§. 9. BUT against what we have delivered (that the least Creature conceivable, hath in it Infinite Creatures; so that the least Particle of Body or Matter may be Infinite ways extended, and divided into parts less, and yet still lesser, and lesser) some may frame this following Objection. That which is actually divisible, so far as an actual division can any ways be made, is divisible into parts indiscerpible; but Matter or Body (to wit, that Matter that is entire or compound) is actually divisible so far as an actual division can any ways be made, therefore, &c. I Answer, this Argument labours under that fallacy which Logicians call Compositiones non Componendorum, which is a Conjunction of Words, or Terms, that imply a contradiction or absurdity, and that appears in this Term, actually divisible, which signifies one and the same thing to be divided, and not to be divided; for Actually denotes Division, and Divisible not Division, but only a capacity to be divided, which is as absurd and contradictory, as if one should say visibly blind, or sensibly insensible, or livingly dead; but if by the Terms Actually Divisible, they do not mean two, but only one thing, to wit, that it is either really divided, or only divisible, we shall easily discover the Fallacy: For, First, if by Actually Divisible, they mean nothing else but that which is divided, in this sence I grant the Major, to wit, that that which is really divided, so far as an actual division can any ways be made, is divisible into parts indiscerpible; but by the same reason the Minor is false, viz. that Matter is divided so far as an Actual Division can possibly be made. But, Secondly, if by that which they call Actually Divisible, they mean a thing only divisible, or in which there is a power or capacity to be so divided: Now I deny the Major, to wit, That that which is divisible, so far as division can be made, is divisible into parts indiscerpible; and besides in this sence, that proposition is merely Tautological, and a needless repetition of the same thing, just as this would be; whatsoever can be removed out of its place, in as much as it can be removed, may be removed to some certain distance; but London or Rome may be removed out of their place, in as much as they may be removed, Ergo, &c. By the same way of Argument may be proved, that the Soul of Man consists of a Finite Number of Years only, in which it doth exist, or hath a Being, and consequently that it is Mortal, and hath an end; to wit, thus, that whose Time or Duration is actually divisible, so far as an actual division can possibly be made, shall have an end, and is divisible into a Finite Number of Years; but the Time or Duration of the Soul is actually divisible, so far as an actual division can possibly be made, Ergo, &c. But if it be denied, that the Time of the Soul (if it should come to such a division of Years) shall then have an end; but that it is possible for it to re-assume another Time after this First, and so ad infinitum. Now, I say the same, which is, that Matter if it should come to such a division, may indeed have an end of that division; but yet may admit of another division after this First, and so ad infinitum. And here is to be noted, when I say the least Particle of Body, or Matter so called, may be always divided into parts, less, ad infinitum; so that no actual division can be made in any Matter, which is not always farther divisible, or capable to be divided into less parts, and that without end; yet I would not hereby determine, what the Absolute Power of God will or can do; as some do vainly and grosly dispute; but only hint what the Power of God probably may do, or will do, so far as he operates in and with his Creatures, to wit, in as much as in all Productions, and Generations, as also in all Resolutions and Divisions, in the Nature of Bodies, or the Creature, he never divides nor never can divide any Body into such small parts, that each of these is not always capable of a farther division; for the Body of no Creature can ever be reduced into its least parts; yea, into such that it cannot be reduced back again, either by the most subtile operation of any Creature, or created Power: And this Answer may suffice to our present purpose: For God makes no division in any Body or Matter, but so far as he co-operates with the Creatures, and therefore he never reduces Creatures into their least parts; because then all Motion and Operation in Creatures would cease; (for it is the Nature of all Motion to wear and divide a thing into subtiler parts;) for to do this would be contrary to the Wisdom and Goodness of God; for if all Motion and Operation should cease in any particular Creature, that Creature would be altogether unprofitable and useless in the Creation, and so would be no better than if it were a mere non ens, or nothing. But as was said before, God cannot do that which is contrary to his Wisdom and Goodness, or any of his Attributes. [Mathematical Division of Things, is never made in Minima; but Things may be Physically divided into their least parts; as when Concrete Matter is so far divided that it departs into Physical Monades, as it was in the first State of its Materiality. Concerning the Production of Matter, see Kab. denud. Tom. 1. Part 2. pag. 310. following; and Tom. 2. the last Tract, pag. 28. Numb. 4, 5. then it is again fit to resume its Activity, and become a Spirit, as it happens in our Meats.]