HAVING considered how far these Desires must necessarily affect us, and when they are the Occasions of Pleasure or Pain; since by the first general Observation, the Pursuits of the several Pleasures, and the avoiding the several Pains, may often be inconsistent with each other; let us next examine, which of these several Pleasures are the most valuable, so as to deserve our Pursuit, even with neglect of the others; and which of these Pains are most grievous, so as to be shunned even by the enduring of other Pains if necessary.
The Value of any Pleasure, and the Quantity or Moment of any Pain, is in a compounded Proportion of the Intenseness and Duration.
In examining the Duration of Pleasure, we must include not only the Constancy of the Object, but even of our Fancy; for a Change in either of these will put an end to it.
The difficulty in comparing the several Pleasures, as to Intenseness. To compare these several Pleasures and Pains as to their Intenseness, seems difficult, because of the Diversity of Tastes, or Turns of Temper given by Custom and Education, which make strange Associations of Ideas, and form Habits; from whence it happens, that, tho' all the several kinds of original Senses and Desires seem equally natural, yet some are led into a constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of one kind, as the only Enjoyment of Life, and are indifferent about others. Some pursue, or seem to pursue only the Pleasures of the external Senses, and all other Pursuits are made subservient to them: Others are chiefly set upon the Pleasures of Imagination or internal Senses; social and kind Affections employ another sort, who seem indifferent to all private Pleasure: This last Temper has generally joined with it an high moral Sense, and Love of Honour. We may sometimes find an high Sense of Honour and desire of Applause, where there is indeed a moral Sense, but a very weak one, very much perverted, so as to be influenced by popular Opinion, and made subservient to it: In this Character the Pleasures of the external Senses, or even of the Imagination, have little room, except so far as they may produce Distinction. Now upon comparing the several Pleasures, perhaps the Sentence of the Luxurious would be quite opposite to that of the Virtuous. The Ambitious would differ from both. Those who are devoted to the internal Senses or Imagination, would differ from all the three. The Miser would applaud himself in his Wealth above them all. Is there therefore no disputing about Tastes? Are all Persons alike happy, who obtain the several Enjoyments for which they have a Relish? If they are, the Dispute is at an end: A Fly or Maggot in its proper haunts, is as happy as a Hero, or Patriot, or Friend, who has newly delivered his Country or Friend, and is surrounded with their grateful Praises. The Fly or Maggot may think so of itself; but who will stand to its Judgment, when we are sure that it has experienced only one sort of Pleasure, and is a stranger to the others? May we not in like manner find some Reasons of appealing from the Judgment of certain Men? Or may not some Characters be found among Men, who alone are capable of judging in this matter?
The Pleasures of a moral Kind proved superior by the Testimony of the Virtuous. It is obvious that those alone are capable of judging, who have experienced all the several kinds of Pleasure, and have their Senses acute and fully exercised in them all.
Now a high Relish for Virtue, or a strong moral Sense, with its concomitant publick Sense and Affections, and a Sense of Honour, was never alledged to impair our external Senses, or to make us incapable of any pleasure of the Imagination; Temperance never spoiled a good Palate, whatever Luxury may have done; a generous affectionate publick Spirit, reflecting on itself with delight, never vitiated any Organ of external Pleasure, nor weakened their Perceptions. Now all virtuous Men have given Virtue this Testimony, that its Pleasures are superior to any other, nay to all others jointly; that a friendly generous Action gives a Delight superior to any other; that other Enjoyments, when compared with the Delights of Integrity, Faith, Kindness, Generosity, and publick Spirit, are but trifles scarce worth any regard.[1]
By the Testimony of the Vicious. Nay, we need not confine our Evidence to the Testimony of the perfectly Virtuous. The vicious Man, tho' no fit judge, were he entirely abandoned, since he loses his Sense of the Pleasures of the moral Kind, or at least has not experienced them fully, yet he generally retains so much of human Nature, and of the Senses and Affections of our Kind, as sometimes to experience even moral Pleasures. There is scarce any Mortal, who is wholly insensible to all Species of Morality.
A Debauchee has never perhaps felt the Pleasures of a wise publick-spirited Conduct, of an entirely upright, generous, social, and affectionate Life, with the Sense of his own moral Worth, and merited Esteem and Love; this course of Life, because unknown to him, he may despise in comparison of his Pleasures. But if in any particular Affair, a moral Species, or Point of Honour has affected him, he will soon despise his sensual Pleasures in comparison of the Moral. Has he a Person whom he calls his Friend, whom he loves upon whatever fantastick Reasons, he can quit his Debauch to serve him, nay can run the Hazard of Wounds and Death to rescue him from Danger? If his Honour be concerned to resent an Affront, will he not quit his Pleasures, and run the hazard of the greatest bodily Pain, to shun the Imputation of Cowardice or Falshood? He will scorn one who tells him, that a Lyar, or a Coward, may be happy enough, while he has all things necessary to Luxury.
It is in vain to alledge, that there is no disputing about Tastes:
To every Nature there are certain Tastes assigned by the great Author of all. To the human Race there are assigned a publick Taste, a moral one, and a Taste for Honour. These Senses they cannot extirpate, more than their external Senses: They may pervert them, and weaken them by false Opinions, and foolish Associations of Ideas; but they cannot be happy but by keeping them in their natural State, and gratifying them. The Happiness of an Insect or Brute, will only make an Insect or Brute happy. But a Nature with further Powers, must have further Enjoyments.
Nay, let us consider the different Ages in our own Species. We once knew the time when an Hobby-Horse, a Top, a Rattle, was sufficient Pleasure to us. We grow up, we now relish Friendships, Honour, good Offices, Marriage, Offspring, serving a Community or Country. Is there no difference in these Tastes? We were happy before, are we no happier now? If not, we have made a foolish Change of Fancy. Our former toys we more easily procured, kept in good order, and managed, than the present Objects of our Cares, an Employment, a Son, a Friend, a Country, a Party. But this Change of Fancy does not depend upon our Will. Our Nature determines us to certain Pursuits in our several Stages; and following her Dictates, is the only way to our Happiness. Two States may both be happy, and yet the one infinitely preferable to the other: Two Species may both be content, and yet the Pleasures of the one, greater beyond all comparison, than those of the other.
The virtuous Man, who has as true a Sense of all external Pleasure as any, gives the preference to moral Pleasures. The Judgment of the Vicious is either not to be regarded, because of his Ignorance on one side; or, if he has experience of moral Sentiments in any particular Cases, he agrees with the Virtuous.
Experience proves the same. Again, we see in fact, that in the virtuous Man, publick Affections, a moral Sense, and Sense of Honour, actually overcome all other Desires or Senses, even in their full Strength. Here there is the fairest Combate, and the Success is on the side of Virtue.
There is indeed an obvious Exception against this Argument. Do not we see, in many Instances, the external Senses overcome the moral?
But the Reply is easy. A constant Pursuit of the Pleasures of the external Senses can never become agreeable, without an Opinion of Innocence, or the Absence of moral Evil; so that here the moral Sense is not engaged in the Combat. Do not our[2] Debauchees, among their Intimates, continually defend their Practices as innocent? Transient Acts of Injustice may be done, contrary to the moral Sentiments of the Agent, to obtain relief from some pressing Evil, or upon some violent Motion of Appetite: and yet even in these cases, Men often argue themselves into some moral Notions of their Innocence. But for a continued Course of Life disapproved by the Agent, how few are the Instances? How avowedly miserable is that State, wherein all Self-Approbation, all consciousness of Merit or Goodness is gone? We might here also alledge, what universal Experience confirms, that not only an Opinion of Innocence is a necessary Ingredient in a Course of selfish Pleasures, so that there should be no Opposition from the moral Sense of the Agent; but that some publick Affections, some Species of moral Good, is the most powerful Charm in all sensual Enjoyments.
And yet, on the other hand, Publick Affections, Virtue, Honour, need no Species of sensual Pleasure to recommend them; nor even an Opinion or Hope of Exemption from external Pain. These powerful Forms can appear amiable, and engage our Pursuit thro' the rugged Paths of Hunger, Thirst, Cold, Labour, Expences, Wounds and Death.
Thus, when a Prospect of external Pleasure, or of avoiding bodily Pain, engages Men into Actions really evil, the moral Sense of the Agent is not really overcome by the external Senses. The Action or Omission does not appear morally evil to the Agent. The Temptation seems to extenuate, or wholly excuse the Action. Whereas when a Point of Honour, or a moral Species, makes any one despise the Pleasures or Pains of the external Senses, there can be no question made of a real Victory. The external Senses represent these Objects in the same manner, when they are conquered. None denies to the Virtuous their Sense of Pain, Toil or Wounds. They are allowed as lively a Sense as others, of all external Pleasure of every kind. The Expences of Generosity, Humanity, Charity and Compassion, are allowed, even when yielded to Virtue, to be known to the full. But the moral Sense, weak as it often is, does not yield even to known external Pleasure, Ease or Advantage: but, where there is a depraved Taste, and a weak Understanding, private Advantage, or the avoiding of some external Evil, may make Actions appear innocent, which are not; and then the moral Sense gives no Opposition. All the Conquest on such Occasions is only this, that private external Advantage surmounts our Aversion to Dishonour, by making us do Actions which others will censure, but we esteem innocent. In these Cases we generally fear only the Reproach of a Party, of whom we have conceived an unfavourable Opinion.[3]
Nay farther: It was before observed, that fantastick Associations of Ideas do not really increase the Pleasure of Enjoyment, however they increase the previous Desire. The want of such Associations does not abate the external Pain, tho' it diminishes the previous Fear, or takes away some farther Fears which may attend the Pain. So that a Man of the most correct Imagination does feel and know all the Good in external Pleasure, and all the Evil in Pain. When therefore the moral Sense, and publick Affections, overcome all sensual Pleasure, or bodily Pain, they do it by their own Strength, without foreign Aids. Virtue is never blended with bodily Pleasure, nor Vice with bodily Pain in our Imaginations. But when the external Senses seem to prevail against the moral Sense, or publick Affections, it is continually by Aid borrowed from the moral Sense, and publick Affections themselves, or from our Sense of Honour.
The Conquest is over a weakned moral Sense, upon partial views of Good, not by external Pleasure alone, but by some moral Species, raised by a false Imagination.
Set before Men in the clearest Light all external Pleasures, but strip them of their borrowed Notions of Dignity, Hospitality, Friendship, Generosity, Liberality, Communication of Pleasure; let no regard be had to the Opinions of others, to Credit, to avoiding Reproach, to Company: Separate from the Pursuit of Wealth all Thoughts of a Family, Friends, Relations, Acquaintance; let Wealth be only regarded as the Means of private Pleasure of the external Senses, or of the Imagination, to the Possessor alone; let us divide our confused Ideas,[4] and consider things barely and apart from each other: and in opposition to these Desires, set but the weakest moral Species, and see if they can prevail over it. On the other hand, let us examine as much as we please, a friendly, generous, grateful, or publick-spirited Action; divest it of all external Pleasure, still it will appear the more lovely; the longer we fix our Attention to it, the more we admire it. What is it which we feel in our own Hearts, determining as it were our Fate as to Happiness or Misery? What sort of Sensations are the most lively and delightful? In what sort of Possessions does the highest Joy and Self-Satisfaction consist? Who has ever felt the Pleasure of a generous friendly Temper, of mutual Love, of compassionate Relief and Succour to the distressed; of having served a Community, and rendered Multitudes happy; of a strict Integrity, and thorough Honesty, even under external Disadvantages, and amidst Dangers; of Congratulation and publick Rejoicing, in the Wisdom and Prosperity of Persons beloved, such as Friends, Children, or intimate Neighbours? Who would not, upon Reflection, prefer that State of Mind, these Sensations of Pleasure, to all the Enjoyments of the external Senses, and of the Imagination without them?[5]
Our Judgments in the Case of others proves the same. The truth, in a Question of this nature, one might expect would be best known by the Judgment of Spectators, concerning the Pursuits of others. Let them see one entirely employed in Solitude, with the most exquisite Tastes, Odors, Prospects, Painting, Musick; but without any Society, Love or Friendship, or any Opportunity of doing a kind or generous Action; and see also a[6] Man employed in protecting the Poor and Fatherless, receiving the Blessings of those who were ready to perish, and making the Widow to sing for Joy; a Father to the Needy, an Avenger of Oppression; who never despised the Cause of his very Slave, but considered him as his Fellow-Creature, formed by the same Hand; who never eat his Morsel alone, without the Orphan at his Table, nor caused the Eyes of the Poor to fail; who never suffered the Naked to perish, but warmed them with the Fleece of his Sheep; who never took advantage of the Indigent in Judgment, thro' Confidence in his own Power or Interest; Let this Character be compared with the former; nay, add to this latter some considerable Pains of the external Senses, with Labour and kind Anxiety: which of the two would a Spectator chuse? Which would he admire, or count the happier, and most suitable to human Nature? Were he amusing himself with imaginary Scenes of Life, or were he advising a Son, or a Friend, which of these States would he chuse or recommend? Such a Trial would soon discover the Prevalence of the moral Species above all Enjoyments of Life.
Little Happiness in malicious Pleasures. There are a sort of Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense, arising from the Gratification of Anger or Hatred. To compare these Pleasures with those of Benevolence, we must observe what holds universally of all Mankind. The Joy, and Gaiety, and Happiness of any Nature, of which we have formed no previous Opinion, either favourable or unfavourable, nor obtained any other Ideas than merely that it is sensitive, fills us with Joy and Delight: The apprehending the Torments of any such sensitive Nature, gives us Pain. The Poets know how to raise delight in us by such pastoral Scenes, they feel the Power of such pleasing Images: they know that the human Heart can dwell upon such Contemplations with delight; that we can continue long with Pleasure, in the View of Happiness of any Nature whatsoever. When we have received unfavourable Apprehensions of any Nature, as cruel and savage, we begin indeed from our very publick Affections, to desire their Misery as far as it may be necessary to the Protection of others.
But that the Misery of another, for its own sake, is never grateful, we may all find by making this Supposition: That had we the most savage Tyger, or Crocodile, or some greater Monster of our own Kind, a Nero, or Domitian, chained in some Dungeon; that we were perfectly assured they should never have power of doing farther Injuries; that no Mortal should ever know their Fate or Fortunes, nor be influenced by them; that the Punishments inflicted on them would never restrain others by Way of example, nor any Indulgence shown be discovered; that the first Heat of our Resentment were allayed by Time—No Mortal, in such a Case, would incline to torture such wretched Natures, or keep them in continual Agonies, without some prospect of Good arising from their Sufferings. What farther would the fiercest Rage extend to, if once the Tyrant, thus eternally confined from Mischief, began himself to feel Remorse and Anguish for his Crimes? Nay, did he continue without Reflection on his past Life, so as neither to betray Remorse nor Approbation, were Mankind well secured against his Temper, who would delight to load him with useless Misery?
If the Misery of others then be not grateful for itself, whence arises the Pleasure of Cruelty and Revenge? The Reason is plainly this: Upon apprehending Injury to ourselves or others, Nature wisely determines us to study Defense, not only for the present, but for the future. Anger arises with its most uneasy Sensations, as every one acknowledges. The Misery of the Injurious allays this furious Pain. Our Nature scarce leads to any farther Resentment, when once the Injurious seems to us fully seized with Remorse, so that we fear no farther Evils from him, or when all his Power is gone. Those who continue their Revenge further, are prepossessed with some false Opinion of Mankind, as worse than they really are; and are not easily inclined to believe their hearty Remorse for Injuries, or to think themselves secure. Some Point of Honour, or Fear of Reproach, engages Men in cruel Acts of Revenge: But this farther confirms, that the Misery of another is only grateful as it allays, or secures us against a furious Pain; and cannot be the Occasion, by itself, of any Satisfaction. Who would not prefer Safety from Injury, to the having revenged an Injury? Who would not chuse an untainted Reputation, for Courage gained in a just War, in which, without Hatredor Anger, we acted from Love of our Country, rather than the Fame acquired by asserting our questioned Courage with furious Anger in a Duel, and with continued Hatred toward the Person conquered? Who can dwell upon a Scene of Tortures, though practised upon the vilest Wretch; or can delight either in the Sight or Description of Vengeance, prolonged beyond all necessity of Self-Defense, or publick Interest? The Pleasure of Revenge then is to the Pleasures of Humanity and Virtue, as the flaking the burning, and constantly recurring Thirst of a Fever, to the natural Enjoyments of grateful Food in Health.
Moral Evil compared with other Evils, appears greater. Were we to compare, in like manner, the Pains of the publick and moral Sense, and of the Sense of Honour, with other Pains of the external Senses, or with the greatest external Losses, we should find the former by far superior. And yet nothing is more ordinary, than to find Men, who will allow the Pleasures of the former Classes superior to any other, and yet look upon external Pain as more intollerable than any.
There are two Reasons for this Mistake. Causes of Mistake. 1. They compare the most acute Pains of the external Senses with some smaller Pains of the other Senses.
Whereas, would they compare the strongest of both Kinds, they would find the Ballance on the other side. How often have Parents, Husbands, Friends, Patriots, endured the greatest bodily Pains, to avoid the Pains of their publick and moral Sense, and Sense of Honour? How do they every day suffer Hunger, Thirst, and Toil, to prevent like Evils to those they love? How often do Men endure, for their Party or Faction, the greatest external Evils, not only when they are unavoidable, but, when by counter-acting their publick or moral Sense, or Sense of Honour, they could extricate themselves? Some Crimes appear so horrid, some Actions so cruel and detestable, that there is hardly any Man but would rather suffer Death, than be conscious of having done them.
The second Cause of Mistake in this Matter, is this, The avoiding moral Evil by the Sufferance of external Pain, does not diminish the Sense of the Pain; but on the other hand, the Motive of avoiding grievous Pain, really diminishes the moral Evil in the Action done with that design.
So that in such Instances we compare external Pain in its full strength, with a moral Pain of the lighter sort, thus alleviated by the Greatness of the Temptation[7]. To make a just Comparison, it should be thus: Whether would a Man chuse to be tortured to Death, or to have, without any Temptation or Necessity, tortured another, or a dear Friend, or Child to Death?
Not whether a Man will betray his Friend or Country, for fear of Tortures, but whether it be better voluntarily, and under no fear, to betray a Friend, or our Country, than to suffer Tortures, or the Pain of the Gout or Stone equal to Tortures?
Upon such Comparisons as these, we should find some other Pains and Misery superior to any external Pain. When we judge of the State of others, we would not be long in suspense which of these Evils to chuse as the lightest for those whom we[8] most regarded.
Publick Affections compared with our Desire of Virtue. We have hitherto only compared on the one side the publick and moral Sense, and the Sense of Honour jointly, with the external Senses, the Pleasures of Imagination, and external Advantage or Disadvantage jointly. The reason of joining them thus must be obvious, since, to a Mind not prepossessed with any false Apprehensions of things, the former three Senses and Desires really concur, in exciting to the same Course of Action; for promoting the publick Good, can never be opposite to private Virtue; nor can the Desire of Virtue ever lead to any thing pernicious to the Publick: Had Men also true Opinions, Honour could only be obtained by Virtue, or serving the Publick.
But since there may be some corrupt partial Notions of Virtue, as when Men have inadvertently engaged themselves into some Party or Faction pernicious to the Publick, or when we mistake the Tendencies of Actions, or have some Notions of the Deity,[9] as requiring some Actions apprehended pernicious to the publick, as Duties to himself; in such cases there is room to compare our publick Sense or Desires with our moral, to see which is prevalent. The Pleasures of these Senses, in such cases, need not be compared; the following either the one or the other will give little Pleasure: The Pain of the counteracted Sense will prevent all Satisfaction. This State is truly deplorable, when a Person is thus distracted between two noble Principles, his publick Affections, and Sense of Virtue. But it may be enquired, which of these Senses, when counteracted, would occasion the greater Pain? Perhaps nothing can be answered universally on either side. With Men of recluse contemplative Lives, who have dwelt much upon some moral Ideas, but without large extensive View of publick Good, or without engaging themselves to the full in the publick Affections, and common Affairs of Life, the Sense of Virtue, in some partial confined View of it, would probably prevail; especially since these partial Species of Virtue have always some sort of kind Affection to assist them. With active Men, who have fully exercised their publick Affections, and have acquired as it were an Habit this way, it is probable the publick Affections would be prevalent. Thus we find that active Men, upon any publick Necessity, do always break through the limited narrow Rules of Virtue or Justice, which are publickly received, even when they have scarce any Scheme of Principles to justify their Conduct: Perhaps, indeed, in such cases, their moral Sense is brought over to the Side of their Affections, though their speculative Opinions are opposite to both.
The Moral Sense compared with the Sense of Honour. It is of more consequence to compare the publick and moral Senses, in opposition to the Sense of Honour. Here there may be direct Opposition, since Honour is conferred according to the moral Notions of those who confer it, which may be contrary to those of the Agent, and contrary to what he thinks conducive to the publick Good.
To allow the Prevalence of Honour, cannot with any Person of just Reflection, weaken the Cause of Virtue, since Honour presupposes[10] a moral Sense, both in those who desire it, and those who confer it. But it is enough for some Writers, who affect to be wondrous shrewd in their Observations on human Nature, and fond of making all the World, a selfish Generation, without any natural Disposition toward a Publick Interest, or toward any moral Species; to get but a Set of different Words from those commonly used, yet including the same natural Dispositions,[11] or presupposing them, however an inadvertent Reader may not observe it; and they are sufficiently furnished to shew, that there is no real Virtue, that all is but Hyppocrisy, Disguise, Art, or Interest. To be honoured, highly esteemed, valued, praised, or on the contrary, to be despised, undervalued, censured or condemned; to be proudor ashamed, are Words without any meaning, if we take away a moral Sense.
Let this Sense be as capricious, inconstant, different in different Persons as they please to alledge, a Sense of Morality there must be, and natural it must be, if the Desire of Esteem, Pride or Shame be natural.
To make this comparison between the publick and moral Senses on the one hand, and that of Honour on the other, it is to be observed, that all Aversion to Evil is stronger than Desire of positive Good. There are many sorts of positive Good, without which one may be easy, and enjoy others of a different kind: But Evil of almost any kind, in a high Degree, may make Life intolerable. The avoiding of Evil is always allowed a more extenuating Circumstance in a Crime, than the Prospect of positive Good: to make therefore just Comparisons of the Prevalence of several Desires or Senses, their several Goods should be opposed to each other, and their Evils to each other, and not the Pleasures of one compared with the Pains of another.
Publick Affections, in their nearer Ties, frequently overcome not only the Pleasures of Honour, but even the Pains of Shame. This is the most common Event in Life, that for some apprehended Interest of Offspring, Families, Friends, Men neglect Opportunities of gaining Honour, and even incur Shame and Contempt. In Actions done for the Service of a Party, there can be no comparison, for Honour is often a Motive on both sides.
It is also certain, that the Fear of Shame, in some Instances, will overcome all other Desires whatsoever, even natural Affection, Love of Pleasure, Virtue, Wealth, and even of Life itself. This Fear has excited Parents to the Murder of their Offspring; has persuaded Men to the most dangerous Enterprizes; to squander away their Fortunes, to counteract their Duty, and even to throw away their Lives. The Distraction and Convulsion of Mind observable in these Conflicts of Honour, with Virtue and publick Affection, shows how unnatural that State is, wherein the strongest Principles of Action, naturally designed to co-operate and assist each other, are thus set in Opposition.
It is perhaps impossible to pronounce any thing universally concerning the Superiority of the Desire of Honour on the one hand, or that of the Desire of Virtue and publick Good on the other. Habits or Custom may perhaps determine the Victory on either side. Men in high Stations, who have long indulged the Desire of Honour, and have formed the most frightful Apprehensions of Contempt as the worst of Evils; or even those in lower Stations, who have been long enured to value Reputation in any particular, and dread Dishonour in that point, may have Fear of Shame superior to all Aversions. Men, on the contrary, who have much indulged good Nature, or reflected much upon the Excellency of Virtue itself, abstracted from Honour, may find Affections of this kind prevalent above the Fear of Shame.
To compare the moral Sense with the Sense of Honour, we must find cases where the Agent condemns an Action with all its present Circumstances as evil, and yet fears Infamy by omitting it, without any unequal Motives of other kinds on either side: Or when one may obtain Praise by an Action, when yet the Omission of it would appear to himself as considerable a Virtue, as the World imagines the Action to be. The common Instances, in which some, who pretend deep Knowledge of human Nature, triumph much, have not these necessary Circumstances. Duels no proper Instances. When a Man condems Duelling in his private Sentiments, and yet practices it, we have indeed a considerable Evidence of the Strength of this Desire of Honour, or Aversion to Shame, since it surpasses the Fear of Death. But here on one hand, besides the Fear of Shame, there is the Fear of constant Insults, of losing all the Advantages depending upon the Character of Courage, and sometimes even some Species of Virtue and publick Good, in restraining an insolent Villain: On the other hand is the Fear of Death. The moral Sense is seldom much concerned: for however Men may condemn voluntary Duelling; however they may blame the Age for the Custom, or censure the Laws as defective, yet generally, in their present Case, Duelling appears a necessary Piece of Self-Defence, against opprobrious Injuries and Affronts, for which the Law has provided no Redress, and consequently leaves Men to the natural Rights of Self-Defence and Prosecution of Injuries. The Case seems to them the same with that of Thieves and Night-Robbers, who may be put to Death by private Persons, when there is no hope of overtaking them by Law. These are certainly the Notions of those who condemn Duelling, and yet practise it.
It is foreign to our present Purpose, to detect the Fallacy of these Arguments, in defence of Duels, when Men from a sudden Anger, upon some trifling or imaginary Affronts the despising of which would appear honourable in every wise Man's Eyes, expose themselves, and often their dearest Friends to Death, and hazard the Ruin of their own Families, as well as that of their Adversary; though the Success in such Attempts can have no tendency to justify them against the dishonourable Charge, or to procure any Honour from Men of worth.
Nor the Case of Lucretia. The magnified Instance of Lucretia[12] is yet less to our purpose. Some talk, as if she indeed would rather have died than consented to the Crime; but the Crime did not appear so great an Evil as the Dishonour; to the Guilt she submitted to avoid the Shame.
Let us consider this renowned Argument. Was there then no Motive on either side, but Fear of Shame, and a Sense of Duty? If we look into the Story, we shall find, that to persuade her to consent, there conspired, beside the Fear of Shame, and of Death, which she little regarded, the Hope of noble Revenge, or rather of Justice on the Ravisher, and the whole Tyrant's Family; nay, the Hopes of a nobler Fame by her future Conduct; the Fear of suffering that contumely by force, which she was tempted to consent to, and that in such a manner as she could have had no Redress. All these Considerations concurred to make her consent. On the other side, there was only the moral Sense of a Crime thus extenuated by the most grievous Necessity, and by hopes of doing Justice to her Husband's Honour, and rescuing her Country: Nay, could she not have at once saved her Character and her Life by consenting; when in that virtuous Age she might have expected Secrecy in the Prince, since boasting of such Attempts would have been dangerous to the greatest Man in Rome?
It is not easy to find just Room for a Comparison even in fictitious Cases, between these two Principles. Were there a Person who had no Belief of any Deity, or of any reality in Religion, in a Country where his secular Interest would not suffer by a Character of Atheism; and yet he knew that the Profession of zealous Devotion would tend to his Honour: If such a Person could have any Sense of Morality, particularly an Aversion to Dissimulation, then his Profession of Religion would evidence the Superiority of the Sense of Honour; and his Discovery of his Sentiments, or Neglect of Religion, would evidence the Ballance to be on the other side. I presume in England and Holland, we have more Instances of the latter than the former. It is true, our Gentlemen who affect the Name of Freedom, may have now their Hopes of Honour from their own Party, as well as others.
The Adherence to any particular Religion by one in a strange Country, where it was dishonourable, would not be allowed a good Instance of the Prevalence of a moral Species; it is a very common thing indeed, but here are Interests of another Life, and Regard to a future Return to a Country where this Religion is in repute.
The Pleasures of Imagination greater than those of external Senses. The Pleasures of the internal Senses, or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, who have any tolerable Taste of them, as a much superior Happiness to those of the external Senses, though they were enjoyed to the full.
Other Comparisons might be made but with less use, or certainty in any general Conclusions, which might be drawn from them.
The Pleasures of Wealth or Power, are proportioned to the Gratifications of the Desires or Senses, which the Agent intends to gratify by them: So that, for the Reasons above offered, Wealth and Power give greater Happiness to the Virtuous, than to those who consult only Luxury or external Splendor. If these Desires are grown enthusiastick and habitual, without regard to any other end than Possession, they are an endless Source of Vexation, without any real Enjoyment; a perpetual Craving, without Nourishment or Digestion; and they may surmount all other Affections, by Aids borrowed from other Affections themselves.
The fantastick Desires are violent, in proportion to the Senses from which the associated Ideas are borrowed. Only it is to be observed, that however the Desires may be violent, yet the obtaining the Object desired gives little Satisfaction; the Possession discovers the Vanity and Deceit, and the Fancy is turned toward different Objects, in a perpetual Succession of inconstant Pursuits.
A Comparison of the several Pleasures as to Duration. These several kinds of Pleasure or Pain are next to be compared as to their Duration. Here we are not only to consider the Certainty of the Objects occasioning these Sensations, but the Constancy of our Relish or Fancy.
The Objects necessary to remove the Pains of Appetite, and to give as grateful external Sensations as any others, to a Person of a correct Imagination, may be universally secured by common Prudence and Industry. But then the Sensations themselves are short and transitory; the Pleasure continues no longer than the Appetite, nor does it leave any thing behind it, to supply the Intervals of Enjoyment. When the Sensation is past, we are no happier for it, there is little pleasure in Reflection; and that almost solely arises from the return of Appetite; and some Prospect of repeated Enjoyment, or some moral Notions of Love or Friendship or Communication of Pleasure: without these the Remembrance of past sensual Enjoyments is more generally nauseous. Nor are past Sensations any security against, or support under either external Pain, or any other sort of evil incident to us. If we keep these Senses pure, and unmixed with foreign Ideas, they cannot furnish Employment for Life: If foreign Ideas come in, the Objects grow difficult and uncertain, and our Relish or Fancy full of Inconstancy and Caprice.
In like manner, the Pleasures of the Imagination may be enjoyed by all, and be a sure Foundation of Pleasure, if we abstract from Property, and keep our Imagination pure. Such are the Pleasures in the Observation of Nature, and even the Works of Art; which are ordinarily exposed to view. But as these give less Pleasure the more familiar they grow, they cannot sufficiently employ or entertain Mankind, much less can they secure us against, or support us under the Calamities of Life, such as Anger, Sorrow, Dishonour, Remorse, or external Pain. If the monstrous or trifling Taste take place, or the Ideas of Property, they may indeed give sufficient Employment, but they bring along with them little Pleasure, frequent Disgusts, Anxieties, and Disappointments, in the acquiring and retaining their Objects.
The publick Happiness is indeed, as to external Appearance, a very uncertain Object; nor is it often in our power to remedy it, by changing the Course of Events. There are perpetual Changes in Mankind from Pleasures to Pains, and often from Virtue to Vice. Our publick Desires must therefore frequently subject us to Sorrow; and the Pleasures of the publick Sense must be very inconstant. 'Tis true indeed, that a general Good-will to our kind, is the most constant Inclination of the Mind, which grows upon us by Indulgence; nor are we ever dissatisfied with it: the Incertainty therefore is wholly owing to the Objects. If there can be any Considerations found out to make it probable, that in the Whole all Events tend to Happiness, this implicit Hope indeed may make our publick Affections the greatest and most constant Source of Pleasure. Frequent Reflection on this, is the best Support under the Sorrow arising from particular evils, befalling our Fellow-Creatures. In our nearer Attachments brought upon ourselves, we may procure to ourselves the greatest Enjoyments of this kind, with considerable Security and Constancy, by chusing for our Friends, or dearest Favourites, Persons of just Apprehensions of Things, who are subjected only to the necessary Evils of Life, and can enjoy all the certain and constant Good. And in like manner, our Attachment to a Country may be fixed by something else than the Chance of our Nativity. The Enjoyments of the publick Sense cannot indeed secure us against bodily Pains or Loss; but they are often a considerable Support under them. Nothing can more allay Sorrow and Dejection of Mind for private Misfortunes, than good Nature, and Reflection upon the Happiness of those we love.
The moral Sense, if we form true Opinions of the Tendencies of Actions, and of the Affections whence they spring, as it is the Fountain of the most intense Pleasure, so it is in itself constant, not subject to Caprice or Change. If we resolutely incourage this Sense, it grows more acute by frequent Gratification, never cloys, nor ever is surfeited. We not only are sure never to want Opportunities of doing good, which are in almost every one's power in the highest Degree;[13] but each good Action is Matter of pleasant Reflection as long as we live. These Pleasures cannot indeed wholly secure us against all kinds of Uneasiness, yet they never tend naturally to increase them. On the contrary, their general Tendency is to lead the virtuous Agent into all Pleasures, in the highest Degree in which they are consistent with each other. Our external Senses are not weakened by Virtue, our Imaginations are not impaired; the temperate Enjoyment of all external Pleasures is the highest. A virtuous Conduct is generally the most prudent, even as to outward Prosperity. Where Virtue costs us much, its own Pleasures are the more sublime. It directly advances the Pleasures of the publick Sense, by leading us to promote the publick Happiness as far as we can; and Honour is its natural and ordinary Attendant. If it cannot remove the necessary Pains of Life, yet it is the best Support under them. These moral Pleasures do some way more nearly affect us than any other: They make us delight in ourselves, and relish our very Nature. By these we perceive an internal Dignity and Worth; and seem to have a Pleasure like to that ascribed often to the Deity, by which we enjoy our own Perfection, and that of every other Being.
It may perhaps seem too metaphysical to alledge on this Subject, that other Sensations are all dependent upon, or related by the Constitution of our Nature, to something different from ourselves; to a Body which we do not call Self, but something belonging to this Self. That other Perceptions of Joy or Pleasure carry with them Relations to Objects, and Spaces distinct from this Self; whereas the Pleasures of Virtue are the very Perfection of this Self, and are immediately perceived as such, independent of external Objects.
Our Sense of Honour may afford very constant Pleasures by good Oeconomy: If our moral Sense be not perverted; if we form just Apprehensions of the Worth of others, Honour shall be pleasant to us in a compound Proportion of the Numbers and Worth of those who confer it. If therefore we cannot approve ourselves to all, so as to obtain universal Honour among all to whom we are known, yet there are still Men of just Thought and Reflection, whose Esteem a virtuous Man may procure. Their Dignity will compensate the Want of Numbers, and support us against the Pains of Censure from the Injudicious.
The Inconstancy of the Pleasures of Wealth and Power is well known, and is occasioned, not perhaps by Change of Fancy, for these Desires are found to continue long enough, since they tend toward the universal Means of gratifying all other Desires; but by the Uncertainty of Objects or Events necessary to gratify such continually increasing Desires as these are, where there is not some fixed View different from the Wealth or Power itself. When indeed they are desired only as the Means of gratifying some other well-regulated Desires, we may soon obtain such a Portion as will satisfy us. But if once the End be forgotten, and Wealth or Power become grateful for themselves, no farther Limits are to be expected: the Desires are insatiable, nor is there any considerable Happiness in any given Degree of either.
The Durations of the several Pains considered. Were we to consider the Duration of the several Pains, we may find it generally as the Duration of their Pleasures. As to the external Senses, the old Epicurean Consolation is generally just: Where the Pain is violent, it shortens our Duration; when it does not shorten our Duration, it is generally either tolerable, or admits of frequent Intermissions;
and then, when the external Pain is once past, no Mortal is the worse for having endured it. There is nothing uneasy in the Reflection, when we have no present Pain, or fear no Return of it.
The internal Senses are not properly Avenues of Pain. No Form is necessarily the Occasion of positive Uneasiness.
The Pains of the moral Sense and Sense of Honour, are almost perpetual. Time, the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us least Relief from them. All other Pleasures are made insipid by these Pains, and Life itself an uneasy Burden. Our very Self, our Nature is disagreeable to us. 'Tis true, we do not always observe the Vicious to be uneasy. The Deformity of Vice often does not appear to those who continue in a Course of it. Their Actions are under some Disguise of Innocence, or even of Virtue itself. When this Mask is pulled off, as it often happens, nor can any vicious Man prevent its happening, Vice will appear as a Fury, whose Aspect no Mortal can bear. This we may see in one Vice, which perhaps has had fewer false or fantastick Associations of favourable Ideas than any, viz. Cowardice, or such a selfish Love of Life, and Aversion to Death, or to the very Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from serving his Country or his Friend, or supporting his own Reputation. How few of our gay Gentlemen can bear to be reputed Cowards, or even secretly to imagine themselves void of Courage? This is not tolerable to any, how negligent soever they may be about other Points in Morality. Other Vices would appear equally odious and despicable, and bear as horrid an Aspect, were they equally stript of the Disguises of Virtue. A vicious Man has no other Security against the Appearances of this terrifying Form, than Ignorance or Inadvertence. If Truth break in upon him, as it often must, when any Adversity stops his intoxicating Pleasures, or Spectators use Freedom with his Conduct, he is rendered perpetually miserable, or must fly to the only Remedy which Reason would suggest, all possible Reparation of Injuries, and a new Course of Life, the Necessity of which is not superseded by any Remedy suggested by the Christian Revelation.
The Pains of the publick Sense are very lasting. The Misery of others, either in past or present Ages, is matter of very uneasy Reflection, and must continue so, if their State appears in the whole absolutely Evil. Against this there is no Relief but the Consideration of a good-governing Mind, ordering all for good in the whole, with the Belief of a future State, where the particular seeming Disorders are rectified.
A firm Persuasion of these Things, with strong publick Affections interesting us strongly in this Whole, and considering this Whole as one great System, in which all is wisely ordered for good, may secure us against these Pains, by removing the Opinion of any absolute Evil.
The Pains arising from foolish Associations of moral Ideas, with the Gratifications of external Senses, or with the Enjoyment of Objects of Beauty or Grandeur, or from the Desires of Property, the Humour of Distinction, may be as constant as the Pains of the Senses from which these Ideas are borrowed. Thus what we gain by these Associations is very little. The Desires of Trifles are often made very strong and uneasy; the Pleasures of Possession very small and of short Continuance, only till the Object be familiar, or the Fancy change: But the Pains of Disappointment are often very lasting and violent.
Would we guard against these Associations, every real Pleasure in Life remains, and we may be easy without these things, which to others occasion the greatest Pains.
Gemmas, Marmor, Ebur, Tyrrhena Sigilla, Tabellas,
Argentum, vestes Getulo Murice tinctas,
Est qui non habet, est qui nec curat habere. Hor.
See this Argument in Plato de Repub. Lib. IX. And Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.
Treat. II. Sect. 4. Art. 4. last Paragraph.
Sect. 4. Art. 3.
See Marcus Antoninus, Lib. III. c. II. and often elsewhere.
See this Subject fully treated, in the second Part of Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue.
See the Character of Job, ch. xxxi. See also Treat. II. Sect. 6.
Treat. II. Sect. 7, 9. Cor. 3.
Treat. II. Sect. 6. Art. 1.
Such mistaken Notions of Religion, and of some particular moral Species, have produced these monstrous Decisions or Apothegms; viz. Some Actions are not lawful, though they were necessary not only to universal temporal Happiness, but to the eternal Salvation of the whole World, or to avoid universal eternal Misery.
Fiat Justitia & ruat Caelum.
Whereas the only Reason why some Actions are looked upon as universally and necessarily Evil, is only this, that in our present Constitution of Nature, they cannot possibly produce any good, prepollent to their evil Consequences.
Whatever Action would do so, in the whole of its Effects must necessarily be good. This Proposition is Identick.
See Treat. II. Sect. 5. Art. 4.
Livy, Lib. I. c. 57.
Treat. 2. Sect. 3. last Paragraph.