is often recommended as the safest for Christians to live in.
The same Propositions may be applied to our Opinions concerning the natural Tendencies of Actions. Where the Evidence is obvious as before, good Affection will produce true Opinions, and false Opinions often argue want of good Affection below Innocence. Thus, tho in Assent or Dissent of themselves, there can neither be Virtue nor Vice, yet they may be Evidencesof either in the Agent, as well as his external Motions. 'Tis not possible indeed for Men to determine precisely in many cases the Quantity of Evidence, and its proportion to the Sagacity of the Observer, which will argue Guilt in him, who contrary to it, forms a false Opinion. But Men are no better judges of the Degrees of Virtue and Vice in external Actions. This therefore will not prove that all false Opinions or Errors are innocent, more than external Actions: The Searcher of Hearts can judge exactly of both. Human Punishments are only Methods of Self-Defence; in which the Degrees of Guilt are not the proper Measure, but the Necessity of restraining Actions for the Safety of the Publick.
How want of Attention evidences a bad Temper. It is next to be considered, how far want of Attention to the Deity can argue want of good Affections, in any Agent, to whom he is known.
Every good Temper will have strong Affections to a good Deity, and where there is strong Affection there will be frequent Reflection upon the Object beloved, Desire of pleasing, and Caution of offence. In like manner every Person of good Temper, who has had the Knowledge of a Country, a System, a Species, will consider how far these great Societies may be affected by his Actions, with such Attention as he uses in his own Affairs; and will abstain from what is injurious to them.
Attention to a Deity apprehended as good, and governing the Universe, will increase the Moment of Beneficence in any good Agent, various ways, such as by Prospects of Reward, either present or future, by improving his Temper thro' Observation of so amiable a Pattern, or by raising Sentiments of Gratitude toward the Deity, a part of whose Happiness the Agent may imagine depends upon the Happiness of the Universe. In like manner, the considering a Species or System may increase our good Offices, since their Interests are advanced by good Offices to Individuals.
But then from a like Reasoning to that in Art. II. 'tis plain, that in equal Moments of good produced by two Agents, the Goodness of the Temper is inversly as the several additional Helps, or Motives to it. So that more Virtue is evidenced by any given Moment of Beneficence from good Affections only toward our Fellows, or particular Persons, than by the same Moment produced from the joint Considerations of the Deity, or of a general System or Species.[3]
But an injurious Action which appeared to the Agent not only pernicious to his Fellows, or to particular Persons, but offensive to the Deity, and pernicious to a System, is much more vicious than when the Agent did not reflect upon the Deity, or a Community.
Nothing in this Scheme supersedes the Duty of Love to the Deity, and general Benevolence. We must not hence imagine, that in order to produce greater Virtue in our selves, we should regard the Deity no farther, then merely to abstain from Offences. Were it our sole Intention in beneficent Actions, only to obtain the private Pleasure of Self-Approbation for the Degree of our Virtue, this might seem the proper Means of having great Virtue with the least Expence. But if the real Intention, which constitutes an Action virtuous, be the promoting publick Good; then voluntarily to reject the Consideration of any Motive which would increase the Moment of publick Good, or would make us more vigorous and stedfast in Virtue, must argue want of good Affection. In any given Moment of Beneficence, the unaffected Want of Regard to the Deity, or to private Interest, does really argue greater Virtue. But the retaining these Motives with a View to increase the Moment of publick Good in our Actions, if they really do so, argues Virtue equal to, or greater than that in the former Case: And the affected Neglect of these Motives, that so we may acquit our selves virtuously with the least Expence to our selves, or with the least Moment of publick Good, must evidence want of good Affections, and base Trick and Artifice to impose upon Observers, or our own Hearts. Therefore
Since Gratitude to the Deity, and even Consideration of private Interest, tend to increase the Moment of our Beneficence, and to strengthen good Affections, the voluntary Retaining them with this View evidences Virtue, and affecting to neglect them evidences Vice.[4] And yet,
If the Moment produced by the Conjunction of these Motives, be not greater than that produced with unaffected Neglect of these Motives, from particular good Affection, there is less Virtue in the former than in the latter.
Men may use Names as they please, and may chuse to call nothing Virtue but what is intended chiefly to evidence Affection of one kind or other toward the Deity.
Writers on this Scheme are not well agreed about what this virtuous Intention is; whether only to evidence Submission, or Submission and Love, or to obtain the divine Benevolence, and private Happiness to the Agent, or to give Pleasure to the Deity. But let them not assert, against universal Experience, that we approve no Actions which are not thus intended toward the Deity. 'Tis plain, a generous compassionate Heart, which, at first view of the Distress of another, flies impatiently to his Relief, or spares no Expence to accomplish it, meets with strong Approbation from every Observer who has not perverted his Sense of Life by School-Divinity, or Philosophy. 'Tis to be suspected, that some Vanity must be at the Bottom of these Notions, which place Virtue in some Nicety, which active Tempers, have not leisure to apprehend, and only the Recluse Student can attain to.
To be led by a weaker Motive, where a stronger is alike present to the Mind, to love a Creature more than God, or to have stronger Desires of doing what is grateful to Creatures than to God, when we equally attend to both, would certainly argue some Perversion of our Affections; or to study the particular Goodof one, more than that of a System, when we reflected on both: But as no finite Mindcan retain at once a Multiplicity of Objects, so it cannot always retain any one Object. When a Person therefore not thinking at present of the Deity, or of a Community or System, does a beneficent Action from particular Love, he evidences Goodness of Temper. The bare Absence of the Idea of a Deity, or of Affections to him, can evidence no evil; otherways it would be a Crime to fall asleep, or to think of any thing else: If the bare Absence of this Idea be no evil, the Presence of kind Affections to FellowCreatures cannot be evil. If indeed our Love to the Deity excited to any Action, and at the same time Love to a Creature excited to the Omission of it, or to a contrary Action, we must be very criminal if the former do not prevail; yet this will not argue all Actions to be evil in which pleasing the Deity, is not directly and chiefly intended. Nay, that Temper must really be very deficient in Goodness, which needs to excite it to any good Office, to recal the Thoughts of a Deity, or a Community, or a System. The frequent recalling these Thoughts, indeed, does strengthen all good Affections, and increases the Moment of Beneficence to be expected from any Temper; and with this View frequently to recal such Thoughts, must be one of the best Helps to Virtue, and evidence high Degrees of it. Nay, one cannot call that Temper entire and complete, which has not the strongest Affection toward the greatest Benefactor, and the most worthy Object.
Beings of such Degrees of Knowledge, and such Extent of Thought, as Mankind are not only capable of, but generally obtain, when nothing interrupts their Inquiries, must naturally arise to the Knowledge of theDeity, if their Temper be good. They must form general Conceptions of the whole, and see the Order, Wisdom, and Goodness in the Administration of Nature in some Degree. The Knowledge and Love of the Deity, the universal Mind , is as natural a Perfection to such a Being as Man, as any Accomplishment to which we arrive by cultivating our natural Dispositions; nor is that Mind come to the proper State and Vigor of its kind, where Religion is not the main Exercise and Delight.
Whether the Deity is the sole proper Object of Love. There is one very subtle Argument on this Subject. Some alledge, That since the Deity is really the Cause of all the Good in the Universe, even of all the Virtue, or good Affection in Creatures, which are the seeming Causes of Love toward them, it must argue strange Perversion of Temper to love those in whom there is no Cause of Love, or who are (as they affect to speak) nothing, or Emptiness of all Goodness. TheDeity alone is amiable, in whom there is infinite Fulness of every amiable Quality. The Deity, say they, not without some Reason, is the Cause of every pleasant Sensation, which he immediately excites according to a general Law, upon the Occasion of Motions arising in our Bodies; that likewise he gave us that general Inclination, which we modify into all our different Affections; God therefore, say they, is alone lovely. Other Things are not to be beloved, but only the Goodness of God appearing in them; nay some do make the loving of them, without considering God as displaying his Goodness in them, to be infinitely evil.
In answer to this it must be owned, that God's being the Cause of all the Good in the Universe, will no doubt raise the highest Love to him in a good Temper, when it reflects upon it.
But 1st, had all Men this Apprehension that there was no good in any Creature,
they really would not love them at all. But Men generally imagine with very good ground, that there are good Beings distinct from God, tho produced by him: And whether this Opinion be true or false, it evidences no evil.
As upon this Scheme God is the Cause of all pleasant Sensation, so is he the Cause of all Pain: He is, according to them, the Cause of that Inclination which we modify into evil Affection, as well as into good. If then we are to love God only, for what we call good Affection in Creatures, and not the Creatures themselves, we must also only love God upon observing evil Affections in Creatures, and have no Aversion to the basest Temper, since God gave the general Inclination alike in both Cases.
If we may suppose real Beings distinct from God, that their Affections are not God' s Affections, if God is not the only Lover and Hater, if our moral Sense is determined to approve kind Affections, and our Love or Benevolence must arise toward what we approve; or if we find an Instinct to desire the Happiness of every sensitive Nature, we cannot avoid loving Creatures, and we must approve any kind Affections observed in others toward their Fellows. 'Tis true, we must approve the highest Affections toward the Deity, and condemn, as a Deficiency of just Affections toward God any Degree which is not superior to our other Affections. But still, Affections towards Creatures, if they be distinct Natures from God, must be approved.
If to make a Mind virtuous, or even innocent, it be necessary that it should have such sublime Speculations of God, as the τὸ πα̑ν in the Intellectual active System (if we call one Agent in many Passive Organs an active System) then God has placed the Bulk of Mankind in an absolute Incapacity of Virtue, and inclined them perpetually to infinite Evil, by their very Instincts and natural Affections. Does the parental Affection direct a Man to love the Deity, or his Children? Is it the Divinity, to which our Pity or Compassion is directed? Is God the Object of Humanity? Is it a Design to support the Divinity, which we call Generosity or Liberality? Upon Receipt of a Benefit, does our Nature suggest only Gratitude toward God ? Affections toward the Deity may indeed often accompany Affections toward Creatures, and do so in a virtuous Temper: but these are distinct Affections. This Notion of making all virtuous Affections to be only directed toward God, is not suggested to Men by any thing in their Nature, but arises from the long subtle Reasonings of Men at leisure, and unemployed in the natural Affairs of Life.
If there be no Virtue or Cause of Love in Creatures, it is vain for them to debate wherein their Virtue consists, whether in regard toward the Deity, or in any thing else, since they are supposed to have none at all.
To conclude this Subject. It seems probable, that however we must look upon that Temper as exceedingly imperfect, inconstant, and partial, in which Gratitude toward the universal Benefactor, Admiration and Love of the supreme original Beauty, Perfection and Goodness, are not the strongest and most prevalent Affections; yet particular Actions may be innocent, nay virtuous, where there is no actual Intention of pleasing the Deity, influencing the Agent.
See Treat. 2. Sect. 3. Art. II. last Paragraph.In many Questions of this Nature we must have recourse with Aristotle to a Sense, which is the last Judge in particular Cases.318
De Nat. Deor. Lib. 2. cap. 37. Ex Aristotele.
See Luke x. 12, 13, 14.
This may sufficiently justify the Writers of Morality in their proving, that Virtue is the surest Means of Happiness to the Agent.
'Tis also plain from universal Experience, that a Regard to the Deity, frequent Reflection on his Goodness, and consequent Acts of Love, are the strongest and most universally prevailing Means of obtaining a good Temper. Whatever Institution therefore does most effectually tend to raise Mens Attention, to recall their Minds from the Hurry of their common Affairs, to instruct them in the Ways of promoting publick Good farther than the busy Part of the World without assistance would probably apprehend, must be so wise and good, that every honest Mind should rejoice in it, even though it had no other Authority than human to recommend it. Every one will understand that by this is meant a publick Worship on set Days, in which a stop is put to Commerce, and the busy part of Mankind instructed in the Duties of Piety and Humanity.